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Abstract
Recent evidence has shown that monetary policy has a neutral real effect in the long run.
Exploiting the short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment creates an infla-
tion bias which can be eliminated at a high economic and social cost. Hence, the only
variable that could be controlled by the monetary authority in the long run is the inflation
rate. This indicates that the monetary policy’s role should be placed on achieving the goal
of price stability. This thesis considers two monetary regimes with a quantitative target
for the goal of price stability. It consists of four separate yet related empirical studies on
inflation targeting and a fixed exchange rate system.
First, we assess the institutional preconditions for adopting inflation targeting: central
bank independence and transparency, in Jordan, where the credibility of low inflation is
imported from abroad. These institutional requirements are assessed based on the experi-
ence of two inflation targeters that act as a benchmark of the study: New Zealand and the
UK, in their first year of implementing the framework. The chapter addresses the insti-
tutional challenges of adopting inflation targeting when a country faces a macroeconomic
trilemma of exchange rate stabilisation. The assessment of central bank independence,
using the index of Mathew (2003), indicates that the central bank of Jordan is not in-
dependent as stated by the central bank’s personal legislations. The central bank is also
not fiscally independent; non-securitised and securitised lending is offered at no cost to
cover the expenditure of the central government as well as the public corporations. The
assessment of central bank transparency using the index of Eijffinger and Geraats (2006)
shows that although providing the market with more transparent policies will not be in-
feasible, given the enhancement in the level of central bank independence, the central
bank should clarify the policy changes and any inclination of preferences and release all
relevant macroeconomic data to the public. Comparing the overall results to the two
inflation targeters, the study recommends the need to grant the central bank more per-
sonal independence and induce more fiscal discipline which entails non-moneterisation of
the government deficit in order to build a domestic reputation for the goal of price stability.
Second, the interest rate pass through is examined within its intermediate lag of ac-
tion to shed light on the credibility of monetary policy in Jordan, where the reputation
of low inflation is imported through a fixed exchange rate system to the U.S dollar. The
Johansen approach is performed to estimate the long-run degree of pass-through along
with the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium. The parsimonious conditional dynamic
model of Hendry and Doornik (1994) is employed to connect the short-run and long-run
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effect, and to estimate the mean lag of adjustment under (a)symmetric market response.
The results are compared to that of two inflation targeting countries at time proceeding
building the credibility of price stability domestically: New Zealand and the UK. This is to
show how far Jordan is from building a domestic reputation for the goal of price stability.
The empirical findings suggest that the interest rate pass-through in Jordan is weak and
slow and the symmetric mean lags in the loan and deposit market are highly sticky. In
addition, a deviation from symmetry is found in the loan market, where the mean lag is
sticker to decreasing, which indicates the existence of non-competitive pricing behaviour
in the market. Comparing the results to the two inflation targeters, the study suggests
that Jordan needs to move to a more resilient exchange rate arrangement, provided the
need for an intensive reform in economic constitutions and institutions.
Third, we examine the credibility of the current experience of a pegged exchange rate
system to the US dollar in eleven emerging market economies: Bahamas, Bahrain, Bar-
bados, Belize, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and Venezuela, over the
annual span from 1996 to 2012. Based on the first generation-demand mismanagement
models, the second generation of currency crises and the empirical works on the European
Monetary System crisis, two proxies reflecting the market agents’ realignment expectations
are employed: the interest rate differential and the exchange rate market pressure index.
The two proxies are regressed on a set of macro-fundamentals derived from the theory and
empirical works of currency crises and gathered from the IMF-IFS and the World Bank
Indicators. The analysis is based on unbalanced panel data models: fixed effects and first
difference GMM. We construct different setups to consider the small sample size at hand
and the nexus between current account and money stock as in the notion implied by the
monetary approach to balance of payments, in which a balance of payments deficit results
from excessive domestic credit creation. When interest rate differential is used as a proxy
for the credibility, both panel models provide evidence that inflation differential is the
main driving force for generating realignment expectations, and explains why anchoring
interest rates in not feasible for soft fixed exchange rate targeting countries. This result is
consistent with the empirical findings on the credibility of the European Monetary System
before the collapse. However, when the exchange rate market pressure index is used as
a proxy for the credibility, none of the fundamentals appear significant in explaining the
realignment expectations. When we examine the credibility in the countries which have
not experienced a shift in monetary regime during the study period: Bahamas, Bahrain,
Barbados, Belize, Jordan, Oman, the estimation of the fixed effects model suggests that
inflation differential is a vital factor of the credibility. The deterioration in current account
and the reserve adequacy also appear to be important indicators for expecting realignment
iv
from the parity condition in these countries.
Fourth, we investigate the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty un-
der inflation targeting and a fixed exchange rate system and examine the role of both
regimes in lowering inflation rate and inflation uncertainty. We utilise monthly data on
consumer price index obtained from the IMF-IFS for the period 01:1980-06:2014 and
construct different GARCH in mean models. The findings suggest that the hypotheses
of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Friedman (1977) and Ball et al. (1990) are valid
under the two monetary regimes, that is, inflation uncertainty increases inflation and infla-
tion generates inflation uncertainty, respectively. The results provide evidence that both
regimes could reduce inflation uncertainty; however, it could be argued that the impact of
exchange rate targeting on inflation uncertainty holds as long as the possibility to renege
on the fixed parity commitment is not perceived by the market. The results also indicate
that inflation targeters have been successful at reducing the inflation rate and inflation
persistence more than fixed exchange rate targeting countries, where the regime has no
impact on lowering average inflation and inflation inertia.
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Chapter 1
Thesis Introduction
At the beginning of the last century, policy activists believed that monetary policy could
keep productivity and unemployment close to their full-employment levels. However, ex-
ploiting the relationship between inflation and unemployment failed to reduce unemploy-
ment rates and rather resulted in higher inflation rates, which were eliminated at a high
economic and social cost. This is because attempting to increase inflation decreases unem-
ployment temporarily as the new level of prices is not perceived by the market. Once wage
earners and employers adjust to inflation, unemployment returns back to its natural rate
but at a higher inflation rate. Friedman (1968)and Phelps (1968) state that the relation-
ship between inflation and unemployment, or the expectations augmented Phillips curve,
is vertical in the long run. Hence, the only variable that can be controlled by the monetary
authority in the long run is the inflation rate. In the absence of constrained discretion or
the dominance of active monetary policy, the temptation to exploit the trade-off between
inflation and unemployment results in inflation bias as suggested by the time inconsis-
tency problem by Kydland and Prescott (1977)and Barro and Gordon (1983). It follows
that the emphasis should be placed on the goal of price stability. In 1990, the goal of
price stability received the explicit priority with the introduction of inflation targeting by
New Zealand. The need for a low-inflation framework which could suppress inflation and
provide the leverage over the political inflationary bias encouraged a number of middle
and high income countries to adopt inflation targeting. The foremost aspect of inflation
targeting is the announcement of a forward-looking inflation target. Providing the market
with an explicit quantitative target like the changes in consumer prices eases the public
understanding and anchors their inflation expectations. In fact, inflation targeting is built
on high institutional arrangements and constitutions related to central bank independence
and transparency as well as the existence of a well-developed financial market. These ar-
rangements allow building the credibility of low inflation domestically instead of importing
it from abroad.
Over the last century, the majority of countries have abandoned different fixed ex-
change rate arrangements either discretionary or involuntarily. Since ever, the foreign-
built credibility of price stability has been questioned. The first generation models, led by
Krugman (1979), and the majority of the post-crisis literature on the European Monetary
System suggest that the collapse of fixed exchange rate systems happens due to demand
mismanagement. This implies that one or more weak macro fundamentals could generate
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successful speculative attacks. On the other hand, advocates of the escape clause mod-
els tend to believe that the past currency crises happened due to self-fulfilling prophecy.
This view is challenged on the basis that animal spirit scenarios would not generate if
macroeconomic factors were well-behaved. In general, recent evidence suggests that even
when a fixed exchange rate system does not collapse, deteriorations in the level of nominal
interest rates, foreign reserves loss and/or exchange rate devaluation or revaluation often
take place (Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2003).
However, fixed exchange rate systems are still a prominent option among emerging
market economies for setting the credibility of monetary policy. In fact, inflation target-
ing and fixed exchange rate regimes provide the market with a quantitative target for the
nominal prices through which inflation expectations can be settled (Canavan and Tom-
masi, 1997) (Herrendorf, 1999). Announcing a quantitative target for monetary policy is
the first aspect of transparency, which could eliminate the market uncertainty about fu-
ture inflation (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2010). Indeed, it is believed that many of inflation
costs come from the uncertainty about future inflation. Bernanke et al. (1999) states that
“ many of the cost of inflation arise from its uncertainty or variability rather than from
its level”. Hence, a monetary regime should be effective in reducing inflation uncertainty
along inflation rate. The nexus between inflation and inflation uncertainty has received
heavy attention after the Nobel lecture of Friedman (1977), in which he states that in-
flation increases inflation uncertainty. This notion of a positive causality from inflation
to inflation uncertainty is supported by Ball (1992). However, Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) argue that inflation uncertainty raises the level of inflation rate, whereas Holland
(1995), points out the possibility of a negative nexus between inflation uncertainty and
inflation as a result of monetary authority stabilising reaction to high inflation.
This thesis consists of four independent chapters related to inflation targeting and a
conventional fixed exchange rate system. The first chapter assesses the existence of the
institutional requirements for a successful move from a fixed exchange rate system to infla-
tion targeting for the case of Jordan. The chapter highlights the degree of development of
the economic institutions and constitutions as well as the transparency of monetary policy
when the monetary credibility is imported from abroad. Therefore, the chapter identifies
the challenges to build a domestic monetary reputation which is crucially fundamental to
adopt inflation targeting when the economy anchors inflation expectations on a foreign
base. The preconditions for adopting inflation targeting: central bank independence and
central bank transparency are measured, using the index of Mathew (2003) and Eijffinger
and Geraats (2006), respectively, and the results are compared to two inflation targeting
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role models in their early days of implementing inflation targeting. The second chapter
examines the credibility of monetary policy in Jordan under the current fixed exchange
rate system to the U.S dollar and assesses the reputation of monetary policy and the
degree of development of the financial market, which is fundamental to achieve the goal
of price stability domestically. We create a benchmark by comparing the results of the
current credibility of monetary policy in Jordan to that of New Zealand and the UK prior
to their transition to inflation targeting.
The third chapter examines the credibility of the most recent experience of the con-
ventional fixed exchange rate to the U.S. dollar, based on the empirical literature of the
European Monetary System and the first and second generation models of currency crises.
It is intended to point out whether the current fixed exchange rate system is different from
the past pegged exchange rate arrangements prior to currency crises. The fourth chapter
investigates the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty under inflation
targeting and the conventional fixed exchange rate system to the U.S dollar and examines
the role of each monetary regime in reducing inflation and inflation uncertainty.
1.1 Towards Adopting Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies:
The level of Central Bank Independence and Transparency When
The Monetary Reputation is Imported From Abroad: The Case of
Jordan
Over the last two decades, inflation targeting has become a popular monetary policy frame-
work; more than twenty countries have adopted inflation targeting, and the world has been
divided into inflation targeters and non-targeters. Indeed, inflation targeting proves its
effectiveness in lowering inflation rates and enhancing the performance of inflation and
output. It also anchors inflationary expectations and reduces inflation forecast errors.
Additionally, it is found that emerging market countries have benefited from the frame-
work, in terms of delivering both lower inflation and a more stable real economy, more
than their advanced counterparts (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007) (Walsh, 2009).
These benefits encourage monetary authorities and researchers to question adopting the
framework in other countries. In this chapter, we assess the main institutional precondi-
tions of inflation targeting: central bank independence and transparency for Jordan, an
emerging market country with a fixed exchange rate system. Each institutional precon-
dition for adopting inflation targeting is compared to two inflation targeting countries:
New Zealand and the UK, in their early days of implementing the framework. The study
contributes to the literature on adopting inflation targeting in emerging market economies
by highlighting the case of a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate system. It
also sheds light on the similarities and mismatches between building the credibility of low
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prices domestically and importing the mechanism of price stability from abroad.
In fact, building the credibility domestically or committing to an explicit inflation rate
requires limited if not absent control over the inflation strategy. Hence, the economic and
personal independence of central banks from the fiscal authority must be ensured to enable
achieving the declared inflation target. This perspective is supported by the correlation
found between the level of independence and inflation rates. In the absence of a clear
relationship between the monetary and fiscal authorities, the demand mismanagement of
the political actor could lead to a divergence between the real inflation rate and the policy
target. In fact, obliging the monetary authority to money finance the government deficit
through printing money and/or lending advances to the government creates more infla-
tion. In addition, government tend to create inflation in an attempt to soothe the burden
of public debt as implied by the public choice theory of Sargent and Wallace (1981). As a
result, central bank independence is crucially fundamental for adopting inflation targeting.
The study assesses the level of independence of the central bank of Jordan using
Mathew (2003)index, given that the independence from the political authority can be
exercised even if the economy faces a macroeconomic trilemma of exchange rate stabili-
sation. The index is composed of three independence aspects: personnel, economic and
fiscal. According to the index categories and coding, each aspect has six categories captur-
ing the institutional legislations and the real practices that forge the relationship between
the two economic authorities. Different weight is assigned to each category based on its
importance in measuring the degree of independence from the author’s perspective. How-
ever, some changes are performed to the index to be consistent with the purpose of the
study. Some categories are removed or added and weighted equally with a range of 1
(high independence) to 0 (low independence). The total score for each three independence
aspects is different depending on the number of categories included after the amendments.
The assessment of the central bank independence is based on the legislations of central
banks and the government deeds.
According to many studies on the effect of transparency in improving the rule of mone-
tary policy, it is found that transparency is an optimal rule to anchor inflation expectations
and ensure a full monetary policy transmission to achieve the final goals of monetary pol-
icy. Hence, announcing an explicit inflation rate establishes the first link with the market;
however, this link could be strengthened by enabling the market to infer the direction of
monetary policy and increasing the accountability of policy decisions. To examine the
current level of central bank transparency, we employ the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006)in-
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dex, which classifies the monetary policy making practices under five aspects: political,
economic, procedural, policy and operational. Each aspect is associated with three criteria
and the overall score of all transparency sub-indexes is fifteen.
The results of the level of central bank independence point out that the turnover rate
of Governors, that is, the number of Governors within a given period of time over the
length of this period, suggested by Cukierman et al. (1992), as a defacto measure of cen-
tral bank independence in developing countries, is invalid for the case of Jordan. The
rate is set on political electoral cycle, which reflects the political intentions to exploit the
trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Nonetheless, Jordan is ruled by a king
who appoints the Cabinet, Governor of the central bank and the Senate. Therefore, the
notion of the turnover rate and, thus the principle of the time inconsistency problem do
not apply to Jordan. However, the fiscal mismanagement and the absence of independent
personal legislations of the central bank weaken the credibility of adopting inflation tar-
geting in Jordan. The study highlights that there is no limitation on how many times
Governor can be reappointed by the government. For example, Al-Nabulsi was appointed
five times, holding an eighteen years at chair. Therefore, it could be argued that hold-
ing the tenure for a long period of time invalidates the credibility of the turnover rate of
Governors and, consequently, it should be an indicator of a low level of independence. In
addition, although the central bank’s legislations indicate that Governor can be dismissed
by the executive branch, subject to the king’s consent, only for health or criminal convic-
tion reasons, two Governors were dismissed by the Prime Minister for unclear reasons and
without the consent of the Parliament. In addition, the legislations of the central bank
are lenient with regards to the non-securitised borrowing from the central bank. The
non-securitised lending is offered generously with free market interest rates and covers
not only the expenditure of the central government but also the expenditure of the public
corporations. The weak fiscal independence and the absence of fiscal restrictions could
also threaten the current fixed exchange rate system.
The assessment of the level of transparency suggests that the central bank of Jor-
dan has to provide the market with clear statements regarding the policy changes and
outcomes and any inclination of future preferences. Data on capacity utilisation and un-
employment has also to be released to the public. However, comparing the level of current
transparency to that of New Zealand and the UK in the early days of inflation targeting, it
could be argued that enhancing the level of transparency will not infeasible if the country
moves towards adopting the full-fledged inflation targeting. However, improving the level
of central bank independence is essential to strengthen transparency of data and actions
5
and to set the base for central bank accountability. Generally, the study prevails that
the preconditions for adopting inflation targeting, which are essential to build a domestic
reputation for the goal of price stability, do not exist in Jordan. The current monetary
regime and the dominance of the political authority over the economic aspects contribute
to the weaknesses of monetary policy. In the absence a credible base for independent and
transparent policies and the economic schemes that can control the discretion of policy
makers adhering to any monetary regime is just a fig-leaf.
1.2 The Credibility of Monetary Policy Under The Fixed Exchange Rate
System: The (A)symmetric Transmission Mechanism in Jordan
The credibility of a monetary regime in the market can be measured by the ability of the
central bank to induce changes in the market and speed up the transmission of monetary
policy to achieve the long-run target of monetary policy along secondary objectives, which
are consistent with the goal of price stability. Whether the credibility of low prices is
domestically built or imported from abroad, the central banks official instrument should
have a quick and complete impact on saving and investment decisions to achieve the
final goal of the policy. The interest rate pass-through channel through which policy
message is transmitted to the market could reflect the effectiveness of monetary policy
in meeting the inflation target. We assess the credibility of monetary policy when the
economic fundamentals are managed by fixing the exchange rate to a central currency.
Therefore, we examine the interest rate pass-through channel for the case of Jordan within
its intermediate lag of action, which reflects the time lag needed by commercial banks
to affect spending and investment decisions. The Johansen approach (Johansen, 1991)
is conducted to estimate the long run degree of pass-through along with the speed of
adjustment to disequilibrium from official interest rates to retail interest rates and by
using a parsimonious error correction model of Hendry and Doornik (1994), we connect
the short and long run effects of monetary policy. In addition, we examine whether the
asymmetric behaviour of banking sector to monetary shocks exist. Berger and Hannan
(1989)and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) point out that firms could follow a non-competitive
pricing behaviour. Two hypotheses, based on the structure performance and efficient
hypotheses in the industrial market, are put forward explaining the asymmetric adjustment
in the financial market: the bank concentration, or bank’s collusive pricing hypothesis,
and the consumer behaviour hypothesis. To examine the asymmetries in the market,
we incorporate two dummy variables based on whether retail interest rates are above or
below their long-run equilibrium level. The results indicate that the degree of pass-through
varies in Jordan from incomplete to overshooting. An asymmetric response is found in
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the Jordanian loan market at 10% level of significance, showing that banks follow a non-
competitive pricing behaviour as they respond quicker to increasing their interest rates
on loans. The symmetric mean lags of the loan rate with respect to changes in official
interest rates are slow; in all cases banks need more than twenty months to converge to
the long run equilibrium. By contrast, no asymmetry is found in the deposit market, and
rather, we find a faster mean lag, i.e., 10-13 months. Comparing the results for Jordan to
that for the two inflation targeters, our findings provide evidence that with a weak and
sluggish interest rate pass-through, as well as asymmetry in the loan market, the monetary
policy in Jordan under the pegged exchange rate regime to the US dollar is dependent
and ineffective. This suggests that Jordan has to move to a more resilient exchange
rate arrangement following a comprehensive monetary reform, given the weak financial
constitutions and the dominance of the government over the central banks policies, to be
able to target the level of inflation on domestic bases.
1.3 The Credibility of a Soft Pegged Exchange Rate in Emerging Market
Economies: Evidence from a Panel Data Study
The credibility of fixed exchange rate systems has been questioned over the last century.
The failure of the gold standard, the Bretton Woods system, the European Monetary
System, and the currency crises in Latin America and East Asia has proven that achiev-
ing the price stability goal through fixing the exchange rate is short-lived. Consequently,
the literature has emerged to identify why a fixed exchange rate is more prone to crises
and how the credibility of the fixed system would be weakened. The collapse of a fixed
exchange rate system according to the first generation models happens due to the incon-
sistency between the monetary and fiscal policies. The empirical works on past currency
crises indicate that a number of bad fundamentals has led to the abandonment of the
peg. The most important fundamentals were the inflation differential between a domestic
economy and anchor country, real exchange rates, current account deficit and fiscal deficit.
Based on the first generation-demand mismanagement models and the empirical works
on the European Monetary System crisis, we assess the credibility of the current experience
of pegged exchange rates in emerging market economies. Eleven countries adherent to the
fixed exchange rate to the US dollar are selected: Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and Venezuela over the yearly span from
1996 to 2012. The countries are selected based on their defacto and dejure exchange
rate policy. We utilise the IMF defacto classification, however, this classification was
first published in 1999. Therefore, we classify the countries for the years 1996-1998 based
on the behaviour of nominal exchange rate and international reserves as in the defacto
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classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). The study is the first to examine
the current credibility of a soft-fixed exchange rate regime.
Two proxies measuring the credibility are adopted to reflect realignment expectations
of market agents: the interest rate differential and the exchange rate market pressure
index. The two proxies are regressed on a set of macro-fundamentals derived from the
theory and empirical work of currency crises. The macroeconomic fundamentals selected
are: inflation differential, debt to GDP, current account to GDP, money growth, interna-
tional reserves and import to GDP.
In fact, the exchange rate fixers are assumed to preserve a very low interest rate dif-
ferential, which, according to the uncovered interest rate parity condition, is supposed to
equal the expected changes in exchange rate. When the system is highly credible, market
agents anticipate a zero domestic inflation rate and presume the parity condition to hold.
Due to data limitation and the short frequency for macroeconomic data gathered from the
IMF-IFS and the World Bank Indicators, the analysis is based on panel data models. On
the basis of weak exogeneity of regressors, the fixed effects model is employed to remove
the country-specific heterogeneity. To allow for endogeneity in the macroeconomic setting,
Arellano and Bond (1991)’s first difference GMM is carried out. Different setups are con-
structed to consider the small sample size at hand and to account for the nexus between
current account and money stock as in the notion implied by the monetary approach to
balance of payments.
When the credibility is assessed by the interest rate differential, and under the strict
assumption of regressors exogeneity, the groupwise heteroscedasticity test and the Pesaran
(2004)’s cross sectional dependence test indicate that the countries are spatially depen-
dent. Accordingly, the specification tests are corrected; the Hausman test is estimated
under different procedures to consider the use of robust standard errors and cross sec-
tional dependence, and suggests that fixed effects model is more consistent than random
effects model. In all setups modelled, inflation differential is found to be significant at 1%,
and explains 20% of the spread between the exchange rate fixers and the United States.
This finding is consistent with other studies on the credibility of the European Monetary
System, in which inflation differential appeared as a main factor in reducing the credibility
of the system. The same finding is obtained when we allow for endogeneity. On contrary,
when the exchange rate market pressure index is used as a proxy for the credibility, none
of the fundamentals appear significant. The cross sectional tests also provide mixed in-
ferences about whether to accept the spatial dependence among countries. This is likely
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to be due to the variance-weighted scheme of the index, where the weight of the small
exchange rate changes is considerably large, while huge changes in foreign reserves are
assigned with a negligible weight. We then examine the credibility in the countries which
have not experienced a shift in monetary regime during the study period. The estimation
of the fixed effects model provides evidence that inflation differential is a vital factor in
determining the credibility of the peg. The deterioration in current account and the re-
serve adequacy also appear to be important indicators for expecting realignments in these
countries.
The results suggest that anchoring inflation through pegging the currency is question-
able. The positive inflation rates explains why anchoring interest rates, as implied by the
uncovered interest rate parity, is not possible in countries with soft pegs to the US dollar
and, consequently, it explains why the foreign credibility of low prices in the absence of
strong domestic constitutions and institutions is difficult to import.
1.4 Inflation Targeting or Exchange Rate Targeting: Which Monetary
Rule Supports The Goal of Price Stability in Emerging Market
Economies?
The adoption of monetary regimes of quantitative identification constrains the ability of
policy makers to pursue their political advantages. The confined discretion of policy mak-
ers’ deeds that can be exercised by declaring a nominal anchor provides the market with
a reference for the goal of price stability. When non-discretionary monetary policies are
not exercised, eliminating the inflationary bias could result in high social and economic
costs. However, it is thought that many inflation costs come from the uncertainty about
the course of future inflation rather than from its level (Bernanke et al., 1999). In fact,
the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty has received attention in the literature
after the Nobel lecture of Friedman (1977). Friedman argues that the relationship between
unemployment and nominal wage changes is not stable owning to inflation uncertainty,
and hence inflation increases inflation uncertainty. Ball (1992) also points out, based on a
monetary policy-time inconsistency game theoretical model of Barro and Gordon (1983),
that inflation leads to higher inflation uncertainty. On the other hand, on the basis of the
same time inconsistency model, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) argue that, an increase in
inflation variability raises the level of inflation rate. Holland (1995), however, shows that a
negative link could be an indicator of stabilising effects of monetary framework, as central
banks respond to inflation uncertainty by reducing money supply and thus decreasing the
inflation rate.
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It is believed that inflation uncertainty can be reduced by settling the market inflation-
ary expectations, which can come through better inform the market about the direction
of monetary policy. The simplicity of monetary quantitative targets improves the market
awareness about the course of future inflation; however, market agents can easily under-
stand the changes in consumer prices more than the changes in other nominal variables.
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty
under two quantitative monetary targets for the objective of price stability: a fixed ex-
change rate and inflation targeting. We assess the impact of monetary regime on inflation
uncertainty. In fact, there are a large number of studies which investigate the nexus be-
tween inflation and inflation uncertainty, but little attention has been paid to the cases
with soft fixed exchange rates, or for such cases the influence of monetary regime has not
been considered. So, this study is the first to compare between the two monetary regimes
and detail the role of the fixed exchange rate system in affecting inflation and inflation
uncertainty. We utilise different GARCH in mean models to investigate the relationship
between inflation and inflation uncertainty in two emerging market economies adherent to
the fixed exchange rate to the US dollar: Jordan and Egypt, and three inflation targeters:
South Africa, Brazil and Poland.
GARCH in mean allows examining the relationship between inflation and inflation un-
certainty simultaneously, by incorporating a measure of volatility in the inflation equation.
We examine the relationship under plausible asymmetric responses to inflation shocks by
exponential GARCH in mean. The effect of the examined monetary regimes on inflation
uncertainty in the long run is also assessed by applying component GARCH in mean
model. To model the impact of monetary regime on inflation dynamics, slope dummies
are plugged in the conditional mean equations, in which the dummy takes the value of
one when the examined monetary regime is in effect, and zero otherwise. Two interactive
dummies are selected based upon the overall improvement in the model fit. To examine
the nexus between inflation and inflation uncertainty, we utilise monthly data on consumer
price index obtained from the IMF-IFS for the period 01:1980-06:2014. The calculated
inflation series is seasonally adjusted by executing the Census Bureaus X12. The series
properties indicate that the distribution is positively skewed and leptokurtic. To consider
this asymmetry and peakness of the distribution in modelling the relationship between
inflation and inflation uncertainty, we use a generalised error distribution.
The findings suggest that inflation uncertainty increases inflation and inflation gen-
erates inflation uncertainty under the two monetary regimes, as argued by Cukierman
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and Meltzer (1986)and Friedman (1977)and Ball (1992), respectively. We show that infla-
tion targeters have been successful at reducing the inflation rate and inflation persistence
more than fixed exchange rate countries, where the regime has no impact on lowering
average inflation and inflation inertia. Both regimes appear effective in lowering inflation
uncertainty, as the inflation regime slope dummy, incorporated in the conditional inflation
variance equation, is found significant and negative in all respective countries; however, its
magnitude is close to zero for Egypt. This could be due to the several depreciations in the
Egyptian Pound in the last three years before opting out of the system, which might have
resulted in lowering the credibility of the fixed exchange rate and raising the likelihood of
the collapse. Hence, it could be argued that fixing the exchange rate could still influence
inflation uncertainty as long as the possibility to renege on the fixed parity commitment
is not perceived by the market. The negative effect, which reflects a decrease in inflation
uncertainty, of both regimes holds under asymmetries and also in the long run, except for
South Africa, where the regime dummy turns insignificant. The findings provide evidence
that inflation targeters have not equally benefited from inflation targeting. The chapter
highlights the importance of monetary regimes in reducing the uncertainty about future
inflation and underlines the direct benefits of inflation targeting. The role of the fixed ex-
change rate in lowering inflation and inflation uncertainty in the two exchange rate fixers
is not obvious. Although the fixed exchange rate system could be effective in reducing
inflation uncertainty, according to the results, the continuation of this effect depends on
the credibility of the system in the market.
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Chapter 2
Towards Adopting Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market
Economies: The level of Central Bank Independence and
Transparency When The Monetary Reputation is Imported
From Abroad: The Case of Jordan
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter is carried out to investigate adopting inflation targeting at institutional lev-
els in Jordan. The institutional features characterised inflation targeting are assessed to
underline the possibility and challenges to target inflation domestically in Jordan. The
first part of the introduction provides an overview about inflation targeting and the pre-
conditions for adopting the framework. The second part highlights the monetary history
of Jordan and the motivations of the study.
2.1.1 Inflation Targeting
It was widely believed among the advocates of activist policies that monetary policy
could keep productivity and unemployment close to their full-employment levels. The
principle of policy activism was based on the tenet that the nexus between inflation and
unemployment, known as the Philips curve, could be utilised to achieve a long-run low
unemployment. However, the activist policies failed to deliver the promises of low un-
employment and rather resulted in high inflation rates. The activism was challenged in
different aspects; the most important one was the dynamics of market agents’ expectations
about future policy outcomes. Both Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) state that the
trade-off between inflation and unemployment is transitory, and in the long run, due to
adjustments to market agents’ wage settings, the only macroeconomic variable that can be
controlled by the central bank is the inflation rate (Bernanke et al., 1999). Two decades
later, namely in December 1989, New Zealand led the world to a new monetary frame-
work called Inflation Targeting (IT), with one focused objective of monetary policy, that
is, price stability. The need for a low-inflation framework which could suppress inflation
and provide the leverage over the discretionary intentions of policy makers encouraged
a number of middle and high income countries to follow IT. The movement to IT was
supported by the failure of other monetary anchors such as monetary aggregates in the
mid-1980s and the pegged exchange rate in the early 1990s.1
In effect, IT is based upon announcing a forward-looking medium inflation forecast,
either in a range or point form. The announcement of the policy target allows the mar-
ket agents to perceive the direction of monetary policy and act in accordance with the
path of inflation target. It is thought that central banks under IT could prolong the
effect of the main monetary instrument, i.e., interest rates, the benefit which works out
to settle the market expectations (Thornton, 2012). Hence, it is widely believed that
1A nominal anchor is a nominal variable that is the target of monetary policy, which restricts the price
level to a certain value
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IT is an inflation expectation anchor (Mishkin, 2004), which leads to decrease inflation
uncertainty, and eliminates the volatility of inflation rates (Drew and Karagedikli, 2008).
Indeed, with the privilege of establishing a clear link with the public, and making the
economic information available for the market, inflation targeters are ranked among the
most transparent central banks in the world (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006). In fact, the
level of transparency of inflation targeters policies has evolved over the years of adoption
to be consistent with the expectation hypothesis. For instance, the forward path of mone-
tary policy was released by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1997, through disclosing
up to three year projections for inflation and output and the formal macroeconomic model.
Nevertheless, the use of monetary policy instruments entails the existence of an unam-
biguous relationship with the political authority. In fact, the rationale behind adopting
a nominal anchor is to eliminate the leverage of governments in exploiting the short-
run trade-off between inflation and unemployment for political advantages as implied by
the time inconsistency problem, by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983), which creates an inflationary bias. Therefore, it is essential to tame the govern-
ment intentions by ensuring a politically independent monetary authority represented in
the personnel legislations of the central bank. In addition, as central bankers under IT
are held responsible for achieving an inflation target, the credibility and stainability of
the system hinge mainly upon the ability of monetary policy to control its instruments,
which requires an economic independence from the government. That is why all inflation
targeters except Brazil (Hammond, 2012) enjoy legal independence,2 and many of them
after adopting IT have increased their central banks’ economic independence to achieve
the announced inflation target and strengthen the base of accountability.3
Financial independence is also fundamental for central banks to control their liquidity
management. The need to impose restrictions on fiscal deficit is supported by the perspec-
tive that fiscal deficit is an inflationary phenomenon. Lin and Chu (2013)4 and Catao and
Terrones (2005)5 argue that the dynamic relationship between inflation and fiscal deficit
comes from the fact that government tends to finance its deficit throughout Seigniorage,
2This refers to its personnel independence; the Bank of Brazil’s legislations do not specify the terms of
appointment of both Governor and deputies. However, Gutie´rrez (2003) indicates that the bank of Brazil
is defacto independent.
3This concept implies the features which enable central banks to be responsible of their actions. These
features are determined by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) as the existence of formal rank objectives,
monetary policy transparency, and the ability of monetary policy to bear the last responsibility, i.e., central
bank independence.
4The empirical results show that inflation rate is strongly affected by fiscal deficit, namely during
high-inflation periods. This happens because money supply tends to grow quickly when inflation is high.
5They conclude that the positive correlation between fiscal deficit and inflation takes place in developing
and high-inflation countries rather than in low-inflation countries.
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which, consequently, leads to high inflation. The government might also prefer to create
inflation to reduce the burden on fiscal debt. This means that limiting government bor-
rowing from central banks is one way to discipline the government expenditure. In fact,
most inflation targeters have either prohibited securitised lending or imposed rigorous con-
straints upon advances from the central bank.
The successful implementations of IT across developed and emerging market countries
have led monetary authorities and researchers to question adopting this strategy. However,
one of the challenges that faces countries which seek to adopt IT is the level of develop-
ment of monetary institutions and constitutions that may hamper building the credibility
of low inflation domestically. Therefore, adopting IT or building the base to move towards
a domestic reputation for the price stability goal, particularly in developing and emerging
market economies, requires intensive considerations of the economic conditions to assess
the level of monetary institutional development, or what kind of reforms should be im-
plemented to successfully manage the transition to the low inflation framework. From
the inflation targeters’ experience, there are some key features associated with IT frame-
work, agreed among economists to be preconditions for adopting the framework. These
preconditions are: central bank independence, transparency, credibility, the existence of a
well-developed financial market, and the presence of a stable and predictable relationship
between inflation and monetary instruments. The focus of this chapter is on assessing the
institutional preconditions for the case of Jordan.
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2.1.2 Historical Background and objectives of the study
Jordan is a small open economy, which relies on foreign aid and workers’ remittances and
experienced a fragile monetary history, the factors which make the economy highly vulner-
able to internal and external shocks. During the late 1960s, Jordan witnessed a continuous
depreciation in its exchange rate due to internal and regional circumstances. The major
internal source was the inappropriate easy monetary policy, accompanied with government
dominance to ease fiscal policy laxity, which took place at the end of the 1960s and lasted
until the early 1990, when the monetary policy started adopting an intermediate target
M2. This was the first step to improving the ability of the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ)
to achieve its monetary goals and develop its autonomy. However, the political external
disturbances, especially the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, had more severe effects on the econ-
omy, as Jordan lost its primary port, Jaffa port, part of its land in the Jordan Valley
and essential markets of its exports and imports (Hammarneh, 1994). This was followed
by a drop in oil prices, simultaneous with the 1982 first Persian Gulf War, which dried
up the main sources of aid, remittances and foreign money flows (Maziad, 2009). The
outcome of all these problems, known in the Jordanian history as the dinar crisis, was a
remarkable depreciation in the Jordanian currency and the distortion of economic policies,
which reached its peak between 1988 and 1989. However, the procedures taken after the
crisis were reforming and enhancing the monetary policy’s autonomy and restoring the
market credibility, especially when the CBJ proved its effectiveness in coping with the
1990 second Gulf War (Al Malki, 1994). During the reform process, a decision was taken
in 1995 to peg the exchange rate to the US dollar. Undoubtedly, fixing the exchange rate
enables the CBJ to improve its credibility and builds the base for attracting investments
from domestic and global markets.
Nevertheless, the subsequent dollar depreciations in early 2002, and the 2008 financial
crisis (Ghanem et al., 2010), as well as the difficult economic conditions of Jordan after
the 2003 Iraq War and the Arab Spring raise skepticism on the stability and sustainability
of the pegged exchange rate system. Many economists in Jordan, especially after the 2008
financial crisis, advised the CBJ to change its monetary anchor; however, the policy mak-
ers argued that the pegged exchange rate to the US dollar has played an important role in
improving the credibility of the currency. They also pointed out that the level of foreign
reserves has been increased unprecedentedly, as the current regime worked out to attract
investment (the CBJ’s 2010 annual report). Moreover, the CBJ’s own view according to
the IMF evaluation report (1989-2004) is that “there is no reason to fix a system that is
not broken”. Nonetheless, the IMF’s executive directors suggest that Jordan should move
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towards a more flexible exchange rate regime and focus on maintaining the price stability
as a leading objective. Furthermore, in 2010, the bank underwent a considerable reduction
in its holding of international reserves coupled with enormous fiscal deficit, which present
a direct threat to the pegged exchange rate system.
Therefore, in the light of these reasons we are motivated to study the preconditions for
a successful IT institutional implementation in Jordan. We examine to what extent the
institutional factors, i.e., central bank independence and transparency, which are funda-
mental to build a domestic reputation for price stability, are developed in Jordan. In order
to support our analysis, the level of independence and transparency of central bank of Jor-
dan is compared to two inflation targeters taken as models: New Zealand and the UK.
However, as we aim at assessing the possibility for adopting IT in Jordan, we focus on the
early days of IT for both inflation targeters, given that the shift to a high IT form is most
likely to be gradual for an emerging market country with a fixed exchange rate regime.
Moreover, the two inflation targeters have implemented many enhancements to solidify
their anchor; some of these needed a decade to apply. The plausible question that may
seem to arise here is why to compare the economic conditions and institutions of a small
developing open economy like Jordan to that of two advanced economies. The choice to
compare the results to New Zealand and the UK is important for two main reasons. First,
considering the UK and New Zealand as role models allows creating a factual benchmark
for measuring the level of central bank independence and transparency; this comparison
helps understanding the degree of development of institutional and operational arrange-
ments that should exist to build the credibility of low prices domestically. Second, both
countries were targeting exchange rate and have experienced a shift from a fixed exchange
rate system at a certain time prior to targeting price stability domestically, and hence by
comparing the results to New Zealand and the UK we conduct the normative economic
perspective of how the best practical institutional implementation of IT should be.
In fact, many studies have been conducted to measure the level of central bank indepen-
dence and transparency in many countries; however, Jordan has been rarely considered.
For instance, Gisolo (2007) measures central bank independence in many countries includ-
ing Jordan, ranking the CBJ among the least independent central banks. Nevertheless, the
study is based on legal personnel independence, which makes the assessment incomplete
for our objective. Therefore, this chapter aims to assess the level of the CBJ’s defacto
independence and transparency.
The analysis of central bank independence shows that the formal collaborations be-
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tween the central bank of Jordan and government are fragile and unclear, and that the
government’s words do not match its deeds, this presents the first challenge to target price
stability domestically. However, increasing the level of transparency will not be infeasible,
and although some modifications have to be made in this respect, improving the level of
central bank independence is essential to provide the market with high transparent policies.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section one provides the literature review and
theoretical issue. Section two and three review the measurement of central bank inde-
pendence and transparency, respectively. The final section gives a summary, concluding
remarks and recommendations.
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2.2 Literature Review
IT has become a well-known framework for monetary policy. To date, over twenty coun-
tries have shifted their monetary regimes towards IT, and the world has been divided into
inflation targeters and non-targeters. Many studies, e.g., Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2007), Hu (2003), Van der Merwe (2004), have been written to assess the benefits of
adopting this framework in different developing and emerging economies. 6 Empirical ev-
idence that focuses on whether IT strengthens the nominal anchor would be more telling
about these gains.
In an early study by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), after just seven years of the in-
troduction of IT, the authors highlight that IT has a number of advantages related to
enhancing monetary authorities transparency and accountability, and promoting the co-
herence of policymaking. Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) find that IT improves the
credibility of central banks significantly. They further point out that this result supports
the conclusion that IT is a useful regime to communicate with the public. Similarly,
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) examine the economic performance of IT in certain
developing and developed economies that adopted IT explicitly. Their results show that
the average inflation rates for all inflation targeters were reduced, and they were slightly
lower than non-inflation targeters’. Recently, many studies indicate that inflation targeters
have achieved lower inflation rates after IT, and their inflation rates have become even
lower compared to non-inflation targeters. According to Batini et al. (2007), implement-
ing IT controls inflation expectations and makes them consistent with the inflation target.
A similar conclusion is reached by Capistra´n and Ramos-Francia (2010), who argue that
IT reduces the volatility of inflation expectations. Corbo et al. (2002), also state that
inflation targeters have been successful at achieving their inflation targets, and they have
consistently reduced inflation forecast errors.
In South Africa, for instance, Van der Merwe (2004) provides evidence that the in-
troduction of IT has benefited the effectiveness of monetary policy. His evaluation shows
that central bank transparency and accountability, which are essential to target inflation,
help anchoring the market expectations of future inflation, the factors which affect the
price and wage settings. Moreover, Mboweni (1999), the Governor of the central bank
of South Africa, states that adopting IT, which is based on the forward looking strategy,
allows the monetary policy to reduce the changes in economic activities and output growth
fluctuations.
6Such as: Indonesia, Romania, Turkey, Ghana, South Africa, Thailand, Poland, Philippines, Peru,
Mexico, Hungary, Chile, and Brazil.
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Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) conclude that IT leads to a significant reduction
in the volatility of output growth and output gap, namely in emerging market economies.
This may happen because inflation expectations are supposed to be well-anchored under
IT framework. However, Ball and Sheridan (2004) claim that their findings suggest no
evidence that IT improves the economic performance of its followers, the result, which is
based on a performance comparison between some industrialised inflation targeters and
a control group of industrialised non-inflation targeters, contradicts the intuition that
IT affects inflation, output and interest rates and ignores how IT helps economies with
their disinflationary efforts. However, other studies show that IT plays an important role
in enhancing the performance of economic variables. Hu (2003) assesses empirically the
impact of IT on real economic variables for sixty-six countries: inflation targeters and
non-targeters. He finds evidence that IT is effective in improving the performance of in-
flation and output, i.e., low inflation, low GDP growth volatility and high GDP growth,
which is consistent with the view that the major motivation of this framework is to im-
prove the overall economic performance. In addition, Walsh (2009) finds that inflation
targeting has improved the macroeconomic performance in developing economies. The
study’s conclusion regarding the effectiveness of IT in emerging markets is consistent with
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007)’s. Both reveal that emerging market economies have
benefited more from IT, in terms of delivering both lower inflation and a more stable real
economy, than advanced countries.
The benefits gained from this framework have encouraged more countries, namely
emerging market economies and developing countries, to adopt it. Hence, several empiri-
cal studies have searched for the possibility and readiness to shift towards IT in different
economies, and come up with different conclusions. In case of emerging markets, once
preconditions of stable economy are met, IT can be used to shift the economy from high
to low inflation equilibrium (Mart´ınez, 2008).
Schaechter et al. (2000) illustrate that a successful IT is built upon: ”central bank
instrument independence, price stability as a leading objective, a well-developed financial
market, well understood channels between policy instruments and inflation, and transpar-
ent policies to build accountability and credibility”. Their conclusion comes from studying
the mutual institutional and operational key aspects of developed and developing inflation
targeters.7 When the previously mentioned preconditions are met in an economy, it will
be ready for adopting the full fledged IT. However, three main forms of IT have been iden-
7Study conducted by the Monetary and Exchange Affairs for Emerging Market Department at the IMF.
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tified. Full fledged IT, that is, when a country has only one final objective of maintaining
low inflation, and enjoys a transparent and credible monetary policy along with a well-
developed financial market and a flexible exchange rate (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel,
2007). Eclectic IT when a country is able to achieve price stability as a result of its high
monetary credibility, less monetary transparency, but at the same time it does not adhere
to all IT’s rules (Aliyu and Englama, 2009). The last form of IT is inflation targeting
lite. This form is usually pursued by a country which is committed to other monetary
objectives along the objective of price stability due to its vulnerability to external shocks
and its weak financial market (Angeriz and Arestis, 2007).
Undoubtedly, adopting IT across developed countries has encouraged emerging market
economies to move towards this framework. However, the experience of IT in developing
countries reflects that a transition period was needed to adopt the highest form of IT, i.e.,
the full-fledged. Therefore, many scholars have studies the readiness of developing infla-
tion targeters to move towards the full-fledged IT, while others have focused on assessing
the ability of developing non-inflation targeters to follow IT framework.
Alamsyah et al. (2001) investigate whether Indonesia was able to follow the full-fledged
IT after the introduction of the new central bank Act of May 1999.8 The findings suggest
that the existing preconditions cannot be satisfied and need to be improved. In Hungary,
Siklos and A´bel (2002), find that the country is ready for full-fledged IT, although the
relative responsibilities and expectations of the central bank and government need clarifi-
cation and elaboration.
Jha (2008) assesses the readiness of India to adopt IT, by examining the existence of
a stable and significant relationship between inflation rate and short-term interest rates.
Using a VAR model, she concludes that the interest rate has no effect on inflation. Like-
wise, Aliyu and Englama (2009) evaluate the feasibility of IT in Nigeria by testing the
relationship between inflation and monetary instruments, also through a VAR model,
finding the existence of a weak relationship between the inflation rate and interest rate.
Similarly, following the same methodology, Saleem et al. (2010) assesses the precondi-
tions of IT in Pakistan, and reveals that Pakistan cannot adopt the full-fledged IT due to
the undeveloped financial market and weak transparent monetary policies. However, the
last two studies suggest that both Nigeria and Pakistan could adopt inflation targeting lite.
For Tunisia, Boughrara (2007) explores the ability of Tunisia to move to IT. A VAR
8Indonesia has been categorised as a fully fledged inflation targeter since 2005.
21
methodology is used, and the results indicate that adopting IT strategy may lead to in-
crease exchange rate volatility, which generates uncertainty about future inflation, the
effect which weakens the controllability over inflation. In another study conducted by
Boughrara et al. (2008), the authors simulate the effectiveness of IT under the current
financial system in Tunisia, by testing the reaction of frozen loans to official interest rates,
suggesting that Tunisia has to improve its financial market structure before adopting IT.
Both Youssef (2007) and Awad (2008) review the prerequisites for IT in Egypt. The
former focuses on the financial sector, the central bank’s transparency, credibility, technical
capabilities and accountability. The latter tests the efficiency of the monetary aggregates
strategy, adopted by the central bank of Egypt, and finds that the current monetary regime
is not satisfactory and adopting IT is preferred once the institutional preconditions are
reached.
Boughrara et al. (2008) examine the transmission mechanisms in Morocco, in an at-
tempt to clarify the effectiveness of monetary policy under the current financial market,
concluding that Morocco is not yet ready for adopting IT. Using the same approach,
Neaime et al. (2008) aim to shed light on the monetary transmission mechanism across
the Middle East and North Africa region. Their results show that the exchange rate has
a dominant impact on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Egypt, while
in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, the interest rate plays a key role in monetary
policy effectiveness. The same result for Jordan is found by Poddar et al. (2006).
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2.3 Central Bank Independence
Since the seventeenth century, central banks were established, with limited operations and
constraint functions, to provide financing to governments and protect the stability of the
financial system. However, the pervasion of stagflation in the 1960s and the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system in 1972 were the cornerstone to shift the monetary policy’s
helm to focus on maintaining price stability. These challenges have stimulated numer-
ous researches, at both empirical and theoretical levels, to explore the efficient policies to
achieve the goal of price stability. Hence, Central Bank Independence (CBI) has long been
a topic of interest, propped by the correlation found between high levels of independence
and low inflation. This nexus has created so much controversy concerning its impact on
improving the performance of macroeconomics.
Alesina and Summers (1993) and Grilli et al. (1994) find that countries with an inde-
pendent central bank have lower rates of inflation. Cukierman et al. (1992) constructed
a well-known CBI index, including seventy two countries: twenty-one industrial countries
and fifty-five developing countries, and using a wide range of information to investigate
the relationship between CBI and inflation. They ensure that CBI by all means reduces
inflation. In addition, Al-Marhubi and Willett (1995) point out that the causality between
CBI and inflation holds even when a number of explanatory control variables, like open-
ness, exchange rate regime, budget deficit, are included. Recently, the same finding was
yielded by other authors: De Haan and Kooi (2000), Mathew (2003), Crowe and Meade
(2008), Arnone et al. (2006), Siklos (2008). However, for some developing countries, it
is found that CBI alone cannot decrease inflation rates since the main causes are beyond
the direct control of central banks. This, for example, applies to five central and Eastern
Europe countries considered by Dvorsky (2000), who measures the legal and real CBI.
Similarly, the results of Kasseeah et al. (2011) indicate that the CBI contributes to reduc-
ing inflation rates in many African countries; however, it is not sufficient to resolve the
problem of inflation in these countries. Nevertheless, interestingly, a remarkable increase
in the degree of CBI has been observed in developing and emerging market economies,
albeit the increase in the overall levels of CBI in developed countries.
In fact, CBI has been an important argument since the well-known time inconsis-
tency problem is suggested by Kydland and Prescott (1977), and developed later by Barro
and Gordon (1983), who have shed light on the negative implications of central bank
laissezfaire as a result of sacrificing long-run welfare for short-term political gains. This
problem occurs when politically motivated policy makers attempt to play on the short
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run trade-off between unemployment and inflation for purely electoral gain, and hence the
optimal plan made for some future periods becomes invalid. Therefore, Rogoff (1985) rec-
ommends that CBI is important to insulate central banks from political influence, which
leads to eliminate the inflationary bias from the outcome of monetary policy.
CBI is believed to be a good discipline to reducing the budget deficit. If the fiscal
authority is the dominant actor, the principle of easy money will be preferred and the
government will rely on the yield from Seigniorage to finance its deficit. This argument
is propounded by Sargent and Wallace (1981) who debate that fiscal authorities will tend
to pull down its deficit when the monetary policy is dominant. Certainly, an independent
central bank is less exposed to political pressure, and this would enhance price stability
and stimulate economic growth (Alesina and Summers, 1993). Some studies consider CBI
as a mandatory condition to access the European Union. When New Zealand adopted IT
in 1990, CBI becomes a main precondition for adopting IT. According to Eijffinger and
De Haan (1996), a high level of CBI is an important institutional device for maintaining
the price stability goal. In other words, CBI is an important mean to ensure the gov-
ernment commitment to the goal of price stability. This should effectively benefit both
the economy and the government itself, as the price stability leads to reduce the cost of
high inflation, and develops the domestic credit market by enabling the government and
businesses to borrow cheaply in the long run (Cukierman et al., 1992).
Over the last quarter century, many authors, e.g., Grilli et al. (1994), Cukierman
et al. (1992), Mathew (2003) have constructed indexes to measure the level of CBI. The
components of each index are quite similar, categorising the independence under three as-
pects. Firstly, Personnel or Political Independence (PI), which refers to the central bank’s
personal character. Supposedly, central banks should be isolated from any government
pressures in appointing the central bank’s Governor, or deputies among other personal
characteristics. Secondly, Economic Independence (EI), which entails the absence of gov-
ernment approval in policy formulation, the setting of the policy rate or the objectives of
the central bank. Thirdly, the Financial Independence (FI), which is sometimes inscribed
under the economic independence aspect. FI is a critical aspect that requires the existence
of restrictions on credit given to governments.
Yet, countries are ranked differently from an author to another, depending on the pe-
riod and categories taken into account. Moreover, although many studies have found the
evidence that there is an inverse relationship between CBI and inflation, this relationship
may be invalid when the dejure measure of independence, built by the CBI indices, fails
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to capture the defacto independence of central banks in some developing countries, where
economic legislations could be violated by the political authority.
Cukierman et al. (1992) find that the turnover rate of Governor (TOR) is a statistically
significant proxy for assessing the factual CBI in developing countries. They alluded to
Argentina as an example where the TOR is extremely high as its Governor is dismissed
after every cabinet reshuﬄe. The TOR refers to the average terms of office, calculated by
dividing the number of Governors within a given period of time over the length of this
period. This rate does not include any deputy who serves as a Governor in a transitory
period, and counts Governor who is reappointed for a second tenure only once.
Although many studies have relied on the TOR as an informal indicator of personal
independence in developing countries, this rate is invalid for the the case of Jordan as well
as for other developing and emerging market economies. The TOR will be a reliable mea-
sure for CBI, if it is based on setting the electoral cycle every four or five years. Taming
the political intensions for re-election in order to eliminate the time inconsistency problem
is a main motivation of CBI, and that explains why Cukierman et al. (1992) consider a
point like 0.25 consistent with low CBI. Nevertheless, this case of political manipulation
of the trade-off between inflation and unemployment to satisfy intensions for re-election
does not apply to many countries. The theory of time inconsistency and, consequently,
the TOR becomes invalid in a country like Jordan, where the head of the state is a king,
who is responsible for appointing the government, the senate and also the central bank’s
Governor. This also applies to other republic countries whose presidents are elected over
their life to leave the political legacy to their successors. So, we agree with Siklos (2008)
that there is no single definition of CBI valid for all countries, but there are a set of com-
ponents which can define the relationship between governments and central banks.
In Jordan, both the CBJ’s Governor and deputies are nominated by the government,
and then appointed by the king, who is responsible for appointing the government itself.
By other means, since there is no election in Jordan, both the government and the CBJ
are supposed to execute the national economic strategy, sanctioned by the king. Eight
Governors, as can be seen from Table 1, were appointed from 1963, the first appearance
of the CBJ, until the end of 2011. The calculated TOR, with the exclusion of the new
Governor, is roughly 0.17, which is slightly low. This would mistakenly be interpreted as a
high level of political independence. If the last ten years are taken as a period of reference,
the judgment of a high level of political independence will be inaccurate.9 Thus, to avoid
9See the CBJ’s Personal Independence section 2.3.1 for more details.
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any inconsistent results in measuring the CBJ’s independence, given that assessing CBI
based on the dejure index in developing countries and emerging markets is misleading, the
study depends on assessing the real practices of the bank and government alongside the
central bank’s legislations using Mathew (2006) index. The results obtained are compared
to New Zealand, the first country to adopt IT in 1990, and the UK that adopted IT in 1992.
Many studies have relied on the most widely used indices: Grilli et al. (1994) and
Cukierman et al. (1992). Nevertheless, Mathew (2003) has constructed a more com-
prehensive index, which includes three aspects to measure CBI: personnel, economic or
monetary policy and financial independence, and is applied to twenty five countries. Each
aspect has six categories capturing the institutional legislations and the real practices that
identify the relationship between the government and the central bank. In addition, the
author gives different weight to each category depending on its importance in measuring
the degree of CBI from his perspective; however, each aspect of CBI has the same total
score of 12 points. Nevertheless, we perform some modifications to the index, i.e., we add
or drop some categories and change the weight of each category to be equal in measuring
the degree of CBI, which ranges from 1 (high independence) to 0 (low independence). The
total score for each three independence aspects is different depending on the number of
categories included after the amendment.10.
Table 1: The CBJ’s Governors (1963-2012)
Governor Terms of office
Dr. Ziad Fariz 2012-
Mohammed Said shahin 2011-2010
Alsharif Faris Sharaf 2011-2010
Dr. Umayya Toukan 2010-2006
2005-2000
Dr. Ziad Fariz 2000-1996
Dr.Mohammad Said Al Nabulsi 1995-1989
Mr. Hussein Al Qasim 1989-1985
Dr. Mohammad Said Al Nabulsi 1985-1983
1983-1978
1978-1973
Dr. Khalil Al Salem 1973-1968
1968-1963
Note: Gathered by the author from Al Malki (1994) and the CBJ’s website
10Details on these amendments are explained separately in the section of measuring each aspect. The
modified index of Mathew (2003) is enclosed in Appendix A
26
2.3.1 Political Independence or Personnel Independence (PI)
The personal independence entails appointing Governor and deputies for a relatively long
tenure independently from the political authority, and with no government delegates on
the central bank board. According to our modified index, the PI is assigned based on
six categories: who appoints Governor, deputies, terms of office for both Governor and
deputies, Governor’s dismissal and the absence of any government delegates on the central
bank board. For Jordan, Governor and two deputies, as stated by the 1959 constitutive
Act of the CBJ, are appointed by the cabinet conditional to king’s approval for five year
tenure; this also applies to the case of reappointment. The term of office for reappointment
of the two deputies was changed from three to five years by the 1966 Act.
According to the CBJ’s Acts, the Governor and their deputies are prohibited to work
in paid and unpaid employment. In general, since the CBJ’s establishment no action
has been taken by the government to violate any of the CBJ’s personnel legislations but
Governor’s dismissal. Clearly, as stated by all Acts, Governor can be dismissed by the
executive branch, subject to king’s approval, only for health or criminal conviction rea-
sons. However, in 2011, the Prime Minister, with the consent of the king, dismissed the
Governor Sharaf after just ten months at the chair of the CBJ. This decision was taken
without informing the legislative branch nor the public about the reasons for the dismissal.
It seems that history sometimes repeats itself, as this was not the first time when the gov-
ernment policies clashed with the CBJ perspectives. Al Nabulsi, who served as Governor
for nineteen years, unveiled after Sharif’s dismissal that he was dismissed in 1985 because
he refused to increase the internal government borrowing by extra five million dinars,
which was a breach of the financial legislations of the central bank.11
In New Zealand, the Governor is appointed by the Minister of Finance on the rec-
ommendation of the bank’s board, for a term of five years; the same term is also for
reappointment. Governor’s deputies are appointed by the board on the recommendations
of the Governor for five years. In the UK, the Bank of England (BoE)’s Governor and
their deputies are appointed for five years by the government.
The dismissal of Governor for both the BoE and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
(RBNZ) happens only for reasons mentioned in their Acts, e.g., for health or criminal con-
vention reasons. Both the CBJ and the RBNZ have no nominees on the bank board, as
the members are appointed according to their economic knowledge, skills, and experience.
11AlGhad newspaper, an interview, market and money section, p.1, 2nd October 2011.
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Interestingly, the majority of the CBJ’s personnel legislations is almost cognate with
that of the RBNZ, except that the government in Jordan breaks the law, as previously
stated. However, the RBNZ is more conservative regarding the dismissal of Governor; the
law indicates directly that any Governor who fails to achieve the target of monetary policy
is inadequate and could be replaced by the Parliament. This is considered an impetus to
enhance the accountability of achieving the policy target. Indeed, the RBNZ’s legislations
are more comprehensive compared to the CBJ’s. It is stated that Governor will not be
appointed unless there is a mutual agreement between the Governor and the Minister of
Finance, in terms of specifying the policy targets.
What it is noteworthy for both the RBNZ and the CBJ is that there is no limitation
on how many times it is allowed to reappoint Governor or deputies. This was also the
case of the BoE until 2009, when its Act was modified to include two new paragraphs 1
(3) and (4) by section 243 (1) to state that a person must not be appointed as Governor
or deputy more than twice. In other words, Governor or deputy of the BoE should not
hold the same tenure more than ten years. Probably, imposing such restriction is not
important for New Zealand, as the bank’s history shows that no Governor was appointed
more than twice. Nevertheless, in Jordan, the king may accept to appoint Governor who
is competent to achieve his economic vision many times. This clearly happened in the
past, when Al-Nabulsi was appointed five times, holding an eighteen year tenure at chair,
given that he was forced to resign twice, i.e., in 1985 and 1995. Hence, holding the tenure
for a long period of time should be an indicator of a low level of independence.12
Table 2 shows PI score assigned for each bank. The results indicate that the RBNZ is
more politically independent than the CBJ by the difference of the dismissal and deputy’s
appointment categories. In addition, the results reflect that the BoE is the lowest inde-
pendent among the three banks. This finding is consistent with other CBI studies which
classify the BoE as the lowest independent central bank compared to all OCED countries.
This apparently supports the argument that PI is not essential to target inflation domes-
tically. However, it could be argued that a low level of PI might be a threat to achieve
the central bank’s goal, i.e., price stability, namely if, at any time, there is a government
need or advantage to contradict it.
12This explains the low TOR obtained for the CBJ.
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Table 2: The PI score
PI categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Governor’s Appointment 0.5 0 0
Governor ’s Term 0.5 0.5 0.5
Governor’s Dismissal 0 0.5 0.5
Deputy’ Appointment 0.5 1 0
Deputy’s Term 0.5 0.5 0.5
Presence of Government Nominees 1 1 0
Total (6) 3 3.5 1.5
Note: Assigned by author based on Mathew index
Although our assessment relies mainly on the Mathew index, we amend two categories
here: the fourth and the fifth, to be for Governor’s deputy instead of the bank’s board
members. We think that deputy has some essential duties that enable them to affect the
monetary policy either as a representative of Governor or as temporary Governor in some
cases like Governor’s death, dismissal, resignation, or illness. In other words, as Governor
in some countries, such as in Jordan and New Zealand, has the last word on designing
the monetary policy targeting rules, it could be argued that deputy’s responsibilities are
stronger in affecting the monetary policy more than the board members’. Moreover, even
in other countries, where monetary policy decisions are made by a monetary or financial
commission, as in the UK, Governor and deputies are permanent members of each com-
mission.
2.3.2 Monetary Policy Independence or Economic Independence (MPI)
Measuring MPI according to Mathew (2003) index encompasses six categories: central
bank’s objectives, targets, instruments, conflict resolution, exchange rate policy and the
separation of banking supervision.
The literature has pointed out that compelling monetary policy to focus on other ob-
jectives than price stability, such as output growth and unemployment, arouses inflation
because monetary policy has neutral real effects in the long run.13 Hence, in order to
enable central bankers to achieve the long run objective, central banks should be granted
their independence on intermediate variables or related variables like interest rate, ex-
change rate or monetary aggregates. Monetary authorities should also be independent of
any political influences in using monetary instruments like open market operations, short
interest rates or discount window operations to achieve its target. It follows that the
central bank is the only responsible entity for the exchange rate policy. Furthermore, the
13For more details, see Kydland and Prescott (1977.)
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economic independence entails that any clash between the two economic actors should tilt
in favour of central banks’ perspectives.
The CBJ has many objectives, all of them are related to maintaining monetary and
financial stability. The objectives include: achieving an appropriate inflation rate, pre-
serving exchange rate stability, ensuring the convertibility of the Jordanian Dinar and
banking supervision. As a matter of fact, all these objectives aim at attracting investors
and enhancing the investment environment.
Unlike the CBJ, the primary function of the RBNZ, according to the 1989 Act, is
simply clarified as achieving and maintaining stability of the general level of prices, and
by contrast to its previous legislations, the bank has no specified secondary objectives,
i.e., employment and output growth. However, the key issue of IT, which appeared after
the 2008 financial crisis, was how to combine the goal of financial stability with the goal
of price stability. In order to overcome this challenge, inflation targeters have included the
objective of achieving a sound and efficient financial system alongside their objective of
price stability. Nevertheless, a few studies, for example, Arnone and Gambini (2007) and
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006) support the point that the banking supervision should
be institutionally separated from the monetary policy’s roles as a condition to improve the
level of CBI. This comes from the notion that the implementation of monetary policy and
banking supervision are two different functions. This view is further buttressed by statis-
tical evidence showing that countries with a specialised agency for supervising financial
markets exhibit lower levels of inflation compared to those where the banking supervision
is the central bank’s responsibility. Nevertheless, this evidence needs to be reconsidered
especially after the 2008 financial crisis. Hence, we omit the category of banking supervi-
sion as a determinant of CBI from the Mathew index.14
Regarding the monetary policy target, the RBNZ is not fully independent, as setting
its target is a shared responsibility with the treasury. That is why New Zealand is largely
classified as the least economically independent central bank among all OECD, sharing the
same or raking slightly higher than the BoE whose target is reaffirmed each year by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer within the annual budget statement. In effect, the UK was
not granted its operational independence until 1998, when the new Labour government
came to the power tasking the monetary policy committee the responsibility of setting
the official interest rate. In contrast, the RBNZ has ” full operational autonomy in the
14It is worth mentioning here that the banking supervision becomes again the responsibility of the BoE
in 2008 after it was transferred to a special authority called the Financial Services Authority in 1998
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conduct of monetary policy” (Graham et al., 2012). The CBJ has also its independence
in setting the preferable target, as stated by the 1966 Act, which classifies the bank as
an independent institution. This was witnessed during the economic reform process after
the 1989 Dinar crisis.15 In New Zealand, it not expected that a coordination problem is
likely to occur between the two authorities. The Minister of Finance has the power to
appoint Governor after determining the target of the policy.16 In addition, the legisla-
tions indicate that any Governor who fails to achieve the target will be dismissed.17 In
Jordan, dealing with economic conflicts is not clear in Acts but in practice. It is true that
the CBJ’s Acts state that the CBJ is an independent body and has its own privileges;
however, the Prime Minister of Jordan, Al- Bakheet, commented on his decision to dis-
miss the Governor Sharaf in 2011, by claiming that the strategy of Sharaf contradicted
the government policy.18 Generally,the government in all cases determines the last word,
albeit the consultations between the two economic bodies.
In Jordan, the exchange rate is decided by the Council of Ministers, after consultations
with the central bank. Likewise, exchange rate policy is not independent in both the UK
and New Zealand. The Minister of Finance in New Zealand has the power to influence
the exchange rate. However, according to paragraph 20 (1) of the 1989 Act, Governor can
advise the Minister of Finance if they consider any inconsistency with the economic ob-
jective of monetary policy. Table 3 shows the total MPI score for the three central banks
and that of each category, which indicates that CBJ has more economic independence
compared to the BoE, in its early days of IT.
15One of the main indicators of the CBJ’s instrument independence is what was taken to resolve the
1989 crisis, when Al Nabulsi decided to fix the exchange rate to the SDR’s (Al Malki, 1994). However, it is
worth noting that this independence is not absolute nor genuine, and that the government is the dominant
player in setting the preferable target.
16According to the 9 (a) paragraph of the 1989 Act ”the Minister shall, before appointing, or reappoint-
ing, any person as Governor, fix, in agreement with that person, policy targets for the carrying out by the
bank of its primary function during that person’s term of office, or next term of office, as Governor”
17This is related to the principle of accountability, which has a positive impact on market agents’ inflation
expectations. Holding Governors accountable of their decisions is essential to make a belief in the market
that the bank will achieve the target.
18Petra News Agency (Jordan’s official news agency), (20 th September 2011).
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Table 3: The MPI score
MPI categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Objectives 0.5 1 1
Target 0.5 0.5 0
Instrument 1 1 0
General Policy Conflict 0.5 0.5 0.5
Exchange Rate Co-ordination 0.5 1 1
Total (5) 3 4 2.5
Note: Assigned by author based on Mathew index
2.3.3 Fiscal Independence or Financial Independence (FI)
This aspect plays an important role in ensuring the degree of MPI of central banks. Direct
credit to the government must be limited to be consistent with monetary objectives and
targets. It is proven statistically that there is a significant fiscal deficit impact on inflation.
Therefore, one of CBI main motivation is to discipline the fiscal policy by decreasing the
pressure of financing the fiscal deficit (Catao and Terrones, 2005). Indeed, it is completely
irrational to enforce central banks to achieve its objectives without forging its financial
relationship with the government. Limiting advances to cover the fiscal deficit is crucial
for building the credibility of the system, the feature which is a key ingredient to ensure
monetary policy effectiveness (Ja´come et al., 2012).
In fact, more attention has been devoted recently to this issue in the literature, since
direct borrowing from the central bank is prohibited or limited by central banks’ Acts
of developed countries. Fortunately, a large number of emerging market economies has
followed this process recently. Many countries have modified their legislations to limit
advances to the government, through prohibiting them entirely as in the case of most de-
veloped countries, or tightening them to a small percentage of government revenue for less
than one financial year maturity, charged at market-related interest rates. The limitation
can also be securitised by negotiable securities; this limitation is applied by the majority
of developing countries and some developed economies (Ja´come et al., 2012).
Mathew index measures FI based on six categories: limitations on non-securitised lend-
ing, limitations on securitised lending, specification of the limits of lending, maturity of
loans, restrictions on interest rates, and participation of central bank in the primary mar-
ket. However, we adjust some categories to be compatible with the recent global changes
and also to be harmonised with each others. In particular, we give the same weight for
countries which either prohibit any advances or put rigorous restrictions on non-securitised
lending. In addition, we remove one category from the Mathew index, related to restricting
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the amount of non-securitised lending to be in absolute currency or shares of government
revenue.19 We think that this category is not essential in our assessment, since it does not
apply to our inflation targeters cases. Besides, it is not clear to what extent this restriction
should be in terms of shares of government revenue or expenditure. Furthermore, we add
a new category to the index to identify who can benefit from non-securitised advances. It
could be argued that if non-securitised loans are not prohibited, then it should be limited
to the central government and not to local or public corporations.
It is not unexpected that the CBJ was established in 1963 with little political inde-
pendence; however, the limitations on lending to the government set by the 1959 Act were
more restrictive compared to the limitations specified by the following Acts. According
to paragraph 25-A of the 1959 Act, it is prohibited to lend the government any advances,
or buy any government bonds, except what is specified in paragraph (40). Paragraph
(40) states that the bank can provide a temporary loan to cover the provisory government
deficit with a limit of 10% of government revenues, sanctioned by the Parliament for the
year during which the loan is given, and subject to be paid off before the end of the fi-
nancial year. Otherwise, the bank reserves the right not to lend any other advances until
the loan is paid off. Moreover, the 1966 Act includes a paragraph regarding the interest
rate on provisory advances to be at least 2% per annum. The same Act allows the CBJ
to buy government bonds, only from the secondary market, subject not to increase above
20% of government revenues from the last three financial years. However, the 1971 Act
was more permissive, legalising according to paragraph (49), the non-securitised lending
with free market interest rates. The next Acts were even more lenient as the limit of loans
was widened; the limit was increased 5% in 1979. In practice, the CBJ lending to the gov-
ernment, according to the CBJ data, exceeded systematically the 20 percent limit. From
1983 to 1990, the average annual lending to the government was 52 % of revenues with a
peak of 95 % in 1989 (Maziad, 2009). However, Fortunately, what might be considered a
promising step to constrain the ongoing government borrowing from the CBJ is the intro-
duction of the public law in 2001. The law states that the government shall be prohibited
to borrow directly from domestic commercial banks or any financial institutions, and that
domestic borrowing shall be executed by issuing government securities. Moreover, accord-
ing to the article 23 of the law, the total, internal and external, outstanding public debt,
at any time, should not exceed 80% of GDP, at current prices, from the recent year for
which data are available. Calculating the total government borrowing as a percentage of
government revenues, as shown in Table 6, it is found that the percentages are consistent
19Cukierman et al. (1992) think that the limitations in form of absolute currency is more rigours and
restrictive
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with the law as the percentage of Debt to GDP does not exceed 80%. Similarly, the total
outstanding debt did not go beyond 80% of GDP for the period 2008-2011, as presented
in Table 5, but not directly after 2001, when the law was drafted. In fact, the public debt
law does not affect the level of FI directly; rather, it improves the leverage to maintaining
the price stability and decreases the cost of sterilisation under the pegged exchange rate
system.
The fiscal independence for the RBNZ was shaped before moving to IT. One of New
Zealand striving steps to achieve price stability was a commitment from the government
to pursue a program of fiscal consolidation to ease the monetary policy stance. Therefore,
New Zealand Debt Management Office was established in 1988 as a part of the treasury to
improve the management of government debt portfolio. Similarly, in the UK, any kind of
government non-securitised borrowing from the BoE is forbidden, and the responsibility
for government debt management was transferred to the UK Debt Management Office in
April 1998 in order to improve the statutory independence of the BoE. Table 4 shows the
results of the FI based on the amended Mathew index for all three central banks. It is
worth noting that all the improvements made by the inflation targeters after the date of
initial implementation of IT are disregarded.
As adopting IT requires the absence of any form of fiscal dominance, it seems that
the CBJ needs a transition period to be fiscally independent, as can be seen from Table
Table 4. The main challenge which faces the CBJ is that the government violates the
law to achieve its advantages. This, in another way, can be seen from the expansion of
non-securitised lending to cover not only the central government expenditures but also the
public corporations’, although this kind of lending is indisputably prohibited by all the
CBJ’s fiscal legislations. In other words, this means that the CBJ needs a great deal of
reform to strengthen its liquidity management in case of moving to build the credibility
of low inflation domestically. It could even be argued that the fiscal discipline is essential
to maintain the stability of the current fixed exchange rate system. The results shown in
Table 4 indicate that the CBJ has lower FI than the two inflation targeters in their early
days of adopting IT.
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Table 4: The FI score
MPI categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Limitation on non-securitised advances 0.5 1 1
Limitation on securitised advances 0.5 1 1
Specification of the limits 0.5 1 1
Maturity of Loans 0.5 1 1
Restrictions on interest rates 0 1 1
Beneficiary of non-securitised advances 0 1 1
Participation in the primary market 1 1 1
Total(7) 3 7 7
Note 1: Categories are assigned by author based on Mathew index. Note 2: Although
the 2001 Public Debt law abolishes the 1971 public debt law, the provisory advances
to the government, as specified in Article (49) with all its amendments, has not been
abrogated by the agreement. Note 3: Maziad (2009) mentions that the 2008 memoran-
dum of understanding, signed between the central bank of Jordan and the government,
abolishes the short-run free interest rate facility on advances to the government. How-
ever, $800 million backed by government securities were lent to the government in 2008
at no cost. We agree with Ja´come et al. (2012) that any negotiation between the two
economic authorities on setting the interest rates on securitised and non-securitised
advances would ”tilt the balance in favour of governments”. Note 4: for more details
on the sixth category see Ja´come et al. (2012).
Table 5: The Ratio of Total Outstanding Debt to GDP
Year Debt/GDP
2004 102.79%
2005 92.99%
2006 91.28%
2007 83.82%
2008 77.43%
2009 70.25%
2010 74.44%
2011 77.19%
Note: own calculations. Data on Debt and GDP are extracted from the CBJ’s Statis-
tical Database
Table 6: The Ratio of the CBJ’s Lending to Government Revenue
Year Debt/GDP
2004 16.23%
2005 12.66%
2006 10.61%
2007 8.59%
2008 29.54%
2009 22.67%
2010 21.77%
Note: own calculations based on data obtained from the CBJ’s Statistical Database
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2.4 Central Bank Transparency
Twenty years ago, a new concept defining the communication between central bankers and
market agents started to take place, especially with the increasing interest in CBI. The
way through which central banks can communicate and affect the markets behaviour is
known as Central Bank Transparency (CBT). This new term comes clearly into existence
with the introduction of IT, since the first and foremost prominent aspect of IT is to an-
nounce a forward looking point or range inflation target. The process of announcing and
publishing an inflation target establishes an invisible link between the public and central
banks. However, whether or not IT alone stimulates the recent improvements in trans-
parency is still open to debate. Some argue that CBT is not necessarily linked to IT since
many central banks have amended their legislations to be more transparent although they
are not classified as inflation targeters. Nevertheless, the unanimous motivation behind
CBT comes as a result of the need to satisfy the increasing appetite of information as
financial markets become deeper and broader (Crowe and Meade, 2008).
Broadly speaking, the issue of CBT has gained much importance as many studies have
been carried out to investigate the impact of inflation expectations on inflation rate. Pro-
ponents of CBT believe that transparency is the only mean to anchor inflation expectations
and ensure the full monetary policy transmission.20 Hence, many studies have developed
from the belief that increasing the communications with private agents leads to enhance
the credibility of monetary policy. In other words, increasing the level of transparency
can affect the expectations of market agents and, consequently, the inflation rate (Van der
Cruijsen and Demertzis, 2007). According to the forward looking New Keynesian model,
monetary policy could influence the future values of inflation and output gap throughout
anchoring the market expectations about the current macroeconomic variables (Van der
Cruijsen et al., 2010). Crowe and Meade (2008), provide evidence that the private sector’s
expectations about central banks practices become more accurate when transparency is
enhanced. Likewise, Van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2007) find that countries which in-
vest in improving the monetary policy transparency benefit from fixing the private sector
expectations. According to them, a high level of transparency weakens the relationship
between inflation expectations and inflation. In addition, other authors point out that the
benefits of managing the market expectations are not limited to achieving the monetary
policy targets. Svensson (2001) believes that CBT also improves the structure of monetary
policy accountability. These benefits can only be gained by enabling the market agents to
20The concept of well-anchored inflation expectations refers to insensitivity of market agents’ reactions to
macroeconomic data releases. In other words, if market agents’ inflation expectations are weakly anchored,
it is expected that their future inflation expectation will be considerably affected by policy changes in the
long-run.
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understand the exact direction and settings of monetary policies (Blinder et al., 2008).
In fact, there are several ways through which the level of transparency can be increased
in order to reduce policy uncertainty and stabilise the private sector’s expectations, such
as releasing monetary forecasts and/or publishing the minutes, voting records, preferences
and control errors.21 Dincer and Eichengreen (2010) suggest that CBT is a key source
of policy credibility that enables the central bank to respond more effectively to market
changes. In addition, anchoring inflationary expectations is not only effective in improving
the reputation of the central bank, it is also the cheapest way to decrease the sacrifice ratio
of disinflation efforts (Chortareas et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the effect of transparency
on anchoring inflation expectations can only work out when all economic agents behave
similarly. This implies that if one economic actor, that is, the central bank, changes its
monetary policy behaviour, the conduct of market agents will be alerted, and thereby
their inflation expectations will change tremendously (Bernanke et al., 1999). According
to Lucas (1976), policy makers should employ a well-structural micro-founded model in
forming expectations to make their decisions effectively predictive.22 It follows that an
unexpected change in the central bank’s policy instrument should be incorporated by ad-
justing the coefficients of central bank’s prediction model.
In fact, the effectiveness of monetary policy relies mainly on the extent to which central
banks have the influence to use the interest rate tool efficiently. Theoretically, the level
of monetary policy effectiveness is associated with the impact of central banks’ official
interest rates on the market. Geraats et al. (2006) state that the degree of CBT has an
impact on the level of interest rate. The authors incorporated a dummy variable to reflect
the level of transparency in eight central banks over the span 1998-2002, using the index of
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). They find that, in most cases, transparency lowers long run
interest rates. In addition, Kohn et al. (2003) point out that the United States’ market
interest rates are influenced by the speeches and congressional testimony of Greenspan,
who was the Federal Reserves Governor between 1987 and 2006. Transparency gives the
monetary authority the power to influence the long-run interest rate, and thereby enhance
the role of monetary policy decisions in affecting consumption and investment (Dincer and
Eichengreen, 2010). This reflects the fact that releasing information from the monetary
authority, as a part of transparency, eliminates uncertainty about future inflation.
However, the request of gathering and analysing the information seems to be more
21More details in section 2.4.1.
22The model should include some micro variables like: agents’ preferences and the level of technology.
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efficient and highly demanded by market agents in countries with larger and deeper finan-
cial markets and flexible exchange rate regimes. (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2010) study
the effect of CBT for hundred central banks on inflation with respect to political determi-
nants. Greater transparency is found in advanced countries, where transparency can play
a fundamental role in improving the mechanism of accountability. Their study indicates
that countries with a fixed exchange rate are less transparent in their policy decisions.
Chortareas et al. (2002) state that higher degree of CBT has insignificant impacts on
inflation rates in countries with an exchange rate target. However, the impact of an ex-
change rate peg on the level of transparency is arguable. Canavan and Tommasi (1997)
and Herrendorf (1999) suggest that a fixed exchange rate is a monetary anchor through
which transparency can be improved.23 Their argument is based on the belief that a fixed
exchange rate regime provides the market with a long-run rigid indicator of monetary
policy (Chortareas et al., 2002).
It is found that CBT helps reducing the inflation volatility rather than the level of
inflation rate. The studies of Demertzis and Hallett (2007) and Drew and Karagedikli
(2008) indicate that there is no statistically significant correlation between CBT and the
level of inflation, but the variance of inflation is affected by the degree of transparency.
Nevertheless, the extent to which CBT is generally beneficial is still controversial.
Some authors argue that transparency should be unconditionally ample. According to
Chortareas et al. (2002) ”the choice of optimal degree of transparency is related to the
trade-off between flexibility and credibility”. Thus, increasing the level of transparency
might be harmful in countries with high level of transparency, while it is largely funda-
mental for poor-transparent countries. Similarly, Van der Cruijsen et al. (2010) note that
greater transparency may provide the market with bad indications over which central bank
is uncertain about the economic conditions. This may lead to confusing market agents,
and thereby decreasing the monetary policy effectiveness. The findings of Ehrmann et al.
(2012) also reveal that increasing the level of economic transparency is only optimal at
low levels of transparency.
Nonetheless, whether CBT is limited to IT rather than other nominal anchors or dis-
cretionary policies is unsettled in the literature. Some economists believe that CBT has
gained economic interest and that the literature on this issue has become popular with
the adoption of IT across many central banks. Proponents of this view tend to argue that
23They claim that a fixed exchange rate regime is preferable to other nominal anchors, as it is easily
understood and observed by the public.
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adopting IT establishes a communication link with the market, where central banks’ pref-
erences and data are shared with market agents. Crowe (2010) finds that the adoption of
IT decreases the uncertainty among the private sector in forecasting future inflation. Sim-
ilarly, Orphanides and Williams (2004) point out that IT increases the public’s awareness
and enables them to behave more rationally. However, Levin et al. (2004) conclude that
the concept of CBT is much broader than to be restricted to IT, arguing that announcing
a quantitative target is just one aspect of transparency. Nevertheless, Mishkin (2004) and
Savastano et al. (1997) have gone further to claim that transparency is a prerequisite for
adopting IT. Proponents of this notion have been supported by the intensive amendments
made by inflation targeters to enhance their transparency in order to achieve their infla-
tion target efficiently and at low costs. Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) show that the degree
of CBT of nine central banks was improved between the years 1998 to 2002. The major
amendments to central banks legislations, which directly affect the level of transparency,
have occurred in inflation targeting countries. As a matter of fact, the economists who
claim that transparency is not an IT phenomenon provide examples of inflation targeters
which have lower levels of CBT compared to some non-inflation targeters (Geraats et al.,
2006). Furthermore, some opponents usually mention the United States as a preeminent
example of a country with a high transparent monetary authority whose monetary anchor
is not formally IT.24 Yet, all their classifications underline that the highest transparent
central banks in the world are all inflation targeters, e.g., New Zealand, the United King-
dom, Canada and the Czech Republic.
Our objective in this section is to measure the transparency level of the CBJ. The
current level of transparency for the CBJ is compared to the level of transparency in the
year of announcing IT for the two inflation targeters models. To do so, this study uses
the index of Geraats et al. (2006). This index has been utilised by the majority of studies
on CBT, since it is the most comprehensive index and also workable for processing time
series and panel data analysis (Van der Cruijsen and Demertzis, 2007).
The Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index classifies the monetary policy-making prac-
tices in five aspects; each is associated with three criteria:25
1. Political Transparency presents the central bank clarification about their objective,
target quantification and the presence of institutional arrangement between govern-
ment and central bank.
24Note that the US is implicitly an inflation targeter
25The full index of Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) is enclosed in Appendix B
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2. Economic Transparency includes the information regarding the publication of the
economic data, economic model and forecasts.
3. Procedural Transparency reflects the degree of central bank openness in announcing
its strategy, voting records and minutes.
4. Policy transparency measures the transparency at explaining monetary decisions,
announcing policy changes and clarifying the information regarding the future path
of policy.
5. Operational transparency exists when the central bank assesses its performance with
respect to its objective, evaluates its monetary achievement and announces control
errors.
The overall score of all transparency sub-indexes is fifteen; each aspect has three cat-
egories with three scores in total. Thus, the aggregation of the overall index ranges from
0 (low transparency) to 15 (high transparency).
Although CBT has five dimensions, the political transparency seems to be jointly cor-
related with the definition of some CBI’s features. Nevertheless, the significant increase in
CBT has been observed in developed countries, whereas the level of CBI has been remark-
ably improved in developing and emerging market economies. In effect, enjoying a high
level of transparent policies ensures the insulation of central bank from political authority.
Greater transparency constrains the government power to contradict the central bank’s
objective of price stability. So, it could be argued that CBI is the first step to improving
the level of transparency.
To the best of our knowledge, the study of Dincer and Eichengreen (2010) is the only
study that assesses CBT for Jordan using the index of Geraats et al. (2006), ranking
Jordan among the lowest transparent central banks. However, their sample period is rel-
atively old, i.e., 1998-2004. So, our study assesses the level of transparency of the CBJ
for the year 2012, and explains each CBT aspect. Our assessment relies mainly on all
published information for the three central banks and also on other studies which have
been carried out in this scope.
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2.4.1 Political Transparency
The majority of central banks have formal objectives, but transparency is associated with
how these objectives are clarified and prioritised. Both the RBNZ and the BoE amended
in 1989 and 1992, respectively, their legislations and announced that there are officially in-
flation targeters with the objective of maintaining price stability. Although after the 2008
financial crisis both countries added the financial stability to their primary objectives, the
goal of price stability remained the first priority, and indeed achieving financial stability
leads to achieving price stability. Both central banks announce an inflation target; Gover-
nor and the Minister of Finance together set a range inflation target in New Zealand, while
the government in the United Kingdom announces a point target of inflation in the annual
budget statement. So, according to the index criteria, both central banks are assigned the
full score for the first two criteria of political transparency. Unlike the two cases, the CBJ
has many objectives to achieve. As previously mentioned, the monetary anchor in Jordan
is the fixed exchange rate to the US dollar; however, the objectives’ ordering published on
the CBJ’s website is confusing, and rather no priority is set. Although it could be argued
that the exchange rate is a quantitative target through which the price stability goal can
be achieved, the expression of the CBJ’s objectives requires more elaboration in terms of
specifying the main objective of monetary policy. All the three central banks are assigned
the full score for the third criterion, i.e., the presence of institutional arrangement be-
tween government and central bank. All of them have an institutional arrangement with
the government in which each central bank has its own legislations with explicit instrument
independence. However, for Jordan, some arrangements could be violated by the political
authority, and thereby the constitutions and arrangements between the government and
the central bank need more elaboration.
Table 7: Political Transparency Scores
Categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Objective 0.5 1 1
Quantification of the primary goal 1 1 1
Institutional arrangement 0.5 1 1
Total 2 3 3
Note: Calculated by author based on the index of Geraats et al. (2006)
The full score is assigned to the RBNZ and the BoE, as shown in Table 7, as a result of
adopting IT. This indicates that it is feasible for the CBJ to be more politically transparent
if the full-fledged IT is adopted, given the need for more central bank independency. In
fact, IT provides the market with a clear visible quantitative macro-variable with one single
41
objective, i.e., price stability. Generally, inflation targeters became politically transparent
when they adjusted their legislations to start the era of IT. So, it could be argued that
the CBJ can be fully politically transparent once it shifts to the full-fledged form of IT.
2.4.2 Economic Transparency
Economic transparency is associated with the information that formulate the policy deci-
sions. According to the index, the information that should be released by the monetary
authority includes: the economic data, the model used for forecasting or assessing the
bank’s own decisions, and macro-forecasts.
For the two inflation targeting countries, all the key fundamental data that assess the
performance of macroeconomics were made available from 2002 (Eijffinger and Geraats
(2006)). Before this year all data on money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate,
but the capacity utilization were available on the RBNZ’s website and the Office of Na-
tional Statistics of the United Kingdom. The CBJ publishes a long series of money supply,
inflation and GDP, available in Arabic and English. Yet, neither the data on capacity util-
isation nor on unemployment are published, although the data on unemployment rate can
be obtained from the Statistical Department of Jordan by authenticated request. How-
ever, following the index coding, all three central banks are given the same score with
regards to this criterion.
The second criterion reflects the disclosure of the formal macroeconomic model. The
model was not available for both New Zealand and the United Kingdom before 1997
and 1999, respectively (Geraats et al., 2006), but it is still unpublished for Jordan. The
third criterion of economic transparency clarifies whether central banks publish their own
forecasts. In the United Kingdom, the BoE publishes inflation and output forecasts in
the quarterly inflation report, this report started being published from 1997. Similarly,
the RBNZ begun publishing the quarterly monetary policy statement which includes up
to three years projections for inflation and output from 1996. Although macroeconomic
forecasts are unpublished on the CBJ’s website, we find that the key macro-variables are
published in the 2010 IMF country report. However, the three central banks, according
to our assessment, are assigned the same score as shown in Table 8.
Although the CBJ shares the same score with the two inflation targeters, there is a
distinction worth repeating here is that the CBJ, unlike the two inflation targeters in their
early days of IT, does not disclose data on unemployment to the public and it can just be
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obtained by a special request from the Statistics Department.26
Table 8: Economic Transparency Scores
Categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Data 0.5 0.5 0.5
Macro-model 0 0 0
Macro-forecasts 0 0 0
Total 0.5 0.5 0.5
Note: Calculated by author based on the index of Geraats et al. (2006)
2.4.3 Procedural Transparency
This aspect of transparency gives an indication of how monetary policy decisions are made.
Its first criterion measures the clarity of the policy strategy. The second and third criteria
are related to why a decision has been taken and how this decision has been made, respec-
tively. Our three cases have an explicit monetary strategy. The RBNZ and the BoE are
inflation targeters, while the CBJ is an exchange rate fixer. The second criterion is evenly
assigned for all three central banks. The RBNZ currently publishes the explanations of
decisions throughout the quarterly monetary policy statement, which, as mentioned ear-
lier, started being published from 1996. This is also the case of the BoE, which started
publishing such explanations via the minutes from 1998.27 However, the CBJ does not
until the time of writing this give any clear explanations of its decisions. Revising all the
CBJ publications and news on the previous decisions, it is found that the CBJ provides
unclear statements with regards to its reaction to economic changes by stating that ”a
decision has been taken by the Governor due to economic circumstances”.
Although all central banks are given the same score for the second criterion, both the
CBJ and the RBNZ have a full extra point above the BoE for the third one. In Jordan
and New Zealand, policy decisions are taken by the Governor, whereas a decision at the
BoE is taken by the monetary policy committee.28 So, for the BoE to be transparent,
the individual voting records should be submitted. Indeed, the BoE started including the
voting records along with the minute from 1998.
26However, it is not clear whether the Statistics Department has a long series of unemployment rates
and to what extent the criteria of measuring unemployment are transparent and precise.
27The 1998 Act paragraph 15-1- states that the bank ”shall publish minutes of the Monetary Policy
Commission meeting before the end of the period of 6 weeks beginning with the day of the meeting”.
28The Governor of the RBNZ states that holding the Governor responsible of taking decisions is essential
for accountability. This is because the Parliament cannot ask the bank board nor the monetary commission
to step down, but the Governor can be easily dismissed.
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Table 9: Procedural Transparency Scores
Categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Policy strategy 1 1 1
Decision explanation 0 0 0
How a decision is reached 1 1 0
Total 2 2 1
Note: Calculated by author based on the index of Geraats et al. (2006)
Although the CBJ is ranked similar to the RBNZ and higher than the BoE, as shown
in Table 9, the CBJ has to provide the market with clear statements regarding the policy
changes and outcomes, though this was not provided by both the RBNZ and the BoE
in their early days of IT. We think that providing the market with clear explanations
about the changes in the policy, the target or the instruments improves the credibility of
monetary policy.
2.4.4 Policy Transparency
This aspect of transparency assesses the speed of the announcement of any adjustments
in the policy. In addition, it concerns about whether the central bank provides an ex-
planation when adjustments are announced, and whether it takes into consideration the
declaration of future desires or intentions. All three central banks announce their deci-
sions concerning adjustments to key monetary policy instruments at least on the day of
implementation. The CBJ publishes any changes to its major instrument, i.e., the interest
rate on the same day before their implementation. However, the bank does not indicate
when a decision is precisely taken.
Although the three central banks have the commitment to announce the policy changes
promptly, the CBJ and the BoE do not give detailed explanations of why a decision is
taken. For instance, the CBJ, as mentioned earlier, attributes any changes in the policy
to the economic conditions. The RBNZ used initially to conduct in the same way but
not after the introduction of the official cash rate in 1999 (Geraats et al., 2006). Unlike
the RBNZ, both the CBJ and the BoE provide no indication or inclination about their
future preference policy. Again, as greater transparency in the policy aspect happened for
the RBNZ only after a decade of adopting IT, these amendments are not considered in
our assessment. Therefore, all the three cases are given the same score according the index.
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Table 10: Policy Transparency Scores
Categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Prompt announcing of policy adjustment 1 1 1
Explanation of the adjustment announced 0 0 0
Explicit inclination of future actions 0 0 0
Total 1 1 1
Note: Calculated by author based on the index of Geraats et al. (2006)
All the three central banks announce their policy changes almost on the day when the
decision is taken, so all of them are assigned the full score. However, the second criterion
in Table 10 may cause confusion with the second one in Table 9. Hence, it is worth ex-
plaining that the two criteria are not overlapping. The criterion of policy transparency
reflects whether the central bank announces promptly an explanation of its decision re-
garding the operating target or instrument, namely on the day when the decision is taken,
whereas, the second criterion of procedural transparency does not refer to the immediate
comprehensive explanation of a policy change.
2.4.5 Operational Transparency
This aspect evaluates whether central banks assess their policy actions and outcomes with
regards to their objectives on a regular basis. It also evaluates whether the central bank
provides information regarding the control errors that affected the monetary policy trans-
mission in the past. The CBJ issues monthly, quarterly and yearly reports concerning the
performance of major macroeconomic variables. These reports show how the indicators
are reached and evaluated according to the bank’s objectives. The reports also provide
an upshot about the changes in the economic sectors, detailing a number or percent-
age of every change. However, the CBJ does not indicate how control errors affect the
transmission of monetary policy nor it indicates the reaction of monetary policy to shocks.
At the beginning of IT, the RBNZ and the BoE did not evaluate their main operating
target. For the the UK, this is because the BoE was granted its operational independence
in 1997. For the RBNZ, the policy outcomes were not evaluated until 1999, when the
official cash rate was introduced. In addition, both the BoE and the RBNZ used to pub-
lish no information about the control errors and the assessment of the policy outcomes
until the end of the previous century.29 However, they do not, until the time of writing
this, achieve the full score of the second and third criteria of the index. This is because
the effect of operational transparency is unsettled in the literature and flexibility could be
29See Geraats et al. (2006) and Van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2007) for more details
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costly in high-transparent economies (Geraats et al., 2006).
Interestingly, the CBJ is more operationally transparent compared to the case of the
BoE and the RBNZ in their early days of IT, as can be seen from Table 11. The CBJ
does not provide information about the control errors, though. This criterion is still con-
troversial and not implemented entirely by any central bank in the world.
Noticeably, greater transparency in our two inflation targeters models has not hap-
pened after moving to IT, but has rather started after a lag period of time, approximately
five years for the BoE and ten years for the RBNZ. The immediate increase in transparency
due to adopting IT affected the political aspect. Accordingly, it could be argued that im-
proving the level of the CBJ transparency is feasible, given a high level of central bank
independence. However, it is worth noting that the two inflation targeters are currently
classified as the most transparent central banks in the world.
Table 11: Operational Transparency Scores
Categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Policy operating target evaluation 1 0 0
Information about disturbances 0 0 0
Evaluation of the policy outcome 1 0 0
Total 2 0 0
Note: Calculated by author based on the index of Geraats et al. (2006)
Table 12: Total Transparency Scores
Categories CBJ (2012) RBNZ (1990) BoE (1992)
Political transparency 2.5 3 3
Economic transparency 0.5 0.5 0.5
Procedural transparency 2 2 1
Policy transparency 1 1 1
Operational transparency 2 0 0
Total 7 6.5 5.5
Note: Calculated by author based on the index of Geraats et al. (2006)
According to Table 12, Jordan appears to have higher level of CBT than the two infla-
tion targeters in the first year of IT. On the other hand, the standard of the index coding
treats all banks similarly regarding the economic transparency although the unemploy-
ment rate for Jordan is not published. Besides, the CBJ should provide the market with
any change in monetary policy as well as detailed explanations of adjustments. However,
the CBJ could improve its political transparency in case of adopting a full-fledged IT.
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2.5 Conclusions
From the experience of developed and emerging market economies in adopting inflation
targeting, there are some features found to characterise inflation targeters, and agreed to
be preconditions for other countries aiming at successfully moving to target inflation on
domestic bases. Our main purposes are to assess whether it is possible to target inflation
in a small emerging market economy like Jordan, and to highlight the institutional dif-
ficulties in building the credibility of low inflation domestically. In this study, the main
institutional preconditions for inflation targeting: central bank independence and trans-
parency are assessed. We intend to compare the current economic conditions of Jordan to
that of two inflation targeters, taking as model cases: New Zealand, the first to adopt IT,
and the UK, in their early days of implementing inflation targeting
The central bank independence index, set by Mathew (2003), is utilised to assess the
level of personal, economic and financial independence; however, we made some changes
to the index criteria to be compatible with our purpose of the study. We capture the
dominance of the political authority in Jordan in different aspects. The study highlights
some weaknesses in the central bank’s Acts and the clash between the government prac-
tices and the monetary authority’s legislations. Although according to many criteria the
central bank appears to have its autonomy, the practices of the government clash with the
personal legislations of the bank, and thereby the formal collaborations between the two
authorities are ambiguous. In terms of political independence, although appointing and
dismissing Governor and deputies are decided by two sides; i.e., the head of the country
and the Prime Minister, it is recommended to entrust the parliament with the role of ap-
pointing and dismissing Governor and deputies, given that the Prime Minister in Jordan
is appointed by the king. We also suggest the need to set limitations on Governor or
deputy tenure; i.e., the terms of office should not exceed ten years, as in the case of the
UK; paragraphs 1 (3) and (4) by section 243 (1) of 2009 Act.
If the country decides to move towards building the credibility of low prices domesti-
cally, central bank target independence should be granted; both the central bank and the
government should elaborate on how to set and announce the inflation target. Consider-
ing the weak and fragile historical collaborations between the monetary authority and the
government in Jordan and unlike the two inflation targeters cases, it is fundamental to set
legal limitations on exchange rate policies and negotiations with the government which
ensure that the words of the monetary authority are always heard and that the monetary
policies are tilted in favour of long-term social and economic benefits. It is also impor-
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tant to have an independent exchange rate strategy. In this respect, we refer to Al Malki
(1994) on his notes on the 1967 exchange rate depreciation, when the currency was fixed to
the British Pound, “... The central bank provided the government with a comprehensive
study upon the adverse effects and consequences of depreciating the currency against the
British Pound and recommended to keep the exchange rate parity fixed...; However, on
20th November 1967 and upon a meeting between the central bank board and the Cabinet,
the currency was allowed to depreciate by 14.3%... After that, it had taken two decades,
namely during the 1989 Dinar crisis, to reckon the adverse consequences of opposing the
deep perceptive of the central bank...” (Al Malki, 1994, p.261).30 Given that historical
context, target independence is highly important for the case of Jordan under any mone-
tary regime. However, having suggested this, New Zealand, where the target of monetary
policy is set mutually between the Minister of Finance and Governor, is still an appeal-
ing example to follow coupled with the motivation of ensuring central bank accountability.
In addition, according to our assessment, the central bank of Jordan is weakly inde-
pendent in terms of financial policies; the non-securitised lending offered generously with
free market interest rates to cover the expenditure of the public corporations alongside
the central government. Taking into account the legislations enacted by the 2001 Public
Debt Law, the absence of fiscal discipline presents a challenge to achieve price stability do-
mestically; this could also be a threat to the current monetary anchor. The central bank
of Jordan and the government, side by side, should collaborate to enhance the central
bank’s legislations and policies and curtail fiscal deficit moneterisation. In this respect, it
would be ideal to establish a sperate office to hold the responsibility for government debt
management, similar to the experience of the UK.
The level of transparency is assessed using the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index.
The challenges concerning the level of central bank transparency appear to be less promi-
nent. However, ensuring an independent central bank is a fundamental base to make
improvements to the level of transparency. Comparing the scores assigned for Jordan
to the two inflation targeters, it could be argued that the central bank of Jordan could
be more politically transparent by adjusting its objectives and target to move towards a
full-fledged inflation targeting. Nonetheless, the central bank has to be more transparent
stating clearly the policy changes and the corresponding actions and releasing all macroe-
conomic data that help setting the market expectations and improve the credibility of the
central bank, taking into consideration the trade-off between flexibility and credibility of
information releases.
30translated by the researcher.
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Chapter 3
The Credibility and limitations of Monetary Policy Under
The Fixed Exchange Rate System: The (A)symmetric
Transmission Mechanism in Jordan
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3.1 Introduction
The credibility of achieving the announced quantitative target for price stability requires
an effective and efficient monetary policy. This effectiveness is determined by the mag-
nitude and speed at which monetary policy affects retail interest rates to reach the final
goals by influencing consumption and investment decisions. Although they are different
channels for monetary policy and the importance of each channel varies across countries,
economies and time (Amarasekara, 2005), the interest rate pass through channel is the
most widely used channel through which the monetary objectives of maintaining price
stability and/or inducing output growth can be achieved. In fact, this channel has gained
much attention in recent literature and started cropping its popularity with the introduc-
tion of inflation targeting to be a vital and effective channel in achieving the goal of price
stability (Gigineishvili, 2011).
If the transmission mechanism is incomplete and inefficient, the monetary authority
will find it difficult to influence consumers’ and businesses’ behaviour, and, consequently,
it will be impeded to achieve its intermediate and long-run goals. Hence, it is important
to assess the effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving the key macroeconomic goals
and the effectiveness in bringing price stability into economy. This assessment is crucially
essential for designing policymaking rules.
The interest rate channel is designed to convey the policy message, that is, to influence
domestic demand and output, through affecting retail interest rates. In other words, in
case of expansionary monetary policy, lowering official interest rates should pass on to
retail interest rates to encourage investment and consumption (Karagiannis et al., 2011).
Essentially, the monetary policy accounts for one side of the whole transmission pro-
cess; the part of inducing the change. The other side of sending the change to the public is
represented by the financial intermediaries, and their role is as essential as central bank’s.
Commercial banks play a major role, as dispatchers of monetary policy innovations, in
correcting the economic path. For monetary policy to be effective and highly credible in
the market, a change in official interest rates should be completely and quickly transmitted
into changes in retail interest rates.
To understand to how extent monetary policy affects investment and consumption to
meet the monetary policy goals, measuring the size and speed at which monetary impulses
are transmitted could reflect the credibility of monetary policy. In this study, we focus
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on assessing the monetary policy transmission within its intermediate lag of an action for
the case of Jordan. Practically, there are three time lags between taking an action to
when the macro variables react to official changes. The first lag, or the central bank inside
lag, lies between the time when an action is taken and when it is pragmatically imple-
mented. The intermediate lag is the time lag from when an action is taken by commercial
banks to when spending decisions are affected. The third lag, or outside lag, occurs in the
last part of the chain, reflecting the time needed for macroeconomic variables to assimi-
late the changes transmitted through the monetary policy conveyers (Amarasekara, 2005).
Inflation targeting countries, either developed or developing, employ the interest rate
channel to achieve the long run objective of price stability along the other intermediate tar-
gets. Our aim is to assess the effectiveness of the Interest Rate Pass-Through (IRPT), the
main monetary policy transmission channel in Jordan, by examining whether the degree
of pass-through is complete and quick and comparing the results to two inflation targeters
models, New Zealand and the UK, at time proceeding building the rules of monetary pol-
icy domestically. This comparison helps better understand the size of reforms needed for
countries with monetary policy actions veiled behind a fixed exchange rate system, and
allows understanding the difficulties facing a country while building the credibility of low
inflation domestically.
We focus on the role of marginal pricing costs which reflects how official monetary
policies are strong in affecting banks profitability, regulating banking system and thus
achieving price stability. Therefore, we first test whether the degree of pass-through is
complete and quick. An effective monetary policy means that a one percent change in
official interest rates, which could initially be exerted to money market interest rates,
leads promptly to a one percent change in retail interest rates. In fact, the degree of pass-
through could reflect the market structure. In the presence of incomplete pass-through, the
market reflects a high degree of imperfect competition (De Bondt, 2002), switching costs,
information asymmetries (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004), banks fixed adjustment costs or
reliance on long-term capital market funds (Bredin et al., 2002). The pass-through in such
cases of sluggishness is described as sticky.
In addition, while symmetric behaviour of financial intermediaries to monetary shocks
can be an indicator of market efficiency, in which retail interest rates respond indifferently
to changes in official interest rates, the mismatching response in loan and deposit markets
would occur due to market concentration or consumer sophistication (Karagiannis et al.,
2011). There are two hypotheses which explain the deviation from symmetry in an in-
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dustry. According to the structure performance hypothesis, the non-competitive pricing
behaviour happens in concentrated markets where firms have the power to set the market
prices. On contrary, an efficient structure of economy as implied by the efficient structure
hypothesis allows firms to enjoy large scale of economies and thus to produce at a low cost
which adds to the welfare of households and public. Hannan and Berger (1991) Berger and
Hannan (1989) explain the two behaviours in the banking industry. Banks in concentrated
markets, according to them, set low deposit interest rates compared to other banks oper-
ating in less concentrated markets. Hence, banks respond faster to decrease their interest
rates on deposit, following an official change, when they are above long-run equilibrium.
Therefore, we also examine the (a)symmetric behaviour of the financial market.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section two explains the methodology applied to
examine the interest rate pass-through and the asymmetries in the market. Section two
and three present the data and results, respectively. The last section provides conclusions
and policy implications.
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3.2 Methodology
Since many economic variables are found to be cointegrated of order one, studying the
relationship between two economic variables in first difference will invalidate their long run
nexus. In principle, a random linear combination of two series of the same order will also
be cointegrated of that order, and the problem of spurious regression may arise (Harris,
1995). Nevertheless, if we have two cointegrated series of order one, the residuals of the
regression will be stationary I(0), and inference by means of standard hypothesis testing
would be valid.
The partial adjustment model, which identifies the relationship between retail interest
rates and official interest rates, where the latter is assumed to be weakly exogenous, can
be represented as follows:
rrt = φ0 + φ1mmt + ut (1)
rr is the price charged for given loans, or offered to depositors by commercial banks, φ0 is
constant markup or markdown on retail interest rate, mm is the official or money market
interest rate set by central banks, and ut is the error term. Money market interest rates
could also be seen as banks marginal cost of funding, which reflects the marginal yield
of free-risky assets (Weth, 2002). In a perfect competitive financial market, prices set
by commercial banks should equal marginal costs, represented in our study by official or
money market interest rates. Therefore, the derivative of retail interest rates with respect
to money market interest rates should equal one (De Bondt, 2002). In most cases, φ1 lies
between zero and one. The value of one implies a complete pass-through, which means
that retail interest rates are perfectly elastic to changes in money market interest rates.
However, it is rare that φ1 would equal one, owing to market power, information asym-
metries, switching costs, adverse customer reaction, adjustment costs and the possibility
to access different source of finance. In addition, because of information asymmetries, an
overshooting in the pass-through, that is, φ1 >1, might also occur in a situation where
banks behave irrationally in compensating their default risk (De Bondt, 2002), by increas-
ing their interest rates instead of decreasing the supply of loans (Aziakpono and Wilson,
2010).
Studying the stickiness in prices or retail interest rates has received heavy attention
in the literature, which came initially from studying the pass-through of industrial or-
ganisation prices in concentrated markets (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004), using different
error correction models. In this study, we use the Johansen approach (Johansen, 1991)
to estimate the long run degree of pass-through along with the speed of adjustment to
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disequilibrium. The Johansen general equation of vector error correction form is as follows:
∆Zt = µ+ pi∆Zt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
τZt−i + t (2)
pi = αβ (3)
Where Zt is a vector of jointly endogenous variables and pi contains information about the
long run relationships between the variables.31 In accordance, the Johansen reduced rank
regression of the long run relationship is identified in equation 3, as α represents the speed
of adjustment to disequilibrium, whereas β is a matrix of long run coefficients. In this
case, β reflects the magnitude of pass-through, while α shows the speed at which retail
interest rates respond to changes in official interest rates.
According to equations 2 and 3, Johansen suggests that the reduced rank of pi con-
tains a number of cointegrating vectors exist in β : r ≤ n − 1. To specify the number of
r, Johansen puts forward to test two ratios of maximised likelihood functions, known as
the maximal eigenvalue, or lambda-max statistic, and the trace test. In order to look for
[n− 1] cointegrating relationships, the non-stationarity should be ensured.
After obtaining the long run equilibrium, we examine the existence of asymmetries over
an interest rate cycle. Hence, we employ the dynamic model, which connects both the
short-run and the long-run effects using the error correction term. The following equation
represents the full system of Hendry and Doornik (1994), which identifies the conditional
dynamic model when the money market interest rate is weakly exogenous:
∆rrt = δ0 + δ1∆mmt +
p∑
q=1
δt−qmmt−q +
n∑
i=1
γrrt−i + λectt−1 + εt (4)
∆ denotes the first difference of retail and money market interest rates. δ1 and δ2 rep-
resent the short run pass-through and the parameters of the lagged exogenous variable,
respectively. γ is the coefficient of the lagged endogenous interest rates. λ refers to the
speed of adjustment when retail interest rates adjust indifferently to money market rates
changes. ectt−1 = [rrt−1 − α0 − α1mmt−1 ] is the residual of the long run relationship
obtained from equation 1 by the Johansen approach at time (t-1). The sign of λ should
be negative to ascertain stationary. q and i are the optimal lag length determined by the
information criteria. εt is the white noise error term.
The simple model of equation 4 is:
rrt = α0 + α1mmt + λectt−1 + εt (5)
31Note that, according to Johansen equation, no restriction is imposed. Nevertheless, in our analysis,
money market interest rates are considered exogenously determined.
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According to the equation above, the mean lag (Hendry and Doornik, 1994) is:32
ML = (δ1 − 1)/λ (6)
The mean lag of equation 6 measures the degree of stickiness for symmetric error correc-
tion model, where high ML reflects a slow or sticky response to changes in money market
interest rates. This in our analysis reflects the short run lag, i.e., months, needed for a
full long run equilibrium adjustment.
In practice, banks would respond differently to official interest rates changes in an
attempt to maximise their profit by widening the spread between interest rates on de-
posit and that on loans. However, this behaviour depends mainly on the level of market
structure. In a weak competitive market, banks incline to respond to a decrease in official
interest rates by lowering their interest rates on deposit quicker than on loans (Weth,
2002), whereas a high competitive market adds to the welfare of households and investors
(van der Cruijsen, 2008).
According to the findings of Berger and Hannan (1989) and Hannan and Berger (1991),
banks in oligopolistic markets have major price rigidity, and thereby their deposit interest
rates are stickier upward. Similar view of noncompetitive pricing behaviour is argued by
Neumark and Sharpe (1992). Two hypotheses are put forward to explain asymmetric
reactions to monetary policy shocks: the bank concentration, or bank’s collusive pricing
hypothesis, and the consumer behaviour hypothesis (Scholnick, 1996). The latter hy-
pothesis exhibits “the degree of consumer sophistication with respect to capital market”
Karagiannis et al. (2011). In other words, this means that sophisticated consumers are
able to hinder the market power and thereby, deposit markets respond slower following a
decrease in money market rates but quicker following an increase. By contrast, the bank
concentration pricing hypothesis suggests that banks can exercise their market power by
adjusting their interest rates quicker downward on deposit and upward on loans.
Therefore, to see if retail interest rates are rigid upward or downward, we incorporate
two dummy variables depending on whether retail interest rates are above or below their
long-run equilibrium level. This approach is followed by Scholnick (1996) and Ozdemir
(2009). However, we do not use their specification of the dynamic equation; we do not
remove the lagged coefficients of retail and money market rates as in Scholnick (1996) nor
we do omit the intercept from the main equation 4 as in Ozdemir (2009). We spilt the
32In a simple dynamic model, a mean lag measures the time needed for the regressand to converge to
its long-run equilibrium level, and depends on the magnitude of (δ1 − 1). For further details, see (Hendry,
1995).
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error correction term into two series:
ect+ = ect if ect > µ
ect+ = 0 if ect < µ
ect− = ect if ect < µ
ect− = 0 if ect > µ
Where µ is the mean of ect. After including the two dummy variables to equation 4, the
new equation is presented as:
∆rrt = δ0 + δ1∆mmt + δt−q
p∑
q=1
mmt−q + γ
n∑
i=1
rrt−i + λ1ect+t−1 + λ2ect
−
t−1 + εt (7)
λ1 acts as the speed of adjustment when retail interest rates are above their equilibrium
level, and the opposite for λ2.
Our methodology to examine the asymmetries in the financial market could also be
seen as a threshold autoregressive error correction model followed by Enders and Siklos
(2001) and Enders and Chumrusphonlert (2004). In both studies, two dummy variables
are included to capture the changes, i.e., when the error term is above and below its long
run equilibrium level; however, they set the threshold value, µ in our case, to zero.
Retail interest rates are said to be adjusted symmetrically if the coefficient of ect+t−1 is
not statistically different from the coefficient of ect−t−1. Hence, a Wald test is conducted to
test the equality between the two coefficients: λ1 = λ2 = 0. The asymmetric hypothesis
can be rejected if the P-value is less than the level of significance. As explained by the
bank’s collusion hypothesis, if λ1 > λ2, then the response in deposit market is quicker
upward than downward, while if λ2 > λ1, the change in loan rate is faster upward than
downward. It is assumed, according to equations 4 and 6, that retail interest rates behave
indifferently with respect to decreases or increases in official interest rates. The following
equations show the mean adjustment lag when retail interest rates respond asymmetrically
to money market interest rates changes (Liu et al., 2008):
ML+ = (δ1 − 1)/λ1 (8)
ML− = (δ1 − 1)/λ2 (9)
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3.3 Data Collection and Description
All data on Jordanian official, money market interest rates and retail interest rates are
obtained from the CBJ’s Statistical Database. For our comparison purpose, the series
of New Zealand’s deposit interest rate and British interest rates on lending and deposit
are extracted from the International Monetary Fund/ International Financial Statistics,
whereas, the remaining series: the RBNZ’s bill rate-30 and 60 days, interest rate on hous-
ing loan and deposit and British certificates of deposit, are collected from the released
Statistical Database of the their central banks.
All the series represent monthly data from January to December. However, we allow
the time prior to IT for the two inflation targeters models to be compared to the recent
period for Jordan. In accordance, as IT has been adopted in 1990 by the RBNZ and in
1992 by the BoE, we cover the span 1985-1990 and 1985-1992 for New Zealand and the
UK, respectively. For Jordan, the years between 1995 and 2011 are covered; however, we
cover the years from 1997 to 2007 for one money market interest rate, that is, the interest
rate on three months certificates of deposit, as it was the CBJ’s main operating instrument
until the early 2008. Each country’s official and retail interest rates utilised in the analysis
are illustrated in Table 13 and Table14, respectively.
Table 13: Official Interest Rates
Country Official Interest Rate
Jordan CD: Interest rate on Certificate of Deposit
Jordan Redis: Rediscount rate
Jordan Repo: Interest rate on repurchase agreement
New Zealand TB-30: Bank bill yield-30 days
New Zealand TB-60: Bank bill yield-60 days
UK CD: 3 months average of Sterling certificates of deposit interest rate
Table 14: Retail Interest Rates
Country Retail Interest Rate
Jordan Deposit: Weighted average interest rate on demand deposit
Jordan Loan: Weighted average interest rate on loans and advances
New Zealand Housing: Floating first mortgage new customer housing rate
New Zealand Deposit: Six-month term deposit rate
UK Lending: Lending interest rate
UK Deposit: Interest rate on deposit
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3.4 Results
We test for the order of integration of the variables by the mean of the well-known Dickey
and Fuller (1979) test. The results, shown in Tables 15, 16 and 17 point out the possibility
for a long-run of order one relationship between each retail interest rate and money market
rate. A constant is added to the test equation, and the lag length of the test is determined
by the Schwartz information criterion.
Table 15: Unit Root Test-Jordan
Series NO. Obs Level Prob. First difference Prob.
loan 204 -0.408 0.904 -17.648 0.000
Deposit 204 -0.713 0.839 -16.035 0.000
Redisc 204 -1.206 0.671 -7.399 0.000
Repo 204 -0.904 0.76 -11.726 0.000
CD 132 -1.796 0.38 -11.46 0.000
Loan 132 -0.619 0.861 -16.066 0.000
Deposit 132 -0.913 0.781 -14.086 0.000
Table 16: Unit Root Test-New Zealand
Series NO. Obs Level Prob. First difference Prob.
TB-30 72 -1.953 0.306 -9.751 0.000
TB-60 72 -1.871 0.343 -3.277 0.000
Housing 72 -1.357 0.598 -3.277 0.019
Deposit 72 -1.158 0.687 -6.67 0.000
Table 17: Unit Root Test-UK
Series NO. Obs Level Prob. First difference Prob.
CD 96 -1.245 0.651 -7.714 0.000
Lending 96 -1.258 0.646 -6.875 0.000
Deposit 96 -2.241 0.192 -11.503 0.000
In all cases, the series are found to be stationary on first difference, which comprises
the first step to look for a cointegrating relationship. The optimal lag length is determined
based on the Schwartz information criterion to ensure that the residuals are all Gaussian.
Tables 18, 19 and 20, 2nd column, show the optimal lag length of the relationship between
each retail and money market interest rate. Using the Johansen approach, a cointegrating
relationship is found between each official interest rate and retail interest rate, except
between the British CD and deposit.33 Both Johansen maximum likelihood tests confirm
that we cannot reject the hypothesis of one cointegrating vector, as given in Tables 18, 19
and 20.
33Even in the short run, the relationship between the two interest rates is found to be weak with money
market coefficient equals 0.40.
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Post to the 2003 Iraq War, Jordan’s official interest rates increased rapidly until the
2008 financial crisis as can be seen from Figure 1. Apparently, the money market interest
rates do not respond to changes in domestic inflation rates. The official interest rates
reflect the changes in the Federal Fund Interest Rate (FFIR), depicted in Figure 2, given
the commitment to the pegged exchange rate to the U.S. dollar system. In addition, in
Figure 3, the mark-up of the interest rate on loans and the mark-down of interest rate on
deposit increased markedly during the financial crisis onwards. This could be attributed
to the cost-minimisation pursuit of the banking sector in Jordan.
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Figure 1: : Jordan- rediscount rate, repo rate and inflation
*Inflation rate is calculated based on the monthly consumer price index gathered from the CBJ’s
Statistical Database.
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Figure 2: : Jordan- rediscount rate, repo rate and Federal Fund interest rate
*FFIR is obtained from the database of the Federal Reserve Bank of America .
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Figure 3: : Jordan- rediscount rate, repo rate, loan and deposit
Table 18: Trace and Max-Eigen Tests-Jordan
Series lags Trace statistic critical value Max-Eigen statistic critical value
r≤1 %5 r≤1 %5
Redisc/Deposit 2 28.592* 20.261 19.947* 15.892
Redisc/loan 1 32.401* 20.261 26.397* 15.892
Repo/ Deposit 3 30.484* 20.261 23.840* 15.892
Repo/loan 1 23.282* 20.261 20.945* 15.892
CD/Deposit 3 29.632* 20.261 24.793* 15.892
CD/loan 2 24.872** 15.494 21.633** 14.264
Note: *significant at 5% level according to Osterwald-Lenum (1992) critical values of
model 2 (Constant in the cointegration space). **significant at 5% level according
to Osterwald-Lenum (1992) critical values of model 3 (Constant in the cointegration
space and linear trend in the data).
Table 19: Trace and Max-Eigen Tests-New Zealand
Series lags Trace statistic critical value Max-Eigen statistic critical value
r≤1 %5 r≤1 %5
Housing/TB-30 2 23.809* 20.261 20.206* 15.892
Deposit/TB-30 1 20.347** 15.494 17.535** 14.264
Housing/TB-60 2 22.286* 20.261 19.163* 15.892
Deposit/TB-60 1 20.244** 15.494 17.614** 14.264
Note: *significant at 5% level according to Osterwald-Lenum (1992) critical values of
model 2 (Constant in the cointegration space). **significant at 5% level according
to Osterwald-Lenum (1992) critical values of model 3 (Constant in the cointegration
space and linear trend in the data).
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Table 20: Trace and Max-Eigen Tests-UK
Series lags Trace statistic critical value Max-Eigen statistic critical value
r≤1 %5 r≤1 %5
Lending/CD 1 45.276** 15.494 43.547** 14.264
Deposit/CD ... No cointegration
Note: *significant at 5% level according to Osterwald-Lenum (1992) critical values of
model 2 (Constant in the cointegration space). **significant at 5% level according
to Osterwald-Lenum (1992) critical values of model 3 (Constant in the cointegration
space and linear trend in the data).
Intuitively, as official interest rates are supposed to affect retail interest rates and not
vice versa, money market interest rates should be treated as weakly exogenous. This
implies that the speed of adjustment or α for official interest rates in equation 3, should
not be significantly different from zero. This is to ensure that the past disequilibria have
no remaining effects on official interest rates. The results, shown in Table 18, Table 19
and Table 20, indicate that all α of official interest rates are weakly exogenous.34
Table 21: Cointegration Test-Jordan
Official/Retail lags β α(retail) α(official)
normalised
Rediscount/Deposit 2 0.204 (0.027) -0.073*** (0.018) -0.120 (0.064)
Rediscount/loan 1 1.088 (0.161) -0.0415*** (0.007) -0.010 (0.009)
Repurchase/Deposit 3 0.173 (0.017) -0.102*** (0.020) -0.077 (0.108)
Repurchase/loan 1 0.848 (0.129) -0.043*** (0.009) -0.005 (0.014)
CD/Deposit 6 0.233 (0.029) -0.091*** (0.018) 0.132 (0.140)
CD/loan 2 1.276 (0.216) -0.037*** (0.008) 0.021 (0.019)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 22: Cointegration Test-New Zealand
Official/Retail lags β α(retail) α(official)
normalised
Housing/TB-30 2 0.657 (0.086) -0.082*** (0.027) 0.283 (0.164)
Deposit/TB-30 1 0.715 (0.125) -0.157*** (0.038) 0.166 (0.135)
Housing/TB-60 2 0.634 (0.082) -0.097*** (0.030) 0.152 (0.159)
Deposit/TB-60 1 0.700 (0.118) -0.173*** (0.041) 0.116 (0.113)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
34For the case of Jordan, saving deposit interest rate was found to be first difference stationary; however,
their market rates’ α (money market; Redisc and Repo) are significantly different from zero. Therefore, we
exclude this retail rate from our analysis although the Granger causality test indicates that the causality
runs from the money market rates to saving interest rates.
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Table 23: Cointegration Test-UK
Official/Retail lags β α(retail) α(official)
normalised
Lending/CD 1 1.012 (0.011) -0.620*** (0.298) 0.237 (0.366)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
The estimated β, which indicates the degree of pass-through, varies in Jordan from
incomplete to overshooting. Although this might reflect the imperfect competition in the
Jordanian banking sector, it is not possible, due to the lack of information released by
the CBJ which explain the market structural behaviour, such as the commercial banks’
market share of all mortgages issued, to infer whether or not market power exists. In gen-
eral, for Jordan, the degree of pass-through indicates that the changes in money market
interest rates are not fully absorbed by retail interest rates. Furthermore, the overshoot-
ing response of retail interest rates, with respect to changes in rediscount rate, indicates
that banks in Jordan behave irrationally due to information asymmetries. Nevertheless,
as it is clear from the results, the repo rate has the most significant impact on the loan
interest rate; a unit change in repo rate is reflected after one lag by 0.85 changes in loan
rate. However, the degree of pass-through from all money market interest rates to deposit
interest rates is weak.
For New Zealand, the magnitude of pass-through points out that the bill interest rates
changes are not completely reflected into changes in retail interest rates. However, these
results might not be optimal owing to the fact that bank bill rate was not the RBNZ’s
main monetary instrument. The main monetary interest rate between 1985 and 1990 was
the overnight interbank cash rate, which is found stationary at level.35 Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Liu et al. (2008), IRPTC in New Zealand is still, even after the introduction
of the official cash rate in 1999, incomplete for all retail interest rates, but some: floating
mortgage rate, the base lending rate, and the six-months deposit rate. This was attributed
to low household savings and the reliance of the banking sector on international markets
to finance their supply for mortgages. An immediate pass-through is only observed for
the British case, where the magnitude of pass-through is close to one.
In fact, for Jordan, the results provide evidence that the money market instruments
are not effective in inducing changes in retail interest rates. This might be due to the
35Bill rates are the only cointegrated of order one series found to match our targeted period (1985-1990).
The cointegrating relationship between the interbank-overnight rate and deposit is found to be starting
from the year 1994.
62
existence of market power, information asymmetries, switching costs, and the openness
to the world financial markets. Besides, as shown in Figure 1, it is likely that the official
interest rates in Jordan are not powerful at provoking changes in the domestic market,
given the current monetary anchor.
Tables 24 to Table 32 provide the results of the dynamic model estimated for all
cases.36 The symmetric and asymmetric dynamic model of equations 4 and 7 are esti-
mated, respectively, before and after dropping the insignificant lagged values of exogenous
and endogenous variables. The parsimonious results of both equations do not give any
noteworthy difference compared to the general results. We conduct a Wald test to examine
the asymmetries. For each case, we test the null hypothesis if λ1 is not different from λ2
and reject the null if the critical value of the F test’s critical value is less than the cal-
culated value. Generally, in most cases, we could not reject the equality between λ1 and λ2.
We find an asymmetric response in the Jordanian loan market, when the monetary
instrument is the repo rate, at 10% level of significance. The asymmetric result shows that
banks are more sluggish to decrease their interest rates on loan but they are quicker to
increase them. This behaviour could be explained by the structure hypothesis or the bank
concentration hypothesis, which indicates that the non-competitive pricing behaviour ex-
ists in Jordan. Moreover, even when we assume no asymmetries in the loan market, the
symmetric mean lags of the loan rate with respect to changes in rediscount and repo rates
are slow; in both cases the banks need more than twenty months to converge to the long
run equilibrium, while the deposit market shows no deviation from symmetry, and rather
a faster mean lag, i.e., 10-13 months. Generally, the results reveal that even if there are
no asymmetries in the market, substantial lags are needed in the short run, reflecting
a sluggish response to changes in the CBJ’s interest rate instrument. In addition, it is
clear that the changes in the retail market interest rates in Jordan are not mainly due to
changes in the money market interest rates. Adjusted R2 for the loan and deposit market
are very low, i.e., 20%. This questions the efficiency of the monetary policy in Jordan in
handling the changes in the domestic market. The results of the dynamic effects, in Table
24, Table 25, Table 26 and Table 27 indicate that monetary policy in Jordan is not only
weak in the long-run but the impact of money market interest rates on retail interest rates
is also neutral in the short-run as the magnitude of pass-through for most money market
interest rates lags appears insignificant.
Interestingly, the asymmetric behaviour in deposit markets is not observed in Jordan
36Parameters constancy tests and CUSUM test for stability are provided in Appendix C.
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but in New Zealand. The deposit interest rate in the latter is found to be sticky upward,
which is compatible with the collusive hypothesis. The quickest response with no asym-
metries among all cases is found in the UK; the lending rate was adjusted to a monetary
shock within the same month, while the retail interest rates in New Zealand needed eight
to nine months to converge to the long run equilibrium.
The IRPT results for Jordan clarify the limitations of monetary policy under the
pegged exchange rate regime. With a low degree of pass-through, deviation from symmetry
in the loan market and high mean lags, supporting with low R2, the results indicate that
the monetary policy in Jordan is ineffective. Therefore, the credibility of monetary policy
in Jordan in affecting the domestic disturbances, other than providing the market with a
price anchor, is obscure. Considering central bank independence as a prior condition, and
by comparing the results to our two inflation targeters in their period prior to IT, we can
conclude that the effectiveness of the IRPTC in Jordan needs to be thoroughly solidified
to enable building the credibility of low inflation domestically.
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Table 24: Jordan: Short-run Symmetric/Asymmetric Results
Official/Redisc Retail/Deposit GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant -0.061 -0.065 -0.059 -0.062
(-0.015) (0.22) (0.014) (0.022)
∆rediscount -0.002 -0.002 dropped dropped
(-0.02) (0.02)
∆rediscountt−1 -0.006 -0.007 dropped dropped
(-0.02) (0.02)
∆rediscountt−2 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(-0.02) (0.021) (0.02) (0.02)
∆depositt−1 -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.286*** -0.286***
(-0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
∆depositt−2 -0.131* -1.32* -0.131* -0.131*
(-0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
Symmetric ect -0.075 -0.072
-0.018 0.017
Symmetric ML 13
Above equilibrium -0.081 -0.079
0.04 0.039
Below equilibrium 0.077 -0.075
0.024 0.023
ML+ 12
ML− 13
R2 0.232 0.232 0.231 0.231
AdjustedR2 0.208 0.204 0.215 0.211
F-statistics 9.75 8.33 14.75 11.75
Wald test P(F* > Fc)* 0.853 0.856
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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Table 25: Jordan: Short-run Symmetric/Asymmetric Results
Official/Redisc Retail/loan GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant 0.242** 0.137** 0.237** 0.135**
(0.051) (0.067) (0.049) (0.067)
∆rediscount 0.01 0.016 dropped dropped
(0.06) (0.06)
∆rediscountt−1 -0.033 -0.031 dropped dropped
(0.061) (0.061)
∆loant−1 -0.369*** -0.368*** -0.369*** -0.368***
0.064 0.064 0.04 0.064
Symmetric ect -0.041 -0.04
(0.008) (0.007)
Symmetric ML 24
Above equilibrium -0.027 -0.027
(0.009) (0.009)
Below equilibrium -0.017 -0.017
(0.014) (0.014)
ML+ 36
ML− 58
R2 0.208 0.203 0.207 0.202
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.183 0.199 0.19
F-statistics 13 10.02 26.06 16.75
Wald test P(F*>Fc)* 0.131 0.137
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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Table 26: Jordan: Short-run Symmetric/Asymmetric Results
Official/Repo Retail/Deposit GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant -0.073 -0.039 -0.077 -0.043
0.015 0.012 0.014 0.011
∆repo 0.007 0.011 dropped dropped
(0.013) (0.014)
∆repot−1 -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.039***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
∆repot−2 0.035** 0.036** 0.038** 0.039**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
∆repot−3 0.023 0.023 dropped dropped
(0.015) (0.015)
∆depositt−1 -0.304*** -0.314*** -0.27*** -0.282***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.064) (0.065)
∆depositt−2 -0.158** -0.152** -0.145** -0.141**
(0.066) (0.068) (0.064) (0.065)
∆depositt−3 -0.064 -0.061 dropped dropped
(0.655) (0.067)
Symmetric ect -0.102 -0.108
(0.021) (0.067)
Symmetric ML 10
Above equilibrium -0.037 -0.041
(0.018) (0.018)
Below equilibrium -0.058 -0.063
(0.014) (0.013)
ML+ 27
ML− 17
R2 0.277 0.253 0.267 0.242
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.218 0.248
F-statistics 9.173 7.187 14.24 10.36
Wald test P(F*>Fc)* 0.141 0.134
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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Table 27: Jordan: Short-run Symmetric/Asymmetric Results
Official/Repo Retail/Loan GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant 0.382*** 0.185** 0.373*** 0.184**
(-0.081) (0.074) (0.080) (0.074)
∆repo 0.033 0.026 dropped dropped
(0.043) (0.043)
∆repot−1 -0.049 -0.044 dropped dropped
(0.043) (0.043)
∆loant−1 -0.35*** -0.347*** -0.356*** -0.352***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.010) (0.064)
Symmetric ect -0.046
(0.009)
Symmetric ML 21
Above equilibrium -0.026 -0.025
(0.008) (0.007)
Below equilibrium -0.018 -0.018
(0.01) (0.01)
ML+ 37
ML− 54
R2 0.202 0.202 0.197
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.181 0.185
F-statistics 12.48 9.93 24.23 16.22
Wald test P(F*>Fc)* 0.087* 0.087* 0.094*
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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Table 28: New Zealand: Short-run Symmetric/Asymmetric Results
Official/TB-30 Retail/Deposit GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant 0.209* 0.441*** -0.19* -0.043***
(0.105) (0.151) (0.099) (0.141)
∆TB-30 0.024 -0.008 dropped dropped
(0.035) (0.038)
∆TB-30t−1 -0.025 -0.011 dropped dropped
(0.039) (0.039)
∆depositt−1 0.126 0.093 dropped dropped
(0.039) (0.033)
Symmetric ect -0.161
(0.039) (-0.149)
Symmetric ML 7 0.033
Above equilibrium -0.258 -0.263
(0.068) (0.053)
Below equilibrium -0.044 -0.04
(0.068) (0.053)
ML+ 4
ML− 22
R2 0.259 0.306 0.229 0.295
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.251 0.218 0.274
F-statistics 5.68 5.64 20.55 14.25
Wald test P(F*>Fc)* .037** .011**
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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Table 29: New Zealand: Short-run Symmetric/Asymmetric Results
Official/TB-30 Retail/Housing GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant 1.202*** 1.027** 1.136*** 0.855**
(0.287) (0.391) (0.196) (0.284)
∆TB-30 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.072***
(0.018) (0.02) (0.014) (0.019)
∆TB-30t−1 -0.005 -0.001 dropped dropped
(0.018) (0.019)
∆TB-30t−2 -0.008 -0.008 dropped dropped
(0.015) (0.015)
∆housingt−1 -0.125 -1.22 dropped dropped
(0.104) (0.104)
∆housingt−2 0.308 0.297*** dropped 0.298***
(0.104) (0.106) (0.101)
Symmetric ect -0.107 -1.02
(0.025) (0.017)
Symmetric ML 9
Above equilibrium -0.093 -0.077
(0.032) (0.231)
Below equilibrium -0.083 -0.068
(0.043) (0.033)
ML+ 10
ML− 11
R2 0.491 0.495 0.375 0.482
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.437 0.357 0.449
F-statistics 10 8.55 20.45 14.9
Wald test P(F*>Fc)* 0.508 0.47
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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Table 30: New Zealand: Short-run Symmetric/Asymmetric Results
Official/TB-30 Retail/Deposit GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant 0.275** 0.449** 0.271** 0.448**
(0.112) (0.136) (0.104) (0.136)
∆TB-60 0.009 -0.015 dropped dropped
(0.045) (0.045)
∆TB-60t−1 -0.017 -0.017 dropped dropped
(0.05) (0.049)
∆depositt−1 0.012 0.106 dropped dropped
(0.107) (0.105)
Symmetric ect -0.174 -0.173
(0.041) (0.034)
Symmetric ML 6
Above equilibrium -0.251 -0.25
(0.054) (0.048)
Below equilibrium -0.063 -0.064
(0.066) (0.059)
ML+ 4
ML− 16
R2 0.28 0.327 0.262 0.313
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.275 0.251 0.292
F-statistics 6.33 6.24 24.53 15.49
Wald test P(F*>Fc)* 0.033** 0.024**
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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Table 31: New Zealand: Short-run Symmetric/Asymmetric Results
Official/TB-60 Retail/Housing GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant 1.369*** 1.452*** 1.062*** 1.155***
(0.316) (0.373) (0.224) (0.296)
∆TB-60 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.101***
(0.02) (0.021) (0.026) (0.02)
∆TB-60t−1 -0.014 -0.016 dropped dropped
(0.02) (0.02)
∆TB-60t−2 -0.014 -0.013 dropped dropped
(0.019) (0.019)
∆housingt−1 -0.111 -0.106 dropped dropped
(0.101) (0.103)
∆housingt−2 0.327*** 0.333*** 0.35*** 0.359***
(0.102) (0.104) (0.095) (0.098)
Symmetric ect -0.113 -0.088
(0.026) (0.018)
Symmetric ML 8
Above equilibrium -0.119 -0.094
(0.029) (0.022)
Below equilibrium -0.123 -0.099
(0.035) (0.029)
ML+ 8
ML− 7
R2 0.536 0.538 0.521 0.523
Adjusted R2 0.491 0.485 0.499 0.493
F-statistics 11.97 10.15 23.62 17.56
Wald test P(F*>Fc)* 0.671 0.628
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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Table 32: UK: Short-run Symmetric/Asymemtric Results
Official/CD Retail/Lending GTA GTA
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant -0.089*** -0.072** -0.085*** -0.070**
(0.021) (0.029) (0.019) (0.027)
∆cd 0.755*** 0.756*** 0.752*** 0.753***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.03) (0.03)
∆cdt−1 0.002 0.001 dropped dropped
(0.083) (0.083)
∆lendingt−1 -0.028 -0.029 dropped dropped
(0.078) (0.078)
Symmetric ect -0.801 -0.776
(0.111) (0.074)
Symmetric ML 0.31
above equilibrium -0.951 -0.889
(0.201) (0.17)
Below equilibrium -0.732 -0.716
(0.136) (0.11)
ML+ 0.26
ML− 0.33
R2 0.89 0.891 0.89 0.89
Adjusted R2 0.885 0.885 0.887 0.887
F-statistics 181.48 145 372.67 247.4
Wald test P(F*>Fc)* 0.376 0.461
Note: Official: Official interest rates; Retail: Retail interest rates; GTA: General-to-
specific approach. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Wald test tests whether the deviation of the
speed of adjustment to positive and negative monetary shocks is equal.
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3.5 Conclusions
In monetary policymaking, an assessment of the main monetary policy channel is funda-
mental to identify the credibility of monetary policy actions in the domestic market. In
this chapter, we shed light on the credibility of monetary policy under the fixed exchange
rate regime for the case of Jordan. Our aim is to show to how extent a country with a
peg is able to move towards building the credibility of low inflation domestically instead
of importing prices from abroad. Hence, we assess the magnitude and speed of interest
rate pass-through channel and the behaviour of the financial market to monetary policy
shocks and compare the results to two inflation targeters, New Zealand and the UK, prior
to official announcement of inflation targeting. The country-specific comparison allows
understanding whether the move to achieve price stability domestically under the current
financial and monetary system is possible and the reform needed to move towards building
independent domestic monetary policies.
We perform the Johansen approach to examine the degree and speed of adjustment to
disequilibrium in the long run, then we apply a univariate error correction parsimounous
model of Hendry and Doornik (1994) that connects the short-run and long-run effects.
We also test whether asymmetries occur in the deposit and loan markets by incorporat-
ing two dummy variables in the conditional dynamic model to act when retail interest
rates are above or below their long-run equilibrium level. The years from 1995 to 2011
are taken into consideration to assess the current economic situation for Jordan, while we
allow the period prior to IT for our model cases. All data on Jordanian official, money
market interest rates, and retail interest rates are obtained from the central bank’s Statis-
tical Database. Data on New Zealands deposit interest rate, and British interest rates on
lending and deposit are extracted from the IMF-IFS, whereas, the remaining series: the
RBNZ’s bill rate-30 and 60 days, interest rate on housing loan and deposit and British cer-
tificates of deposit are collected from the released statistics data of the their central banks.
Initially, we notice that official interest rates follow changes in the American Federal
reserve rate, given the imported credibility for the goal of price stability. The findings
show that the interest rate pass-through in Jordan is weak and sticky and substantial lags
are needed for a full equilibrium adjustment. Furthermore, banks non-competitive pricing
behaviour is observed in the loan market, where a significant deviation from symmetry
in the speed of adjustment is found sticker to decreasing. Interestingly, an asymmetric
behaviour to monetary shocks in the deposit market is found for the case of New Zealand.
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Our findings indicate, and in comparison with inflation targeters, that with weak and
slow interest rate pass-through, as well as an asymmetric reaction in the loan market,
moving towards achieving price stability by adopting any form of inflation targeting in
Jordan will not give its desirable outcomes. Although the possibility for the lite form of
inflation targeting could be claimed, any commitment to an inflation target while preserv-
ing the goal of exchange rate stabilisation will put the central bank at the risk of losing its
credibility, and increase the likelihood to renege on inflation targeting framework. This
suggests that Jordan has to move to a more resilient exchange rate arrangement to build
in the goal of price stability domestically, given the importance to have an independent
central bank.
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Chapter 4
The Credibility of a Soft Pegged Exchange Rate in
Emerging Market Economies: Evidence from a Panel Data
Study
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4.1 Introduction
Over the last century, fixed exchange rate systems have drawn considerable attention on
their stability and durability. In fact, exchange rate targeting has been widely adopted
to act as a trustworthy mechanism to the low inflation objective, and to eliminate the
exchange rate risk, which complicates the decisions on financial and trade transactions.
Theoretically, it is thought that a fixed exchange rate can act as a coordinating and sig-
nalling device to stabilise inflation expectations (Tamgac, 2013), with its virtue of being
a perfectly controllable policy variable and an easily observed quantitative target of mon-
etary policy (Herrendorf, 1997). These characteristics are based on the belief that all
market agents under a peg propose zero domestic inflation rates and, consequently, with
unambiguous actions of policy makers, the monetary policy is fully observed by individuals.
Despite these appeals, the salient failure of pegged exchange rate regimes across the
world proves that the lifetime of pegs is short-lived. Even when the system does not fall
apart, deteriorations in the level of nominal interest rates, reserves loss and/or exchange
rate devaluation or revaluation often take place (Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2003). Indeed,
the failure of fixed exchange rate systems, from the collapse of the gold standard, the
Bretton Woods system, the European Monetary System (EMS), to the currency crises
in Latin America and the contagion crisis in East Asia, raises susceptibilities on the real
stability of pegs. Hence, the literature on currency crises has emerged to identify why a
fixed exchange rate is more crises prone and what factors hamper the credibility of this
nominal anchor. The first generation model of currency crises, led by Krugman (1979),
demonstrates that the fall of the fixed exchange rate regime comes as a result of the in-
consistency between the exchange rate policy and fiscal stance. The second generation
models, on the other hand, presume that a currency crisis may happen when all macro-
fundamentals are well-behaved, owning to self-fulfilling expectations or sunspot events.37
However, this assumption seems unlikely. Some economists; e.g., Krugman (1979) and
Bordo and Schwartz (1996), have challenged this belief on the grounds that keeping the
exchange rate fixed can only be threatened when the economic fundamentals are not sound.
In effect, during the past two decades, while the majority of countries abandoned
all forms of exchange rate restrictions, and moved towards more resilient exchange rate
arrangements, pegging exchange rates remained a preferable choice to import the anti-
inflationary credible policy in some emerging markets and developing countries. The
empirical works on past currency crises have shown that exchange rate fixers were not
37Sunspots are extrinsic random variables that affect market agents’ decisions and are fundamentally
based on the market psychology and self-fulfilling prophecies.
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successful at bringing the foreign credibility into their economies prior to the regimes fall
(Svensson, 1994), and thereby, the system collapsed eventually. Therefore, following the
insights of currency crises models, the pertinent question to raise is whether or not the
recent experience of a conventional pegged exchange rate has been successful in bringing
low inflation and consistent macroeconomic foundations into domestic economies.
To answer this question, and on the basis of currency crises empirical works, we build
a projection exercise, as in the work of Rose and Svensson (1994), to study the credibility
of a fixed exchange rate regime in eleven countries: Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and Venezuela, adhered to the fixed ex-
change rate to the US dollar. The dollar, according to the IMF 2013 report on exchange
rate arrangements and restrictions, serves as the preeminent anchor currency. However,
owning to data limitation for emerging markets and developing countries, the analysis is
constrained to include eleven countries with few missing observations. With the difficulty
to consider the analysis at individual level, and the intention to draw a general conclusion
about the overall credibility of the conventional pegged exchange rate to the US dollar,
the analysis relies on linear unbalanced panel data models.
The analysis is based upon the previous work on the EMS credibility before the crisis,
which are mainly built on the Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP) condition. Ideally,
the UIP presumes, under the assumption of market efficiency, that the expected changes
in exchange rates are captured by nominal interest rate differentials. The interest rate
differentials are thus used in the previous works on credibility to measure the realignment
expectations of market agents. This measure for the credibility reflects the behaviour of the
economic fundamentals, which are the determinants of market agents’ realignment expec-
tations. Nevertheless, the UIP failed empirically because of its fundamentals of rationality
and risk neutrality (Sarno and Taylor, 2002).38 So despite being a clearing mechanism in
the capital market, the UIP condition has received criticisms on its biasedness. However,
the UIP could differ across exchange rate regimes, time horizons and country-specific char-
acteristics (Chaboud and Wright, 2005). Hence, not accepting the UIP could be attributed
to the absence of a precise specification of the sampling distribution of data or to other
reasons (Huisman et al., 1998). In this respect, Juselius (1995) explains that neglecting
the general properties of time series data and the ignorance of analysing the purchasing
power parity and the UIP together by considering the interactions between the goods mar-
ket and the capital markets as well as the deviation from a steady state could invalidate
38McCallum (1994) claims that the deviation from the UIP occurs as a result of monetary policy actions
which exploit the trade-off between the interest rate and exchange rate stability.
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the statistical results. The UIP may also fail if the time-varying risk premium is ignored
(Francis et al., 2002). Therefore, to reflect the premium required to convince agents to
invest in risky currencies, it is necessary to account for the time-varying risk premia which
comes from highly volatile prices and interest rates, namely in emerging market economies
(Li et al., 2012). Consequently, as the exchange rate expectations can be correlated with
the default risk premium (McCallum, 1994), the interest rate differential consists of two
components: the currency premium and country premium (Frankel et al., 2004), both of
which are highly vulnerable to economic fundamentals.39 Unfortunately, a key problem
with this is that decomposing the country risk premium from exchange rate premium is
not a possible task.
In fact, the UIP works systematically across different economies, but its validity could
differ across time, data and exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, the tendency for any
deviation in the short-run will revoke adjustments to restore equilibrium (Juselius, 1995).
For fixed exchange rate regimes, a deviation from the UIP is one of fixed exchange rate
systems’ defences, i.e., the interest rate defense. According to Flood and Rose (2002)
deviations from the UIP can be seen as a policy action, which is “a necessary condition for
an interest rate defense”, to convince investors to invest in domestic securities. The persis-
tence of a positive interest rates differential also reflects that “the announced commitment
to a fixed exchange rate may not be sufficient to eliminate devaluation risk completely”
(Caramazza, 1993).
Hence, our aim is to study the overall credibility of a fixed exchange rate system, thus
it is more important to understand how the economic fundamentals, which are used to
form the market agents’ expectations, may complicate anchoring domestic interest rates
and widen the spread between the anchor country and that of the followers. In fact,
market agents would ask for more return to bearing the risk related to investing in risky
assets (De Paoli and Sondergaard, 2009), or holding long-term assets (Thornton, 2012).
So, if risk averse investors perceive that the monetary regime is highly credible and can
meet the convertibility of the currency, such additional uncertainty should not exist. In
addition, the interest rate used in our analysis is on annual deposits. Hence, the potential
risk must be related to the financial intermediaries whose actions are supervised by the
monetary authority itself.
The only risk to hold assets denominated in domestic currency that needs to be con-
sidered should be placed on the nature of the peg under investigation; the peg which is
39The latter component of risk was ignored in all previous studies on currency crises.
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described in the literature as ’soft’. It has been argued that the degree of central bank
independence in financially integrated world with soft pegs is not completely eliminated,
as implied by the trilemma, and thereby, a central bank has bound rooms to weather real
shocks (Stone et al., 2008). In other words, it is believed that anchoring interest rate might
not necessarily preserve the stability of exchange rate, since the UIP might be violated by
real shocks, and some bound flexibility is preferred to stabilise the exchange rate in the
short run (Benigno et al., 2007). This arguments, however, is criticised by Husain et al.
(2005), who think that flexibility might have reverse influences on investment, which could
put the credibility of the peg at stake.
To examine the credibility of a soft peg to the US dollar, we regress the interest rate
differential as a measure of realignment expectations on a set of relevant macroeconomic
indicators. The interest rate differential reflects the macroeconomic structure of the do-
mestic economy, as changes in the macroeconomic factors affect domestic interest rates,
given that the macroeconomic fundamentals of the anchor country are exogenous. In ad-
dition, we use the exchange rate market pressure index, constructed by Eichengreen et al.
(1994), to study the role of fundamentals in explaining the pressure on the parity condi-
tion. The set of macro-fundamentals chosen in our analysis is derived from the theory and
empirical works of currency crises. Those fundamentals are likely to be included by market
agents in their exchange rate expectations formation. However, we do not consider any
reputational factor since we believe that long-time ensuring a fixed exchange rate parity
might be counterproductive.
The chapter reveals that inflation differential is the main factor that generates re-
alignment expectations on the fixed exchange rate parity condition. This explains why
anchoring interest rates is not possible for countries with conventional fixed exchange rate
systems. Overall, importing the credibility of anti-inflationary policies from abroad is
doubtful and, therefore, it is suggested that the monetary credibility should be built do-
mestically.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section two presents the currency crises models
and related literature review. Section three discusses the credibility measures used in the
study. Section four outlines the data and the exchange rate classification. Section five
presents our methodology. Section six contains the empirical results. Section seven pro-
vides the conclusions and economic implications.
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4.2 Literature Review
The ineffective monetary policy in a pegged exchange rate economy implies that any
change in domestic assets, [increase/decrease], induces financial mobility, [outflow/inflow],
but leaves the level of output unaffected. This means that the use of monetary tool leads
only to a deterioration in current account which lasts temporarily. In effect, restoring the
equilibrium back to a predetermined central parity is achieved at the expense of foreign
reserves. This indicates that money supply should be restricted to increasing. However,
the first generation models of currency crisis have shown that monetary authorities with
an exchange rate target may raise the stock of domestic assets.
The inconsistency of conflicting macroeconomic priorities between the two economic
actors appears when the central bank finds it is mandatory to money finance the fiscal
deficit. This demand mismanagement is first illustrated by Krugman (1979), who argues
that a country cannot maintain a fixed exchange rate when its government runs a deficit.
He shows that unbalanced fiscal policies endanger the level of international reserves, and
as long as the stock of domestic currency continues to grow, the market agents will replace
the domestic assets in their portfolios. He further argues that even when the increase in
domestic assets does not provoke a speculative attack, the capital loss, due to the increase
in the level of prices, would force investors to engage in selling the domestic currency. The
principles of the Krugman’s model of “balance of payment crisis” assumes that the time
of speculative attack or the international reserves depletion is necessarily known (Bordo
and Schwartz, 1996).
Theoretically, the basic monetary assumption, under the fixed exchange rate, implies
that money stock ’M’ in the central bank’s balance sheet must be consistent with the
fundamentals, which we refer to their total here as ’L’. In one word, ’M’ must remain
constant. In a simple monetary model under the uncovered interes rate parity (UIP) this
can be shown as follows:
ssht = mt − cyt + δrdt (10)
The shadow exchange rate, ssht , on the left hand side of the equation, may appear if central
banks interventions are not generated. The small letter of m and y are the log of money
stock and output relative to the base country, respectively, and rdt denotes the domestic
interest rate. Replacing rdt on the basis of UIP yields:
ssht = mt − cyt + δrft + γ∆set (11)
Where rft is the base country’s interest rate and s
e
t is the expected change in the
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exchange rate. To achieve the equilibrium, the domestic country’s level of prices must be
compatible with purchasing power parity, given that both the domestic nominal exchange
rate and anchor country’s prices are exogenously fixed. So, the fundamentals consist of
all the variables treated as exogenous:
lt = −mft + cyt + brft (12)
Where −mft is the base country’s money stock, given that the domestic money supply
is an endogenous variable. The bars over the right hand side of the equation denotes that
the fundamental factors are fixed exogenously. Substituting equation 12 into equation 11:
ssht = lt +mt + γ∆s
e
t (13)
Consequently, by assuming a credible fixed exchange rate system, the expected change in
exchange rates must cancel out. Hence, we end up with the following equation:
mt = s+ lt (14)
As the monetary authority has no control over the exogenously determined funda-
mentals, the money stock, for any given level of fundamentals, must remain constant;
otherwise, the increase in the stock will lead to reserves loss. If a country keeps running
a deficit, or in other words, if its domestic money is allowed to grow above the zero-level
implied by the fundamentals, the collapse of the regime becomes impending. To put things
differently, with ongoing fiscal deficit, the increase in ’mt’ drives an upward movement in
prices. This real appreciation makes the economy uncompetitive. So, in order to erode
the high demand for imports and settle the deterioration in current account, unsterilised
interventions reinstate the equilibrium at the cost of losing foreign reserves.40
However, the nature collapse, hypothesised by Krugman (1979), has two theoretical
pitfalls.41 First, the model postulates that a central bank with a fixed exchange rate
commitment acts as a passive agent. This, means that market agents are endowed with
perfect foresight while the central bank waits until its reserves are depleted to renege on
the commitment. In reality, this is unlikely. An exchange rate fixer will strive hardly to
defend the exchange rate parity and not as easily as it is suggested by the model (Lahiri
and Ve´gh, 2000). Second, in the original work of Krugman, the inconsistency of demand
management under the pegged system is based on the exogeneity assumption of money
40The monetary model used here is illustrated by Copeland (2008) for the first generations model of
currency crises.
41The nature collapse occurs prior to speculative attacks due to the increase in domestic money supply
and reserves loss.
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growth which ignores the dynamic nature of money markets (Bordo and Schwartz, 1996).
Nevertheless, the theoretical supposition that an abandonment of a peg occurs due
to the conflicting objectives and weak monetary independence is controversial. While
some economists; Andersen and Chiriaeva (2007), Marini and Piersanti (2003) and Tam-
gac (2013), believe that the demand mismanagement explains why fixed exchange rate
regimes collapse, others are convinced that many currency crises from the EMS to the
far East Asian and Latin American crises happened while the macrofundamentals were
flawless and sound. From the latter view, a new generation of models grows based on the
belief that sunspots or self-fulfilling expectations can provoke a crisis or force a devalua-
tion, while the economy works consistently with the bases of a fixed exchange rate system.
Nonetheless, the view that the monetary system might be threatened by self-fulfilling
expectations is rejected by many economists. For example, Bordo and Schwartz (1996)
show that in the past and recent currency crises, one or more unstable fundamentals have
driven the economy onto instability and, consequently, into crisis. Krugman (1996) and
Jeanne (1997) also confirm that self-fulfilling expectations cannot be unconnected from
the economic fundamentals. Moreover, Kaminsky (2006) points out that although the
currency crises have not generated equally, many of them occurred owning to the bad
fundamentals, the fact which makes the self-fulfilling argument improbable.
In order to compromise between the sunspots perspective and the monetary-fiscal
policies discrepancy, the second generation models presume that the monetary authority
confronts multiple equilibria while considering whether to sustain a peg, or opt out for
reasons related to improving unemployment, competitiveness or current account deterio-
ration. So the central bank behaves as a loss function minimiser concerning the feasibility
of holding a peg (Jeanne and Masson, 2000). This implies that the durability of pegs in
the so-called escape clause or “endogenous policy” models (Jeanne, 1997) depends on the
series of market agents actions. It follows that the government defies different scenarios
which may end up with realignment or abandonment of the regime. In fact, renege on
the fixity commitment unveils the government’s desired exchange rate, while from one
dimension, the cost of doing so increases with the length of the past successful record of
no realignments. From the other dimension, such long history of credibility is likely to
be counterproductive to unemployment. Thus, although a tough government is seen to
be credible at achieving low inflation, as argued by Edwards (1996), Holden and Vikøren
(1996), Rose and Svensson (1994) and Eichengreen et al. (1994), the accumulated jobless
rates may intimidate the stainability of pegs (Drazen and Masson, 1993).
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4.3 Realignment expectations measures and macro-fundamentals
On the basis of the standard UIP condition, the interest rate differential between the
domestic countries and their anchor country, reflects the devaluation or realignment ex-
pectations of market agents, the representation of the UIP is as follows:
∆set+k = it − ift (15)
Where ∆set+k denotes the changes in the logarithm of the spot exchange rate at time
t, while the subscripts e and k refer to the market expectations and maturity of assets
denominated in domestic currency, respectively, and the right hand side of the equation
represents the interest rate differential (IR).
The vast majority of empirical works which attempt to explain the currency crises mea-
sure the devaluation expectations as the interest rate differential or the interest differential-
drift adjustment for a fixed exchange rate currency within horizontal bands. However, the
drift approach does not work for all the countries with soft pegs under assessment, since
the majority of the countries in the study are point fixer except Egypt and Kuwait.42 Fur-
thermore, the literature on the EMS and other currency crises presumes that the country
risk premium is relatively small and can be neglected, which means that the interest rate
differential could fully reflect the expected changes in exchange rate. In our study and
due to huge differences in economic structure between the base country and its followers,
the measure of interest rate differential consists of two components: currency and country
risk premium. However, although accounting for the country risk premium is intricate,
we intend to measure the overall credibility of importing low prices from abroad, so such
differentiating is not needed, given that realignment expectations increase with weak eco-
nomic structure and institutions. In addition, the study considers interest rate on deposits,
thereby, the country risk premium is likely to be attached to the deregulation of banking
system and financial intermediaries whose work per se can be supervised by central banks.
In general, currency crises are mainly characterised with huge devaluation in the value
of currency; however, the devaluation is not always the only threat of speculative attacks.
In some cases, the revaluation may result from speculations over a strong currency (Grilli,
1986). This in our study represents the case of an oil-producing country, namely Kuwait,
which dropped out of the fixed exchange rate regime voluntarily during the onset of the
42The central bank of Egypt was spurred to devalue several times to stimulate the competitive position.
There is no determined band, though. Due to the capital inflows, the central bank found itself obliged to
devalue with the escalating fiscal deficit, until it surrendered the parity in 2003. It is worth noting that the
Egyptian Pound has been again in distress since the 2011 revolution; however, in our study, all the years
following the exit from the pegged system is disregarded, provided our aim to measuring the credibility of
the fixed exchange rate system.
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2008 financial crisis. The central bank of Kuwait could not preserve the central fixed parity,
set at 299.63 fils per dollar with margins ± 3.5%, throughout the whole adoption period
from 2003 to 2007; the nominal exchange rate even jumped to exceed the upper limit of
the margin. Although it might be thought that the accumulation of foreign reserves in
such cases is better than their loss, maintaining the peg comes at the cost of price stability.
We calculate our first measure of realignment expectations, i.e., the interest rate dif-
ferential, as the difference between the domestic interest rates on deposits, with one year
maturity, and the annual interest rate on treasury bills of the base country.43 We utilise
another index-proxy to measure the realignment expectations or the pressure on currency
of pegged exchange rate, constructed by Eichengreen et al. (1994), and applied by many
studies, e.g., Pattillo and Berg (1998), Kaminsky (2006), Mouratidis (2008), Lin et al.
(2008). The index comprises three components: foreign reserves, international differential
and expected change in exchange rate. The weighting scheme of the index is assigned as
the inverse of each series variance in the past.
The Exchange rate Market Pressure (EMP) index is presented as follows.
EMPi,t = w1∆si,t + w2∆(r
D
i,t − rUSt )− w3∆Ri,t (16)
Where the subscripts i and t refer to the domestic countries and time, respectively. ∆st
represents the changes in nominal exchange rates over the period of analysis. This vari-
able is dropped from the equation for most of the countries as the nominal exchange rate
remained fixed during the assessment period, except for some devaluation or revaluation
which have occurred in some countries. The second term refers to the interest rate differ-
ential multiplied by its weight. ∆ R is the change in international reserves. Each weight is
set as the inverse of each country-specific series’ variance. Nevertheless, since the sample
contains countries which experienced an exchange rate system shift, the weight is assigned
to the time when the exchange rate is classified fixed.
We link these two credibility measures to a number of macroeconomic determinants of
market expectations selected on the basis of the monetary strand of balance of payments
theory and related empirical work on currency crises. The macrofundamentals included
are: inflation differential (ID), ratio of debt to GDP (D), ratio of current account to GDP
43Data on Treasury Bills (TB) for many fixed exchange rate targeters were not found. In some countries,
the facility of TB began a few years ago. However, the differences between TB, available for some countries
in the study, and that of the anchor country is higher than that between deposit interest rates and US’TB.
Although a more positive interest rate differential would be more informative in reflecting the feedback
from the macrofundamentals, we think that the negative consequences of using the interest rate on deposit
is unlikely to be substantial.
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(CA), foreign reserves (R), money growth (Ms), ratio of import to GDP (M) and ade-
quacy (Ad).44 Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain data on unemployment, labour
costs, and fiscal deficit among many others. All the macro indicators are measured at
yearly frequency, which better reflects the changes in interest rates cycle, as explained by
Bernhardsen (2000). Furthermore, data on macro indicators for the examined countries
cannot be obtained at shorter frequencies.
Essentially, inflation differential, among all macrofundamentals, is extremely substan-
tial in determining the credibility of pegs, since it reflects the type of government in power.
Theoretically, it is argued that a tough government pledges to maintain inflation down
(Holden and Vikøren, 1996) and tracks closely inflation rates of the country to which the
exchange rate is anchored (Frankel et al., 2004). The increase in domestic prices widens the
differential which necessarily feedbacks to nominal interest rates. Many empirical studies
on explaining the market agents’ devaluation expectations have found a significant impact
of inflation differential on interest rate differential prior to currency crises. The relation is
supposed to be positive with the measure of devaluation expectations and negative with
the credibility.
As noted earlier, due to data limitation, data on fiscal balance could not be found, but
the ratio of debt to GDP is a reflection of fiscal imbalances. This indicator has been widely
incorporated in the literature to study the effect of government mismanagement and to
empirically test the fiscal discipline of pegged exchange rates as implied by the theory.45
Indeed, an increase in fiscal debt threatens the sustainability of a fixed exchange rate sys-
tem and lowers its credibility. The demand management also entails that money supply
growth, as marked in the literature review section, must remain constant. In fact, the in-
ability to control money supply endangers the re-controllability over the system stability.
In addition, the literature emphases that current account imbalances is a major reason for
financial crises (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012) as the deterioration in current account de-
creases the level of foreign reserves stock and increases the external debt (Krugman, 1996).
We also consider the foreign reserves as a main determinant of realignment expecta-
tions, Since the foreign reserves, under the fixed exchange rate system, is a main instrument
44We did not include any reputational factors, although many countries in our sample were successful
at keeping their exchange rate fixed. This is to consider the increased risk of pegging continuation.
The few observations on unemployment rates available on the World Bank database indicate that the
unemployment rate amounts around 20% in many countries; it even goes beyond 30% in some countries
like Jordan, Bahamas and Egypt. Furthermore, in some cases, the country’s credit rating might get
downgraded financially, see for instance, Standard and Poor’s-Jordan in years 2010-2012.
45See for example Amato and Tronzano (2000), Tornell and Velasco (2000), Marini and Piersanti (2003),
Vuletin (2004) and El-Shagi (2011).
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to maintain the stability of the regime and hold off speculative attacks. Hence, we include
the changes in reserves as a possible determinant which might affect the credibility pos-
itively. In addition, we incorporate a ratio relating reserves to domestic money growth,
that is, an adequacy ratio of the foreign reserve level. A high adequacy ratio indicates
that money supply grows relatively faster than international reserves, which lowers the
credibility of the peg.
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4.4 Data
The main sources of the data are the IMF international financial statistics and the World
Bank database.46 The data consists of annual observations from 1996 through 2012 for
eleven emerging markets and developing economies: Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and Venezuela. The countries are selected
based on their exchange rate classification and data availability.
Data on international foreign reserves, nominal exchange rate, annual interest rate on
deposit, annual interest rate on Treasury Bill of Federal Reserve bank and inflation for
all countries but Lebanon and Oman, are extracted from the IMF/international financial
statistics.47 Whereas, the ratio of debt to GDP, current account to GDP, money growth,
import to GDP indicators and inflation for Lebanon and Oman are imported from the
World Development Indicators database. The table below shows the number of observa-
tions and the basic statistics of each indicator used in the analysis.
Table 33: Panel Data Properties
Macro-indicator Obs Mean S.D Min Max
IR 183 3.8 4.7 -1.76 30.02
EMP 182 -2.14 6.78 -36.25 20.59
ID 187 3.24 10.11 -6.81 96.94
D 170 54.93 39.64 4.72 177.01
CA 187 1.92 15.1 -31.71 45.02
R 187 9.47 24.24 -80.76 69.63
Ms 184 14.14 12.93 -2.04 75.28
AD 183 0.66 0.39 0.09 1.79
M 182 45.21 18.44 16.72 94.2
46The codes of the data are provided in Table 34
47Data on treasury bills could not be found for the majority of countries. Yet, for countries whose TB
rates are available, the differential is positive and even higher then that of domestic annual deposit.
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Table 34: Data Identification Codes and Sources
Macro-indicator Macro-indicator Data source Code
IR IMF-IFS 60L..ZF
TB IMF-IFS 60C–ZF
ID, except Oman and Lebanon IMF-IFS 64..XZF
D WEI GC.DOD.TOTL.GD.ZS
CA WEI BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS
R IMF-IFS 1..DZF
Ms WEI FM.LBL.BMNY.ZG
M WEI NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS
ID for Oman and Lebanon WEI FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG
Nominal ER IMF-IFS DG.ZF
4.5 Exchange rate classification
Prior to selecting the countries, we scrutinise the exchange rate classification for a wide
range of countries to include those which target the exchange rate in practice. In fact,
it has been observed that defacto nominal exchange rates of countries might differ from
the announced regime. Therefore, the literature on defacto exchange rate classification,
e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), has drawn the
distinction between official exchange rates and real exchange rate policies. In this study,
we utilise the IMF defacto classification of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy
framework of different years. The IMF classification is build upon specific statistical cri-
teria, set on the basis of the backward-looking approach, and is composed of different
arrangements: exchange rate with no separate legal tender, currency board, floating, free
floating, conventional pegged, stabilised, crawling peg, crawling-like, pegged exchange rate
within horizontal bands. Our set of countries is classified under the conventional pegged
arrangement, which is also described as ’soft’. In effect, adopting a soft peg entails that
monetary authorities have the freedom to alter the exchange rate at their own discretion,
i.e., to devalue or revalue, but countries are classified defacto pegged as long as their ex-
change rate’s central parity fluctuates around a narrow margin of 1%. In general, central
banks with a soft peg do not announce any margins for the exchange rate, and that what
distinguishes a soft peg from a pegged exchange rate with a band, where a small band is
allowed and declared officially. Nevertheless, it is important for market agents to acquire
a publicly announced pledge of exchange rate fixity from monetary authority itself. From
this point, it is intended to combine both dejure and defacto arrangements to define the
year in which the fixed exchange rate was effectively adopted. We think that having an
official announcement of the peg would certainly make the exchange rate policy a more
transparent and stronger signalling device. However, due to the lack of evidence on ex-
change rate classification and the mixed information we obtain from related researches,
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our defacto and dejure classification is likely to be inaccurate. Nonetheless, even when
the classification does not match the two exchange rate criteria, each country maintains
being at least a defacto pegger.
The 2013 IMF report on defacto exchange rate classification indicates that defacto
conventional pegs classification encompasses the dejure arrangements. However, owning
to the absence of the IMF reports from the beginning of our assessment period, namely
before 1999, we base our defacto classification on the changes in international reserves and
nominal exchange rates, which is similar to the criteria of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005). We also revise all the available information from the exchange rate related studies
and monetary history of each country published on central banks’ website.
The countries which are considered in the study are: Bahamas, Bahrain48, Barbados,
Belize, Egypt49, Jordan50,Oman, Kuwait51, Lebanon52, Qatar53 and Venezuela54.
According to the stern classification adopted in this study of combing the dejure and
defacto classifications of exchange rate, some of the countries are considered exchange
rate fixers after the start date of the study, i.e., after 1996, while two others, namely
Egypt and Kuwait, opted out during the analysis period. Some countries devalued in one
year or more, e.g., Venezuela in 2005. All the changes in nominal exchange rates are taken
into account by employing the EMP index, albeit not through the interest rate differential.
48It is not clear when the country has officially announced the peg. So, the fixing start year is taken
from the first year in our sample.
49Egypt followed a fixed, adjustable peg to the US dollar from 1948 till 2003. Adjustments to the
exchange rate took place in 1979, 1989 and 1990. The devaluations occurred between 1991 and 1992,
but after that the Egyptian Pound was kept fixed until 2000 (Kamar and Bakardzhieva, 2005). In 2001,
however, the government announced a new parity to the US dollar and shifted gradually to a crawling
peg system. Given these adjustments, the IMF 1999 defacto classification assorted Egypt under the ”
conventional fixed” category. However, according to Karam and Fund (2001), an adjustable currency band
was adopted against the U.S. dollar in January 2001. During 2000, to strengthen its external position,
the authority departed from the defacto peg to the U.S. dollar adopted in early 1991. This band was
subsequently depreciated and widened in mid-2001, resulting in a cumulative depreciation of about 25%
relative to the U.S. dollar. During the last years of the peg, Egypt was hit by a series of external shocks.
The political turmoil in the region and sudden stops led to an enormous fiscal deficit which pressured the
currency. The central bank of Egypt devalued several times during the pegged system despite its dejure
classification (Selim et al., 2010) and the IMF’s defacto classifications. However, the pegged system, as
consequences of high accumulated depreciations, was broken in January 2003. For a detailed description
on the exchange rate arrangement in Egypt, the reader is referred to Selim et al. (2010).
50Jordan has devalued twice over the financial crisis. As a result, the JOD depreciated slightly against
the dollar by 0.11%.
51Kuwait adopted the pegged regime in January 2003 in an attempt to control inflation. Nevertheless,
its exchange rate kept appreciated over the targeted parity, and thereby it opted out with the outset of
the financial crisis.
52The Lebanese Pound was fixed to US dollar in December 1997.
53The central bank of Qatar has been effectively fixing the exchange rate since 1979 (Karam and Fund
(2001)). However, the central bank did not officially announce the peg until January 2001.
54The Bolivar was fixed to US dollar in 2003. Depreciation occurred once in 2005.
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4.6 Methodology
In order to examine the overall credibility of the fixed exchange rate system, data of eleven
countries with a soft peg to the US dollar are pooled and the analysis is built on panel
linear models. In fact, the unavailability of many macro variables for developing countries
at different frequencies, and the missing data for others released, pose a challenge to make
a separate regression at individual level. In addition, it is thought that pooling the data
across emerging markets and developing countries committed to a fixed exchange rate to
the US dollar, might be more important in drawing a general conclusion about the credi-
bility of the pegged exchange rate anchor.
We start with a panel model which assumes exogeneity of explanatory variables. This
exogeneity assumption works theoretically with the Krugman model on demand misman-
agement, where money supply is assumed to be determined by the monetary authority.
As our sample consists of oil-producing countries, non-oil producers and import-reliant
economies, the economic heterogeneity should be considered. Applying the pooled OLS
approach, without inserting country specific dummy variables, will inevitably provide bi-
ased estimates. Hence, to eliminate all the countries-unobserved heterogeneity, the fixed
effects model is employed. The specified linear representation is as follows.
RealignmentExpectations = Xitβκ + αi + εit (17)
Uit = αi + it (18)
Where the regressand is either proxies of market agents’ realignment expectations: in-
terest rate differential or exchange rate market pressure index. Xit is a vector of regressors,
which either change over time but remain constant at country level, or vary across both
time and countries. βk is the κ × 1 vector of coefficient on X. αi and εit are random
country-specific effects and idiosyncratic disturbances, respectively. Whereas, the makeup
of the two, Uit, is called the composite errors. In this model, the country-unobserved
component is presumed to be correlated with the set of regressors. The correlation with
the time-invariant component of the error permits the explanatory variables to enter the
equation in the very limited feature of endogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).
As stated earlier, employing the OLS allows to accept implicitly the restrictive as-
sumption that the regressors are uncorrelated with the latent variables, which necessities
using the within estimator. However, unlike the within estimator, random effects assume
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that a country heterogeneity is orthogonal to regressors.
As a first step, it is crucial to test for group-wise homoscedasticity in the variances
of individual heterogeneity. Breusch and Pagan (1980) build a statistic test based on La-
grange Multiplier (LM) fundamental set under the normality assumption of the composite
errors. In later work, Wooldridge (2010)’s LM test adds an advantage of not limiting the
distribution of the errors to normality. As the panel sample at hand is unbalanced, the
autocorreclation-heterokedasticity panel related tests are cautiously opted. Therefore, we
follow the LM test for unbalanced panels, which is constructed by Greene (2003) and mod-
ified for empirical work in STATA package to take account of the distribution of composite
errors and the variation in the number of observation across individual units. The test
is developed under the assumption of cross sectional dependence. Hence, the rejection of
the homoscedasticity is likely to be, in addition to the reasons related to unobserved com-
ponents and idiosyncratic errors correlation, due to contemporaneous correlations across
individuals. Subsequently, the test can be utilised to identify the presence of cross sec-
tional dependence based on the squared pair-wise correlation coefficients in long panels,
where T is sufficiently larger than N. Nevertheless, the size distortions get bigger when N
increases, and thereby LM statistic provides invalid inferences. Pesaran (2004) develops a
Cross-sectional Dependence (CD) test which depends upon the pair-wise correlation coef-
ficient when the cross sectional dimension is much larger than the time series dimension.
In his spatial dependence Monte Carlo simulation based on a comparison with Breusch
and Pagan test, generated under different setups, he finds that the LM test is only effective
when N is considerably smaller than T. However, based on this simulation and with the
consideration of our study’s panel dimensional properties, where the number of countries
is slightly smaller than that of the time dimension, the CD test is nearly as powerful as
the LM test. In the presence of the spatial patterns, Driscoll and Kraay (1998) propose
a spatial correlation standard errors for pooled OLS and fixed effects estimator in finite
samples, which make the estimator feasible regardless of the cross sectional dimension at
hand. Their simulations and empirical examples reflect the necessity to account for spatial
dependence in order to avoid incorrect statistical inferences.
The autocorrelation test used in this study is derived by Wooldridge (2010) which
detects the existence of first order serially correlated errors. The test is introduced to
empirical usage by Drukker et al. (2003) to be performed after the estimation of pooled
OLS and fixed effects models, and is workable whether the explanatory variables are en-
dogenous or exogenous. A final specification test we run is the Hausman (1978) test to
compare which of the two estimators, fixed or random effects, is more consistent under
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the null hypothesis of countries correlated effects.
Nevertheless, the fixed or random effects models do not allow for dynamic settings
and assume that regressors protrude exogenously. In effect, assuming endogeneity is of
important interest in the study as the marofundamentals cannot be determined away from
the money market dynamics.
Inserting lagged regressend in equation 17 revokes the inconsistency of the within esti-
mator due to the correlation with the idiosyncratic errors. Moving further to assume that
some or all the regressors are endogenously determined would violate the condition of no
correlation between the errors and regressors. One way to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation associated with this dynamic specification is to use a set of moments
assumed to be orthogonal to the error process, or in another term, exogenous. Hence, to
allow for endogenous regressors in the linear specification, the First Difference-Generalised
Method of Moments (FD-GMM) is performed considering the appropriate lag length in
regressors.
The general model that represents all the above features is,
∆yit = ∆δ1yi,t−1 + ...+ δq∆yi,t−q + β∆xit + ∆Uit (19)
∆ is the difference operator, yi,t−q denotes the lagged dependent variable up to time q, xit
is the exogenous, predetermined or endogenous regressors.
We decide to apply the FD-GMM, put forward by Arellano and Bond (1991), rather
than the system GMM in an attempt to minimise the number of instruments, as the size of
the sample at hand is small. Moreover, since all the variables considered in the study are in
level, the lagged differenced instruments are more likely to be powerful. However, the crit-
ical concern is to acquire valid instruments. Sargan test with an asymptotic Chi-squared
distribution under the homoscedasticity assumption tests the validity of instruments or
overriding restrictions, which refers to the difference between the number of instruments
employed and that of estimated parameters. Although the rejection of the null hypothesis
implies the need to reconsider either the model setup or the instruments, the test does not
work when the errors are heteroskedastic. It also over-rejects the null of instruments inva-
lidity as stated by Arellano and Bond (1991). In the last step, Arellano and Bond’s test for
autocorrelation is carried out, in which the errors must be uncorrelated at the second order.
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4.7 Results
As mentioned in the previous sections, the fixing start year differs across countries. Some
countries are assigned as exchange rate targeters, with the strict characteristics of having
an official announcement of peg and defacto behaviour, after the start date of our sam-
ple, i.e., 1996, while some others, either opted out of the pegged exchange rate system or
adopted it during the study period. In order to account for such shifts in exchange rate
regimes, a constant binary variable for the exchange rate arrangement along a set of slope
dummies interacted with the time-varying macrofundamentals are inserted.55
In addition, the fundamentals are divided into four ’projection-equations’.56 In the
first equation, we include inflation differential, debt, current account, foreign reserves,
money growth and their related slope dummy variables. In the second equation, all the
above indicators are kept but the current account is replaced by the ratio of import to
GDP.57 Then in the third setup, we exclude both the money growth and import and em-
ploy the current account alongside the other variables. Finally, the adequacy measure is
incorporated to act for the dual impact of money growth and foreign reserves. We in-
tend to split the indicators into these sorts of groups for two reasons.58 First, our sample
size is relatively small, so it is likely to obtain weak power results when the number of
regressors increases. Second, to take into account the negative relation between the stock
of money supply and reserves, as implied by the monetary approach to the balance of
payments theory.59 The basic idea of the theory is that when central banks issue more
domestic money supply, the public expenditure goes above the national income, which,
consequently, leads to a balance of payments deficit (Blejer (1979)). In other words, the
current account deficit can be interpreted as an outcome of excrescent growth of domestic
money.60
However, along the previously mentioned indicators, other setups, not reported, were
estimated through incorporating other variables, considered in the empirical studies of
currency crises models, like the exchange rate misalignment, calculated by estimating the
deviation of the actual real exchange rates from their trend component, pressure index,
that is, the ratio of international reserves to import, output and real exchange rate. The
55Other dummies were incorporated to consider the 2008 financial crisis. However, the dummies were
found insignificant.
56The variables are lagged one period to avoid simultaneity bias.
57Due to data unavailability, neither data on export nor openness were found for many countries in the
sample. We sought to consider the trade-effect on the realignment expectations, but the choice to include
the ratio of import to GDP came from the inability to acquire a reliable measure for the degree of openness.
58See Frankel and Rose (1996) for more relevant variables on currency crashes in emerging markets.
59See Frenkel and Johnson (2013).
60We also remove the reserves in other setups, but the outcomes remain unchanged.
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latter factor is vital in determining the competitiveness, which represents a main temp-
tation for realignment. Indeed, this fundamental receives much concerns in the literature
mainly since the appreciation in real exchange rate was the main reason for devaluation
in many previous currency crises (Dornbusch et al., 1995).
Nonetheless, employing the relative PPP-based measure may to a large extent induce
collinearity with the inflation differential, especially as many cases in the sample kept their
nominal exchange rate fixed. With the difficulty to incur data on other real exchange rate
indexes, namely the traded-goods index, the results with relative PPP-based index would
be inaccurate. More importantly, the sample contains five oil-producing countries, where
their export sectors rely mainly upon crude oil whose prices are determined in the world
market, as well as some import-reliant economies, the thing which makes the supposition
of realignment to improve the external position unlikely.61 Nevertheless, all the unreported
indicators are found to be constantly insignificant.
To ensure that our setups are not prone to multicollinearity, we apply the Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) test after the pooled OLS regression. The test hypothesises that
a percentage of 10 or above is an evidence of collinearity among regressors. The results,
shown in Table 35, suggest that our setups are not subject to multicollinearity.
The following equations represent the different constructed setups.
∆IRi,t) = erai,t + β1∆IDi,t−1 + β2Di,t−1 + β3CAi,t−1 + β4Ri,t−1 + β5Msi,t−1 + β6pduumyi,t−1
+β7ddummyi,t−1 + β8cadummyi,t−1 + β9rdummyi,t−1 + β10mdummyi,t−1 + αi + εi,t
(20)
∆IRi,t) = erai,t + β1∆IDi,t−1 + β2Di,t−1 + β3Mi,t−1 + β4Ri,t−1 + β5Msi,t−1 + β6pduumyi,t−1
+β7ddummyi,t−1 + β8tdummyi,t−1 + β9rdummyi,t−1 + β10mdummyi,t−1 + αi + εi,t
(21)
∆IRi,t) = erai,t + β1∆IDi,t−1 + β2Di,t−1 + β3CAi,t−1 + β4Ri,t−1 + β5pduumyi,t−1
+β6ddummyi,t−1 + β7cadummyi,t−1 + β8rdummyi,t−1 + αi + εi,t
(22)
∆IRi,t) = erai,t + β1∆IDi,t−1 + β2Di,t−1 + β3CAi,t−1 + β4ADi,t−1 + β5pduumyi,t−1
+β6ddummyi,t−1 + β7cadummyi,t−1 + β8addummyi,t−1 + αi + εi,t
(23)
61Egypt represents a special case, though. Two years before the abandonment of the peg, the central
bank devalued several times in an attempt to support the price competitiveness. Even though, its IMF
classification did not change until the peg was abandoned.
95
∆EMPi,t) = erai,t + β1∆IDi,t−1 + β2Di,t−1 + β3CAi,t−1 + β4Msi,t−1 + β5pduumyi,t−1
+β6ddummyi,t−1 + β7cadummyi,t−1 + β8mdummyi,t−1 + αi + εi,t
(24)
∆EMPi,t) = erai,t + β1∆IDi,t−1 + β2Di,t−1 + β3Mi,t−1 + β4Msi,t−1 + β5pduumyi,t−1
+β6ddummyi,t−1 + β7tdummyi,t−1 + β8mdummyi,t−1 + αi + εi,t
(25)
∆EMPi,t) = erai,t + β1∆IDi,t−1 + β2Di,t−1 + β3CAi,t−1 + β4pduumyi,t−1
+β5ddummyi,t−1 + β6cadummyi,t−1 + αi + εi,t
(26)
Where the regressand is either of the two credibility proxies: interest rate differential
or exchange rate market pressure index, era is the exchange rate arrangement constant
dummy variable, which takes the value of one when the exchange rate system is fixed, and
zero otherwise, ID is the inflation differential, D and CA are the ratio of debt to GDP and
current account to GDP, respectively, Ms is the money growth, M refers to the percentage
of imported goods on GDP, R denotes the log of changes in international reserves, in US
dollar, AD is the ratio of money growth to foreign reserves, pdummy (inflation differen-
tial), ddummy (debt), mdummy (money growth), cadummy(current account), tdummy
(import), addummy (adequacy), rdummy (foreign reserves) are the interactive dummy
variables, calculated by multiplying each related regressor with exchange rate arrange-
ment.62
The estimation of the fixed effects model, when the credibility is measured by the
interest rates differential, indicates that the individuals’ heterogeneity is significant. Ex-
pectedly, the F-test reported in Table 35 implies a rejection of the null hypothesis that
all dummy parameters except one are zero, and thereby assures the inefficiency of pooled
OLS estimates of coefficients.
Nevertheless, the specification tests for autocorrelation and heteroskdasticity indicate
that the results of fixed effects, reported in Table 35 are inefficient. In fact, with autocor-
related and heteroskedastic errors, relying on the default errors is misleading. Therefore,
we first apply the White (1980)’s robust standard errors.63 The results are presented in
Table 36. We modify the Hausman test to consider the usage of robust standard errors fol-
lowing the procedures set by (Hoechle (2007)). The within estimator according to the test
62The credibility proxies are regressed on the lagged values of the expectations determinants.
63The results using cluster robust errors are found indistinguishable from those using the robust standard
errors.
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is more efficient than random effects. The results, shown in Table 36, reflect that inflation
differentials in all setups account roughly for 20% of the spread. However, some of the
other indicators appear either significant in their interactive dummy or with a wrong sign,
such as international reserves in equation 22. Nevertheless, the homoscedasticity tested
by the LM test for unbalanced panels may also indicate the presence of cross sectional
dependence. In addition, the CD test, developed by Pesaran (2004), can also be used to
examine whether the cross sections are independent. Both tests, as reported in Table 35,
confirm that we cannot presume independence across countries. Therefore, we utilise the
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) corrector for standard errors. In principle, this is built upon
Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity correction for cross-sections averages
of moment conditions (Hoechle, 2007). Consequently the lag length needed to correct for
autocorrelation is specified by the default plug-in procedures, that is,
L(T ) = floor[4(
T
100
)(
2
9 )] (27)
where T is the number of time dimension.64 In accordance, the Hausman specification
test is corrected in the way defined by Hoechle (2007). The test’s p-value rejects the hy-
pothesis that random effect provides consistent estimates.
The results, presented in Table 37, provide evidence that inflation differential is the
main driving fundamental that affects the credibility of the peg. On average, 20% of
interest rate differential is explained by the difference in inflation between the domestic
economies and the base country. This reflects why anchoring interest rates is not possible in
the exchange rate targeters considered in this study. In fact, inflation differential increases
the prices of traded goods, and, consequently, deteriorates the competitive position of an
economy. It also triggers higher inflationary expectations, which affect the long-run inter-
est rates (Bernhardsen, 2000). In addition, in the words of Andersen and Chiriaeva (2007):
“a fixed exchange rate policy also implies an inflation target in the sense that the peg
to be credible, the domestic rate of inflation has to equal, in the medium to long term,
inflation in the country to which the exchange rate is pegged”.
The impact of inflation differential on realignment expectations is also confirmed by
the results of FD-GMM, shown in Table 41, where the coefficient of inflation differential
appears with the same magnitude and significance. The deterioration in current account,
64See Hoechle (2007) for more details.
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in the first equation of Table 37, also affects the credibility negatively by 3%. In the same
equation, however, reserves appear with a low effect and a wrong sign. Nonetheless, when
we apply the non-linear test to examine whether the total effect is not different from zero,
the assumption is not rejected. It is possible, as emphasised by Rose and Svensson (1994),
that the changes in international reserves do not precisely measure the ability of central
banks intervention. Unfortunately, coupled with the absence of data on intervention for
our set of countries, the capability of central bank to intervene in foreign exchange rate
markets has not been captured. Further, the reserves effect might not be clear with the
possibility of borrowing reserves during the episodes of unsuccessful speculative attacks
(Holden and Vikøren, 1996). When current account is replaced by import in equation 21,
the money growth becomes significant, but appears in a wrong sign. Likewise, the ratio
of imported good to GDP significantly influences the credibility of the peg, but with an
incorrect sign. Whether this ratio is seen as a measure for the vulnerability to external
shocks that is, the inflation shocks, namely in import-reliant countries, or as a composi-
tion of current account, the coefficient should appear in a positive sign. This inaccuracy
might be attributed to unavailability of data on export for all countries, the factor which
weakens the setup structure of equation 21. According to the results of setups 21 and 23,
debt to GDP ratio appears significant, regardless of the exchange rate arrangement.
Similarly, we apply the same procedures to equations 24 to 26 where the EMP is in-
corporated as the credibility measure. The test of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
prove that we cannot accept the null, as shown in Table 38. However, Pesaran (2004)’s
CD test is rejected, which implies that the individuals can be assumed independent. Us-
ing the White (1980) corrector, the results are unsatisfactory. None of the significant
indicators appear in the correct sign. When we carry on to estimate the equations with
DK’s standard errors relying on the LM test, no fundamental, as can be seen from Table
40, explains the pressure on the exchange rate, but only 5% is attributed to the positive
constant. These results are consistent with Mouratidis (2008), who finds that the fun-
damentals, when the EMP is employed, play no informative role, while they are more
powerful in explaining the interest rate differential.
The within estimator results for the EMP setups are confirmed when we allow for au-
toregressive and endogenous explanatory variables. The FD-GMM results show that the
constant in equation 24, presented in Table 42 remains significant with correct sign and the
same magnitude.65 The only difference is placed to the current account, which is found to
65We attempted to incorporate different instruments such as: forward inflation, naive forecasts of infla-
tion, but the results with the realised values of inflation differential were more informative.
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be highly significant and powerful for all countries regardless of their exchange rate regime.
In general, the sample might be highly heterogeneous with the poolability of low and
high income countries. In particular, some countries are characterised either with high
interest rates such as Venezuela, or with positive current account and low debt, e.g., Qatar
and Kuwait. Hence, we exclude such countries and examine the credibility for six countries
which have been fixing the exchange rate during the study period: Bahamas; Bahrain,
Barbados, Belize, Jordan, Oman. We investigate the relation using the within estimator
approach.66 The results, shown in Table 43, manifests that inflation differential has a
dominant impact on expectations. Moreover, current account deteriorations affect the
credibility by 3% across the setups.67 Interestingly, the domestic currencies are expected
to realign when the money supply growing faster than foreign reserves. The plausible
explanation for this strong effect of the adequacy ratio is that the adequacy of reserves
in these countries might not be enough to repel the realignment expectations. The EMP
results, unreported, for these countries fail again to detect any significant effect of funda-
mentals on exchange rate pressure.
The difference in results between the two credibility measures could be attributed to
three main reasons. First, the interest rate differential is one of the EMP index compo-
nents, which could be seen as a fixed exchange rate defense mechanism, i.e, the interest rate
defense of the parity. Hence, although domestic interest rates changes are not generated
away of fundamentals, fundamentals cannot detect a pressure on the exchange rate, given
the role of the monetary authority in resisting speculative attacks via the interest rate
defence. Second, During episodes of low credibility of the system or a surge of a specula-
tive attacks, the monetary authority would borrow international reserves; these borrowed
reserves are not captured by the EMP and thereby the changes in foreign reserves are
not sufficient to reflect low credibility. Third, the index has a drawback concerning its
weighting scheme; that is, although the index is set to make the variance of each part
equal, the volatility of exchange rates changes are small and thus, in cases of revaluation
or devaluation, the weight of these changes becomes extremely large, while changes in
foreign reserves are assigned with a neglected weight.
66The sample became smaller with the exclusion of some countries, so we did not proceed to the FD-
GMM.
67We also estimate the random effects for setup 22 as suggested by the Hausman test under spatial
dependence. All the determinants remain with the same significance and magnitude but the current
account turns to be insignificant.
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4.8 Conclusion
The study underlines the relationship between the realignment expectations and macroe-
conomic fundamentals, which reflects the overall credibility, in eleven countries adhered
to the fixed exchange rate to the US dollar. The exchange rate fixers are assumed to
preserve a very low interest rate differential which, according to the UIP, is supposed to
equal the expected changes in exchange rate. We adopt two measures to study the market
expectations: the interest rate differential and the exchange rate market pressure index
constructed by Eichengreen et al. (1994).
We build our study on the empirical works of the currency crises generations mod-
els, which generally imply assessing the consistency of macro fundamentals under a fixed
exchange rate system. Essentially, studies on the first generation models, built on the
Krugman (1979)’s hypothesis of demand mismanagement, have shown that the fall of a
fixed regime happens due to feeble macroeconomic pillars that support pegs. The sec-
ond strand of literature on currency crises addresses the importance of market agents’
animal spirits in generating speculative attacks while all the macroeconomy behaves well.
This, however, has been challenged by many economists. It is argued that self-fulfilling
expectations can be generated and turn into successful speculations only when macro fun-
damentals are weak. In that sense, we follow the projection approach of first generation
models, as in the work of Rose and Svensson (1994), and model different setups with
linkage to macrofundamentals in an attempt to shed light on the credibility of the con-
ventional peg to the US dollar. Accordingly, we gather and pool data of eleven exchange
rate targeters to the US dollar over the yearly span 1996-2012.
Different setups are constructed to consider the small sample size and to account for
the relation between current account and money stock in the principle implied by the
monetary approach to balance of payments. Periods with the soft peg under examina-
tion are assigned carefully depending on the official declaration of the system and the
IMF defacto classification. However, the IMF reports are not available, namely for the
years before 1999, thereby, the behaviour of nominal exchange rate and international re-
serves along with the official announcement are assessed on the basis of Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2005). Countries in some cases, due to the mismatches between the dejure
and defacto classification or the late adoption or abandonment of the peg, are assigned
as exchange rate targeters in certain periods. To take account of this, a constant dummy
variable and interactive dummies are inserted in the model setups.
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We first employ the fixed effects model to remove the countries specific heterogeneity,
where the explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous. However, to allow for en-
dogeneity in the macroeconomic setting, as addressed by the second generation models,
we utilise the Arellano and Bond (1991)’s first difference GMM.
Overall, under the strict assumption of regressors exogeneity, the specification tests im-
ply that relying on the estimates obtained from the default standard errors is misleading.
In accordance, we use the White (1980) procedure to correct for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. Nevertheless, the groupwise heteroscedasticity test also indicates that
the countries might be spatially correlated. This is ensured by performing the Pesaran
(2004)’s cross sectional dependence test. The inferences from both tests confirm that in-
dependence across countries cannot be assumed when the interest rate differential is used
as a measure of credibility. Subsequently, the Hausman specification test is estimated un-
der different procedures to consider the use of robust standard errors and cross sectional
dependence. The estimations provide evidence that, in all setups, the within estimator
is more consistent than random effects. On average, the results are stronger when the
interest rate differential is used to measure the market expectations.
The inflation differential appears to be the main driving force for generating realign-
ment expectations. In all the four setups modelled, its influence is found to be highly
significant, and account for around 20%, reflecting the spread between the exchange rate
fixers and the United States. This is in line with other studies where inflation differen-
tial acts as a prominent explanatory fundamental for the majority of collapsed exchange
rate regimes prior to crises, which partially explains the difficulty to anchor interest rates.
However, the other macro indicators in the study are found to be either insignificant or
significant with a wrong sign and/or negligible magnitude. On balance, the results are
similar to the finding of earlier work on credibility of the EMS at time proceeding the cri-
sis. Nonetheless, when the exchange rate market index is used, the fundamentals are not
valuable in explaining the pressure on fixed exchange rate currencies. Moreover, the cross
sectional tests provide mixed inferences about whether to reject the spatial dependence
among countries. Thus, assuming independence across countries, none of the significant
indicators appear in the correct sign. Even when we correct the default standard errors in
the manner of Driscoll and Kraay (1998), the constant in one setup explains only 5% of the
expected pressure on the domestic currencies. Nevertheless, these results are, in principle,
consistent with Mouratidis (2008)’s study on the 1994 Mexican currency crisis, where the
pressure over the currency was not captured by the fundamentals. On the other hand, Li
et al. (2006) argue that the exchange rate market index cannot capture unsuccessful at-
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tacks on a fixed exchange rate currency. Particularly, they criticise the ”variance-weighted
scheme”, since the volatility of changes in exchange rates are small and thus, in cases of
revaluation or devaluation as in our study, the weight of these changes becomes extremely
large, while reserves changes are given a neglected weight.
The results, based on the interest rate differential as a proxy for the system credibility
suggests that the inflation differential remains one critical fundamental in explaining why
an exchange rate parity to the US dollar is expected to realign. Investors ask for inflation
premium to bear the risk of holding assets denominated in domestic currencies. Since the
interest rate considered in the study is on annual deposit, risk aversion must be closely re-
lated to the currency risk and deregulation of financial intermediaries whose well-function
is a responsibility of central banks.
When we split the countries to only include those which did not experience any shift in
exchange rate regime during the study period, the fixed effects model shows that inflation
differential remains a vital factor. The deterioration in current account also appears to
be an important indicator for expecting realignment in these countries. Interestingly, the
reserve adequacy is highly significant and imposes strong impacts on expectations. This
might reflect the economic nature of these countries, where four of them are oil-importers;
even the two oil producing countries, Bahrain and Oman, produce less crude oil compared
to their neighbours: Kuwait and Qatar.68
Broadly speaking, exchange rate fixity in these countries does not provide the credibil-
ity of low inflation. A country with our examined peg, which is described in the literature
as ’soft’, is expected to realign from its predetermined parity when it is hit by real shocks
(Stone et al., 2008). So, it is not surprising that a soft peg among all exchange rate regimes
are more prone to currency crises Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003). This might take us back
to the principle of choice to fix or float, where a fixed exchange rate regime is a better
choice when shocks are of monetary nature (Garber and Svensson, 1994). Financially,
anchoring inflation, according to our results, through pegging the currency is dubious, but
it is possible to be more serving to international trade as the dollar is the currency used
in pricing petroleum. However, this is beyond the scope of our study. It is also likely that
the seemingly prolonged successful exchange rate targeting in such countries, except in
Egypt, Venezuela and Kuwait, reflects their economic nature of being either oil-producers
or reliant importers.
68 The US energy information administration.
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It is evident that having a fixed exchange rate is not enough to bring the credibility
of low inflation into domestic economies. This undoubtedly indicates that credibility of
low inflation must be domestically built and set on microfoundations. As addressed by
Svensson (1994), the monetary credibility can be built domestically by consolidating ”in-
stitutional reforms”. These reforms entail the integrated cooperation of monetary and
exchange rate policies including central bank independence. Indeed, the exchange rate as
a quantitative anchor cannot inherently bring credible economic policies without having
harmonious domestic collaboration and preferences as well as well-armed institutions to
hold the responsibility of fixing the exchange rate.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the study suffers from limitations, which might
affect the power of the results. These could fundamentally be attributed to the less homo-
geneity across developing countries and their poor quality of data or data insufficiency, as
highlighted by Schiavo and Vaona (2008). Principally, due to the small sample size, it was
not possible to consider socio or political factors. However, the study span is not heavily
vulnerable to political turbulence; even in some exceptions like the Hariri assassination
in Lebanon, the overall state of macroeconomy remained stable. It could also be argued
that countries tend not to change the monetary regime during the political unrest periods
(Tamgac, 2013). Yet, examining the effect of economic instability and political distur-
bances, namely the influence of corrupt regimes, is vital and it would have been preferred
if our sample was larger.
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Table 35: Within estimators with default standard errors.
Measure of realignment expectations: Interest rate differential.
equation 20 equation 21 equation 22 equation 23
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
ID 0.576*** 0.556*** 0.615*** 0.642***
D 0.033* 0.041** 0.037* 0.034*
CA 0.034 0.023 0.022
R -0.023 -0.001 -0.031*
Ms -0.065 -0.155**
eradummy 2.244 -4.068 1.68 0.656
pdummy -0.369*** -0.318*** -0.416*** -0.448***
ddummy 0.01 0.006 0.014 0.011
cadummy -0.065* -0.063* -0.067*
rdummy 0.036** 0.009 0.035**
mdummy 0.000 0.103
M -0.185***
tdummy 0.136*
AD -0.733
addummy 2.243
cons -0.794 7.213*** -1.586 -1.104
VIF 4.23 5.08 4.15 5.07
Fixed effect[F-test] F(5,83)=6.96 F(5,5)=23.46 F(4,86)=7.39 F(4,74)=9.72
P-F(11,141) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LM test: Chi2 (11) -359.77 -280.66 -1,222.46 -530.4
Prob > Chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocorrelation, F(1,10) -133.43 -96.118 -76.072 -83.148
Prob > F(1,10) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CD test -6.506 -6.611 -9.168 -6.672
CD test: probability (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman: Prob>Chi2 (9) -0.023 -0.1 -0.081 -0.011
Note: VIF is the variance inflation factor that tests whether multicollinearity exists. Greene (2003)’s
LM test for unbalanced panel: H0: σ
2
i = σ
2 for all I. Wooldridge (2010)’s autocorrelation H0: no first
order autocorrelation. Pesaran (2004)’s CD test: H0: errors are cross sectional independence. ***,
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard Errors are between parenthesis.
Probability is between brackets.
Table 36: Within estimators with robust standard errors.
Measure of realignment expectations: Interest rate differential.
equation 20 equation 21 equation 22 equation 23
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
ID 0.576*** 0.556*** 0.615*** 0.642***
D 0.033 0.041 0.037 0.034
CA 0.034 0.023 0.022
R -0.023 -0.001 -0.031**
Ms -0.065 -0.155***
eradummy 2.244 -4.068 1.68 0.656
pdummy -0.369*** -0.318*** -0.416*** -0.448***
ddummy 0.01 0.006 0.014 0.011
cadummy -0.065* -0.063 -0.067
rdummy 0.036* 0.009 0.035**
mdummy 0.000 0.103
M -0.185
tdummy 0.136
AD -0.733
addummy 2.243
cons -0.794 7.213** -1.586 -1.104
Hausman-robust SE: Prob>F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Probability is between brackets.
104
Table 37: Within estimators with spatial correlation standard errors.
Measure of realignment expectations: Interest rate differential.
equation 20 equation 21 equation 22 equation 23
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
ID 0.576*** 0.556*** 0.615*** 0.642***
D 0.033 0.041** 0.037* 0.034*
CA 0.034* 0.023 0.022
R -0.023* -0.001 -0.031***
Ms -0.065 -0.155***
eradummy 2.244 -4.068* 1.68 0.656
pdummy -0.369*** -0.318*** -0.416*** -0.448***
ddummy 0.01 0.006 0.014 0.011
cadummy -0.065*** -0.063** -0.067***
rdummy 0.036** 0.009 0.035***
mdummy 0.000 0.103**
M -0.185**
tdummy 0.136*
AD -0.733
addummy 2.243
cons -0.794 7.213** -1.586 -1.104
Hausman-Spatial dependence (0.000) (-0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Probability is between brackets.
Table 38: Within estimators with default standard errors.
Measure of realignment expectations: EMP
equation 24 equation 25 equation 22 equation 26
coefficient coefficient coefficient
ID 0.061*** 0.008*** 0.225***
D 0.133* 0.122** 0.145*
CA -0.231 -0.285
Ms -0.183 -0.266
eradummy 18.85 19.859** 16.446
pdummy -0.205 -0.167 -0.388
ddummy -0.163*** -0.141*** -0.141***
cadummy -0.015 -0.017
mdummy -0.036* -0.023
M 0.242
tdummy -0.14
cons -14.039 -20.144*** -16.696
Fixed effect[F-test] 93.4 80.41 134.47
P-F(11,141) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LM test: Chi2 (11) 114.172 76.953 93.197
Prob > Chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocorrelation, F(1,10) 114.172 76.953 93.197
Prob > F(1,10) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CD test -0.599 -1.316 -0.019
CD test: probability (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman: Prob>Chi2 (9) 0.003 0.024 0.022
Note: Greene (2003)’s LM test for unbalanced panel: H0: σ
2
i = σ
2 for all I. Wooldridge (2010)’s
autocorrelation H0: no first order autocorrelation. Pesaran (2004)’s CD test: H0: errors are cross
sectional independence. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Probability is
between brackets.
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Table 39: Within estimators with robust standard errors.
Measure of realignment expectations: EMP
equation 24 equation 25 equation 22 equation 26
coefficient coefficient coefficient
ID 0.061*** 0.008*** 0.225***
D 0.133* 0.122** 0.145*
CA -0.231 -0.285
Ms -0.183 -0.266
eradummy 18.85 19.859** 16.446
pdummy -0.205 -0.167 -0.388
ddummy -0.163*** -0.141*** -0.141***
cadummy -0.015 -0.017
mdummy -0.036* -0.023
M 0.242
tdummy -0.14
cons -14.039 -20.144*** -16.696
Hausman test: Prob>F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Probability is between brackets.
Table 40: Within estimators with spatial standard errors.
Measure of realignment expectations: EMP
equation 24 equation 25 equation 26
coefficient coefficient coefficient
ID 0.061 0.008 0.225
D 0.133** 0.122* 0.145**
CA -0.231* -0.285**
Ms -0.183 -0.266**
eradummy 18.850*** 19.859*** 16.446***
pdummy -0.205 -0.167** -0.388***
ddummy -0.163** -0.141 -0.141*
cadummy -0.015 -0.017
mdummy -0.036 -0.023
M 0.242*
tdummy -0.14
cons -14.039*** -20.144*** -16.696***
Hausman: Prob>F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Probability is between brackets.
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Table 41: First difference GMM.
Measure of realignment expectations: Interest rate differential.
equation 24 equation 25 equation 22 equation 26
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
L.IR 0.254** 0.183* 0.222 0.208
ID 0.472*** 0.453*** 0.508*** 0.544***
Ms -0.177* -0.214***
D 0.021 0.03 0.041 0.034
CA 0.058* 0.021 0.005
R -1.565 2.474 -6.417**
pdummy -0.265** -0.199** -0.289*** -0.318***
ddummy -0.002 -0.009 -0.005 0.003
mdummy 0.08 0.132*
cadummy -0.082** -0.062 -0.043
rdummy 5.006 0.077 7.044***
eradummy 2.88 -2.809 2.622 2.348
M -0.153
tdummy 0.107
AD -0.003
addummy 0.003
cons -0.317 7.232*** -2.327 -2.047
Sargan test: Chi2 (128)=147.37 (128)=139.47 (132)=171.67 (132)=176.46
Sargan test: Prob>Chi2 0.115 0.225 0.011 0.005
Arellano and Bond 0.654 0.718 0.156 0.151
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Sargan test tests the validity
of overriding restrictions under homoscedasticity assumption. Arellano and Bond tests whether errors
are independent at second order.
Table 42: First difference GMM.
Measure of realignment expectations: EMP.
equation 24 equation 25 equation 26
coefficient coefficient coefficient
L.EMP -0.133* -0.081 -0.092
ID -0.019 0.015 0.134
Ms -0.072 -0.228
D 0.152 0.154* 0.153
CA -0.331*** -0.366***
pdummy -0.120* -0.174 -0.300***
mdummy -0.141** -0.047
ddummy -0.169 -0.167** -0.146
cadummy 0.051 0.047
eradummy 18.276*** 19.315* 14.243**
M 0.161
tdummy -0.059
cons -14.707** -20.215 -15.110**
Sargan test: Chi2 125.579 130.253 132.078
Sargan test: Prob>Chi2 0.64 0.403 0.579
Arellano and Bond 0.815 0.926 0.685
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Sargan test tests the validity
of overriding restrictions under homoscedasticity assumption. Arellano and Bond tests whether errors
are independent at second order.
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Table 43: Within estimators with default standard errors.
Measure of realignment expectations: Interest rate differential.
Six countries: Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Jordan and Oman.
equation 20 equation 21 equation 22 equation 23
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient
ID 0.244*** 0.272*** 0.242*** 0.222***
D 0.018 0.013 0.023** 0.032**
CA -0.025** -0.026*** -0.031*
R 1.91 0.834 1.307
Ms -0.023 -0.007
M -0.037***
AD 3.096***
cons 1.122 3.657*** 0.627 -1.38
LM test: Chi2 (6) 37 54.01 48.28 40.19
Prob > Chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocorrelation, F(1,5) 87.14 74.933 94.042 72.079
Prob > F(1,5) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman: Prob>F(5,5) (9) 0 0 0.399 0
Note: Greene (2003)’s LM test for unbalanced panel: H0: σ
2
i = σ
2 for all I. Wooldridge (2010)’s
autocorrelation H0: no first order autocorrelation. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. Standard Errors are between parenthesis. Probability is between brackets.
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Chapter 5
Inflation Targeting or Exchange Rate Targeting: Which
Framework Supports The Goal of Price Stability in
Emerging Market Economies?
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5.1 Introduction
Since the introduction of fiat money, inflation has become an important topic in the
modern economy. This is because inflation has adverse impacts on economic resources,
nominal wages and the intertemporal decisions of market agents. However, the historical
evidence of inflation from the last century revealed that the discretionary money stan-
dard which are bound to a fixed exchange rate regime and that with an independent
central bank were less exposed to high inflation (Bernholz, 2015).69 Hence, inflationary
trends have not been observed before the twentieth century, but with the abandonment
of the metallic money standards.70 Therefore, the inflationary bias that might be created
in the absence of monetary rules has highlighted the need for monetary regimes with a
clear monetary constitution. Nevertheless, over the last century, monetary regimes that
anchor exchange rate to fulfil a certain level of prices have failed to ensure the goal of
price stability. Indeed, the success and the prolonged use of exchange rate to fix prices
have been questioned after the failure of past fixed exchange rate systems. As a conse-
quence, many countries have moved to adopt different forms of Inflation Targeting (IT),
which presupposes an announcement of an inflation rate to achieve the price stability.71
In effect, IT framework has come virtually as a result of the tenet that monetary policy
could achieve the price stability as a prominent goal.72 Nevertheless, pegged exchange rate
regimes with less rigidity, i.e., soft-pegs, are still being widely adopted by some countries.73
Nonetheless, despite having a quantitative target to anchoring prices, there is a con-
sensus among economists that the social and financial costs attributed to inflation result
mainly from the uncertainty about future inflation. Hence, monetary regimes should be
an active tool not only to curb inflation rates, but also to eliminate the uncertainty about
future inflation, the role which is essential to ensure the objective of price stability.
In fact, the linkage between inflation and inflation uncertainty have gained attention
in the recent literature after the Nobel lecture of Friedman (1977), in which he argues that
inflation causes higher inflation uncertainty. The positive relationship between the two
variables is theoretically concreted by Ball (1992), who shows that weak policy makers are
more likely to permit inflation during high-inflation episodes, generating more inflation
69Bernholz (2015) argues that the hyperinflation in the 20th century has not occurred because of Wars as
pointed by Capie (1986), but as a results of the movement to adopt discretionary paper money standards.
70An inflationary development has become more pronounced after the great depression and later at the
outbreak of the World War II.
71Note that some central banks also moved to IT after relinquishing the monetary aggregates.
72See Thornton (2012) for more details on monetary policy effectiveness.
73Pegged exchange rates with ’less rigidity’ or soft fixed exchange rates refer to the monetary regime
with prices linked to a foreign currency, but the domestic central bank preserves the right to devalue or
revalue at its own discretion.
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uncertainty. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), on the other hand, reveal that inflation un-
certainty leads to higher inflation. However, it is argued that the causality from inflation
uncertainty to inflation might turn negative. Holland (1995) states that central banks
could respond to inflation uncertainty through lowering the money stock, and thereby, a
negative nexus might appear as a sign of stabilising reaction of monetary policy. Con-
sequently, over the last three decades, questioning the relationship between inflation and
inflation uncertainty has encouraged a large number of empirical studies, which attempted
to assess the validity of Freidman-Ball (F-B) and Cukierman and Meltzer (C-M) hypothe-
ses. However, an initial difficulty emerged with measuring inflation uncertainty. Early
studies on the topic measured inflation uncertainty either as the dispersion of individual
forecasts drawn from surveys or as the moving standard deviation of inflation. Nonetheless,
it was pointed out that the stress should only be placed on the unpredictable component
of inflation uncertainty, which requires a time varying measure of volatility (Ball et al.,
1990). The move to use such a measure comes with the development of the Auto Regres-
sive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and Generalised ARCH (GARCH), by Engle
(1982) and Bollerslev (1986), respectively.
Therefore, more studies have been conducted to examine the direction of the causal-
ity, making use of ARCH and GARCH models to acquire a time-varying measure for the
volatility. Nevertheless, empirical studies have failed short to account for the influences
of monetary regimes on the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. In-
deed, while there has been considerable studies on the relationship between inflation and
inflation uncertainty, there has been a few studies, e.g., Chang and He (2010), Kontonikas
(2004), Caporale et al. (2010), that have considered the role of monetary regimes on the
nexus, but the attention has been given to IT and the euro regime. On the other hand, as
far we know, no study, other than Khan et al. (2013), has attempted to compare between
two quantitatively-based monetary regimes. Khan et al. (2013) studied the relationship
between inflation and inflation uncertainty for Eastern European countries which are either
currency boards followers or inflation targeters. However, they fail to address distinctions
between the two regimes, and thus, to specify which regime works better at reducing the
nominal and real inflation uncertainty. Furthermore, far too little attention has been paid
to the cases with soft fixed exchange rates. Even when some cases were considered in the
studies, e.g., Daal et al. (2005) and Samimi et al. (2012), researchers have not investigated
the relationship between inflation and uncertainty in much detail, i.e., the impact of mon-
etary regimes on the nexus has been ignored.
Hence, with a similar comparison objective of Khan et al. (2013), this chapter attempts
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to fill a void in the empirical literature, by investigating the nexus between inflation and
inflation uncertainty in emerging market economies under two monetary anchors: a fixed
exchange rate (FER) regime to the US dollar and inflation targeting. The aim of this chap-
ter is twofold. Firstly, to validate the F-B and C-M hypotheses under the two regimes.
Secondly, to evaluate the plausible effects of adopting a certain quantitative target on
inflation uncertainty.
Different GARCH in Mean (GARCH-M) models are constructed to investigate the
relationship in two countries adherent to the fixed exchange rate to the US dollar (FER):
Jordan and Egypt, and three inflation targeters: South Africa, Brazil and Poland.74 These
countries have experienced a shift in monetary regime. For example, some countries have
shifted from monetary aggregates to a FER regime or from a FER system to IT. So, the
chapter also highlights how the economy of the examined countries has benefited from the
regime under investigation. The GARCH-M model used in our study allows examining the
relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty simultaneously, by incorporating
a measure of volatility in the inflation equation. Using an asymmetric GARCH-M type
model, we also attempt to assess the response of inflation uncertainty to inflation shocks.
In addition, by performing the component GARCH-M model, we capture the impact of
monetary regimes, conducted by the above-mentioned countries, on the long-run inflation
uncertainty.
Our findings are in the line with F-B and C-M hypotheses. Inflation and inflation un-
certainty affect each other positively. Both IT and FER regime appear effective in reducing
inflation uncertainty. This suggests the importance of monetary regimes as signalling de-
vices for inflation expectations. The FER regime has no impact on average inflation and
inflation persistence, while IT has been successful at lowering average inflation and infla-
tion persistence of its followers. Nevertheless, the results provide evidence that inflation
targeting countries have not benefited equally from IT.
The plan of this study is as follows: Section two provides the literature review. Section
three discusses the methodology applied. Section four represents the data. The results
and concluding remarks are provided in section five and six, respectively.
74Poland, South Africa and Brazil are classified as emerging markets by the IMF, Columbia university,
FTSE, MSCI and S and P among other lists. Egypt is also considered an emerging market by the FTSE
(secondary market), S and P, MSCI and BBVA, while Jordan is labelled by a few lists, e.g., BBVA. Note
that Egypt opted out from the fixed exchange rate system, so our study compares between the time during
the fixed and after abandoning it.
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5.2 Literature Review
It has been widely thought that inflation is a crucial threat to the economic and social
stability. Indeed, inflation reduces the value of real income and makes official nominal
interest rates a pseudo indicator of monetary policy (Brunner and Meltzer, 1981). Saving
and investment decisions are also affected by inflation; savers and investors alike are un-
certain about how to avoid being taxed on cash balances and how to minimise the cost of
unneeded demand and supply (Sandmo, 1970) (Fischer and Summers, 1989). In addition
to the misallocation of economic resources, inflation redistributes the wealth of creditors
and debtors and discourages the engagement in long-run contracts.
Nevertheless, it is believed that the costs can be small if inflation is fully anticipated.
This notion indicates that the emphasis should be placed on what makes inflation volatile
and unpredictable. Hence, the real costs of inflation should be linked to uncontrolled
inflation, which affects both the supply and demand sides of the economy, as implied
by (Ackley, 1978). Due to unanticipated demand shocks, inflation may increase interest
rates, which thereby, impedes investment decisions, reduces the real value of wealth, low-
ers households spending and encourages imported goods and services. In the absence of
indexed inflation wages, inflation can have more adverse impacts on real incomes. On the
supply side, inflation distorts the management of economic resources, and adds additional
costs to acquire accurate information, which could potentially be costly for small indus-
tries. The effect of inflation is also tremendously important in financial markets. This is
because it influences both ex-ante and ex-post financial decisions. In fact, as high infla-
tion raises uncertainty about future inflation, market agents tend to ask for higher returns
or higher nominal interest rates, while trying at the same time to hedge their wealth by
spending more resources to forecast inflation. The forecasts, however, might mispredict
the real inflation, leading to inferior redistributive impacts on agents’ real balances (Golob,
1994).
Some policy makers and economists suggest that the costs of a predicted low and
moderate inflation rate are acceptable and supported by the economic theory. However,
Okun (1971) shows that an anticipated rate of steady inflation as implied by accelera-
tionists would be ideal to wind down the social and redistributive costs of inflation, but
such steady price level is difficult to achieve due to inflation expectations, which hinge
substantially upon the type of government in power and the trade-off between employ-
ment and inflation. Consequently, he points out that the acceptance of moderate and
steady inflation would trigger higher inflation expectations, which eventually leads to a
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higher inflation rate. Furthermore, he hypothesises, by analysing the inflation behaviour
for different OECD countries, that high inflation may lead to higher inflation variability,
and that high inflation countries experienced higher inflation variability. However, the link
between inflation and its uncertainty has gained much interest after the Nobel lecture of
Friedman (1977). Friedman states that the relationship between unemployment and nomi-
nal wage changes is not stable owning to inflation uncertainty, which increases with level of
inflation.75 Ball (1992) supports the hypothesis suggested by Friedman that high inflation
leads to higher inflation uncertainty. He bases his argument on a monetary policy-time in-
consistency game theoretical model of Barro and Gordon (1983), where market agents are
uncertain about the type of government in power. As long as inflation remains low, both
weak and strong types of policy makers will keep it low. Yet, the dilemma appears when
inflation could be permitted by the weak policy maker, during high inflation episodes, and
thereby, inflation uncertainty will tend to be high when inflation is high. On the other
hand, on the basis of the same time inconsistency model, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)
argue that, as central bankers are motivated to create surprise inflation to stimulate the
economic activity, an increase in inflation variability raises the level of inflation rate.76 In
other words, for Friedman and Ball, higher inflation creates higher inflation uncertainty,
while for Cukieman-Meltzer, the link goes in the other direction, that is, inflation uncer-
tainty increases inflation. Holland (1995), however, shows that a negative link could be
an indicator of stabilising effects of monetary framework conducted by central banks.
Therefore, a large number of empirical works has attempted to examine the nexus be-
tween inflation and inflation uncertainty using different measures of inflation uncertainty.
Glezakos and Nugent (1984) and Pourgerami and Maskus (1987) study the nexus for Latin
American countries. While the former suggests that market agents update their inflation
expectations adaptively, the latter bases their investigation on rationality of agents, in
which responses to changes in inflation happen over shorter horizons. Pourgerami and
Maskus (1987) find that, by regressing the absolute value of expected inflation errors on
realised inflation, higher inflation hinders the predictability of prices changes. However,
their results are weaker compared to Glezakos and Nugent (1984), in which the latter uses
the difference between expected and realised inflation as a measure of unpredicted infla-
tion. Nevertheless, as it is not possible in reality to determine the inflation expectations
75He further argued that inflation-inflation uncertainty leads to lower output growth; however, this
impact is unsettled in the literature and depends on whether money is considered neutral; see e.g., Tobin
(1965), Sidrauski (1967), Stockman (1981). However, the recent studies have shown that the link exists
in practice, but the effect of inflation on economic growth comes through inflation uncertainty, see Chang
and He (2010), Grier et al. (2004). Fountas (2010), on the other hand, finds that output growth is not
affected by inflation uncertainty.
76Policy makers may increase an optimal inflation rate to benefit from low unemployment, see Tobin
(1972), or to lower the public debt, see Fischer and Summers (1989) for further detail.
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formation process, employed by market agents, such estimations for the nexus could be
misleading (Ungar and Zilberfarb, 1993). Hence, other studies have attempted to inves-
tigate the relationship by utilising inflation forecasts gathered from surveys of inflation
expectations. Cukierman and Wachtel (1982) use the mean square of inflation forecast
error to proxy for inflation uncertainty, whereas (Ungar and Zilberfarb, 1993) adopt two
other measures of inflation unpredictability along the mean squared error: the absolute
forecast error of Glezakos and Nugent (1984) and the squared forecast error of Pagan et al.
(1983). Both studies confirm the existence of a positive relationship between inflation and
its unpredictability. Golob (1994) employs the standard deviation of survey participants’
inflation forecasts and proves that uncertainty increases with inflation.77
Although the survey-based measures were believed to be good proxies for inflation
uncertainty, such measures were unable to distinguish between transitory and permanent
shocks to inflation, where the latter has a much stronger effect on the intertemporal deci-
sion making of individuals and businesses. Thus, Ball et al. (1990) claim that the effect
of control errors lasts temporarily and decays over short times, whereas inflation has a
severe effect on uncertainty at longer horizons, where permanent shocks dominate. Engle
(1982) was the first to measure inflation uncertainty as the conditional variance of infla-
tion to study the relationship between inflation and uncertainty in the United States. In
fact, the introduction of Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasicity (ARCH) and Gen-
eral Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasicity (GARCH) approaches by Engle (1982)
and Bollerslev (1986), respectively, encourages a large number of recent empirical work
examining the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty.
Evans (1991) constructs a model which allows for the changes in the structure of in-
flation to affect inflation uncertainty. This is performed by incorporating the different
aspects of inflation uncertainty through the Kalman filter: the conditional variance of
inflation, the conditional variance of expected inflation and the conditional variance of
steady-state inflation. He applies the model to the US during the period 1960:01-1988:06
and concludes that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Grier and Perry (1998) examine
the relationship utilising a GARCH model to produce a proxy for inflation uncertainty in
the G7 countries. Their findings from the Granger causality tests suggest that the nexus
is positive as implied by F-B, but little evidence is found in favour of the C-M hypothesis.
Fountas (2001) and Kontonikas (2004), who apply GARCH and GARCH-M, respectively,
find evidence that the F-B hypothesis, for different examined periods, held true for the
UK. In fact, most studies have used either GARCH or GARCH-M to investigate the rela-
77See also Wachtel (1977) and Carlson (1977).
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tionship between inflation and uncertainty, in different countries, reporting mixed results
concerning the causality between inflation and uncertainty; whether it goes from inflation
to uncertainty or the opposite; others even find the link to be bi-directional. Conrad and
Karanasos (2005) find evidence for the Friedman hypothesis in the US and the UK, while
the results for Japan show that uncertainty affected the level of inflation as suggested by
C-M.
Most of the studies on the link between inflation-inflation uncertainty, e.g., Daal et al.
(2005), Grier and Grier (2006), Hwang (2001), Thornton (2007), Payne (2008), Keskek
and Orhan (2010), Jiranyakul and Opiela (2011), Hartmann and Herwartz (2012), Foun-
tas and Karanasos (2007), support the Friedman hypothesis. Similarly, Grier and Grier
(2006), who apply an augmented multivariate GARCH-M to study the nexus in Mexico,
find that high inflation increases inflation uncertainty. On the other hand, Berument
et al. (2012) and Fountas (2010) suggest that innovations to uncertainty increases infla-
tion. Some studies, e.g., Thornton (2007), Fountas (2010), Daal et al. (2005), find mixed
results for the relationship in some countries, while Balcilar et al (2011) supported both
hypotheses for G3 countries. Nevertheless, Hwang (2001) finds, using ARFIMA-GARCH
model, no causal nexus between inflation and its uncertainty in the United Stated over
the period 1926-1992.
One drawback of GARCH model is that it is unable by its construction to capture the
asymmetric responses to positive and negative shocks to inflation. Hence a new family of
asymmetric GARCH has evolved to consider the fact that bad news in financial markets
has deeper effects than good news (Grier and Perry, 1998). Subsequently, many studies
have constructed different models of asymmetric GARCH. Jiranyakul and Opiela (2010)
examine the nexus, for five Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand, using EGARCH, and find evidence in favour of both the F-B and C-M
hypotheses. They note that inflation is a threat, even in low inflation countries, as it
leads to increase uncertainty. In a similar vein, Nazar et al. (2010) use the same model to
generate a measure for inflation uncertainty in Iran and find that inflation granger causes
inflation uncertainty. The same conclusion is reached by Rizvi and Naqvi (2009) and Daal
et al. (2005), who study the relationship for Pakistan and a number of emerging market
economies and the G7, respectively. However, Daal et al. (2005) show that positive shocks
to inflation have more powerful impacts on inflation uncertainty than negative ones, espe-
cially in Latin American countries, while Rizvi and Naqvi (2009) find that the opposite is
true for Pakistan. Yeh et al. (2011) also found that positive inflation shocks have stronger
effects on uncertainty. Wilson (2006) employs EGARCH-M to investigate the link between
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inflation-inflation uncertainty-output growth in Japan. His findings are in the line with
Friedman (1977), that is, high inflation leads to higher inflation uncertainty and lower
productivity. He also finds that negative shocks increase inflation uncertainty more than
positive shocks. Fountas et al. (2004) reveal that the relationship between inflation and
uncertainty, in five of the six European countries considered in their analysis, over the
period 1960-1999, is consistent with the Friedman hypothesis.
A few studies have applied Markov regime switching AutoRegressive Heteroscedastic
(SWARCH) model to take account of the monetary regime shifts in investigating the rela-
tionship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. For Peru, Castillo et al. (2012) show
that the shift to adopt inflation targeting is characterised with less inflation volatility, and
that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Tas and Ertugrul (2013) utilise the SWARCH
model to study the impact of inflation targeting on inflation uncertainty for a number
of developed and emerging market countries. According to their findings, IT lowers the
variance of inflation in most of the countries examined; however, this positive advantage
increases with high level of central bank transparency and the institutional arrangements.
In fact, the adoption of inflation targeting across many developed and developing cen-
tral banks has increased the appetite to discover the benefit of the new framework. Fountas
(2001) suggests that the announcement of an explicit inflation target has a prominent effect
on lowering inflation persistence and uncertainty at long horizon. Kim (1993) also sup-
ports the Friedman hypothesis for the United States as the nexus is found to be positively
correlated during high inflation periods. Likewise, Tas and Ertugrul (2013) find that the
relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty is positive and inflation variance
has been decreased after IT in most inflation targeters investigated in his study. Similar
findings were obtained by Kontonikas (2004) for the UK. Bhar and Mallik (2013) also
point out that IT is an optimal anchor for the UK, however, they find that the relation-
ship between inflation and uncertainty has turned to be negative after inflation targeting.
Furthermore, Bhar and Mallik (2012) Bhar and Mallik (2013) claim that adopting IT in
New Zealand and Australia grant monetary authorities more flexibility in setting the nom-
inal interest rates.78 Other studies; Neanidis and Savva (2011), Caporale and Kontonikas
(2009), Caporale et al. (2010), show that adopting the Euro played a major positive role
in affecting the nexus between inflation and uncertainty. The only study which com-
pared between two different monetary regimes: currency boards and inflation targeting,
for Eastern European countries, is Khan et al. (2013), who apply EGARCH model and
78See also Mallik and Bhar (2011) on the relationship between inflation uncertainty and interest rates
for five inflation targeters, and Wright (2011) for the effect of inflation targeting on interest rates.
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find support for the Friedman hypothesis. However, the study fails to underline which
monetary anchor worked better at reducing inflation uncertainty.
5.3 Methodology
GARCH type models have been widely employed to investigate the relationship between
inflation and inflation uncertainty, as they provide a time-varying measure for the volatil-
ity.79 Nevertheless, a standard GARCH model does not allow examining the effect of
inflation and inflation uncertainty simultaneously. So, the previous statistical technique
to study the direction of the nexus, conducted by some studies, was the two stage ap-
proach, under which the conditional variance of inflation is estimated in the first stage,
then the Granger causality tests are performed to determine the causal direction of the
relationship.80
However, GARCH-M, developed by Engle et al. (1987), permits inflation to be speci-
fied by inflation uncertainty. Therefore, to investigate the relationship simultaneously, we
allow the conditional variance of inflation to be influenced by the mean, and the inflation
rate to be determined by the conditional variance. These specifications can be represented
as follows:
The mean equation:81
pit = α0 +
p∑
t=1
αipit−i +
q∑
j=1
βjεt−j + δ
√
ht + εt (28)
The variance equation:82
pit = φ+
p∑
t=1
αiε
2
t−1 +
q∑
j=1
βjht−j + λZt− 1 (29)
79GARCH model is ” a weighted average of past squared residuals, but it has declining weights that
never go to zero” Engle (2001), and was developed as a solution to shrink the number of ARCH estimated
parameters required to capture the dynamic of the conditional variance.
80See Nas and Perry (2000) and Grier and Perry (1998). Fountas (2010) incorporates ’in mean coef-
ficients’ to capture the effect of inflation uncertainty on inflation. When the effect is found, for some
countries, insignificant, he estimates the standard GARCH model, and from the estimated conditional
variance he performs Granger causality tests. In the mean equation, he includes lags of inflation uncer-
tainty to consider the inertia of money supply in responding to inflation. The influence of money supply
was suggested by Holland (1995), who argues that central banks will respond to inflation uncertainty by
reducing money supply and, consequently, decreasing the inflation rate.
81In our study, as explained in details in the results section, the mean equation is built on AR specifi-
cations rather than ARMA process, so the lagged error terms are excluded.
82GARCH model estimates a time-varying variance of residuals which acts as a proxy for unexpected
inflation volatility (Daal et al., 2005). The GARCH regression model is built on an autoregressive moving
average of a known variable, where the conditional variance is a linear function of its past values and past
squared shocks. This model has an ARMA construction which makes the model soluble; however, given
its quadratic specification, the model equalises the effect of positive and negative innovations (Zakoian,
1994). Inserting a one-period lagged inflation in the variance equation allows examining the hypothesis of
Friedman (1977) and Ball (1992).
118
Where pit−i is the lagged inflation rate; εt−j is the lagged errors and εt is the error
term, which has conditional and unconditional mean of zero and conditional variance,
ht, given by equation 29. The conditional variance is determined by the lagged squared
residuals, the lagged conditional variance and Zt−1, which includes only lags of inflation.
Stationarity restrictions of the model entail that αi and βj, the non-negative parameters,
must be less that unity. If the sum of the parameters is equal to one, the conditional
variance must be modelled by Integrated GARCH (Harvey, 2013).
If δ in the mean equation is significantly positive, higher inflation uncertainty generates
higher inflation, as argued by C-M. On the other hand, when the coefficient is significantly
negative, the Holland’s hypothesis of monetary policy stabilising effect holds true. λ in
equation 29 determines the effect of inflation on inflation uncertainty. Obtaining a positive
and significant coefficient indicates that inflation uncertainty increases with inflation, as
suggested by F-B.
Nevertheless, the conditional variance of inflation estimated by GARCH-M is formed
to consider only the magnitude of inflation shocks, ε2t−1, and thereby the sign of innova-
tions is ignored by the model construction. Hence, to account for possible asymmetric
responses to positive and negative inflation shocks, an asymmetric GARCH model, i.e.,
Exponential GARCH, is used.
The conditional variance in the EGARCH model, put forward by Nelson (1991), is
set in an algorithmic form, which does not require imposing artificially non-negativity
constraints on the parameters to ensure a positive variance. The model representation
can be seen as follows:
log h2t = ϕ+ β1[|
εt−1
ht−1
|] + β2[ εt−1
ht−1
] + β3 log h
2
t−1 + λZt−1 (30)
In this case, an asymmetric response to inflation shocks exists if β2 6=0. A significantly
positive β2 implies that the inflation uncertainty increases more when the economy is hit
by a positive shock, i.e., εt−1>0, than a negative inflation shock, i.e., εt−1<0 (Wilson,
2006).
Nevertheless, as policy makers are more concerned about the long-run impact of in-
flation uncertainty, and more importantly the impact of monetary anchor on reducing
inflation uncertainty in the long-run, we utilise the Component GARCH (CGARCH),
developed by Lee and Engle (1993). This model separates the long-run from short-run
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components of inflation uncertainty by allowing the mean of the conditional variance to
vary around a time varying level, ϕ.
ht = ϕt + α1(e
2
t−1 − ϕt−1) + β1(ht−1 + ϕt−1 (31)
ϕ.
ht = ϕ+ ρϕt−1 + µ(e2t−1 − ht−1) + λZt−1 (32)
Equation 31 represents the transitory component, which approaches zero with the
power of α1+ β1. ρ in the long run component, shown in equation 32, is usually close to
one, as the time varying trend converges to the mean very slowly. If, 1>ρ>α1+β1, the
short run component of inflation uncertainty will die out rapidly more than the trend.
This indicates that the forecasts of the conditional variance will depend essentially upon
the trend (Kontonikas, 2004).
5.4 Data
Monthly data on Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the period from 1980:01 to 2014:06 are
extracted from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund
for the two FER countries: Jordan and Egypt, and the three inflation targeters: South
Africa, Brazil and Poland. The monetary regime shift experienced by all the countries
allows to spot the benefits of the examined regime in terms of inflation and inflation un-
certainty.
Inflation is computed as ’pit = [log cpit - log cpit−1]’. The inflation series is then
adjusted to remove the seasonality by executing the Census Bureaus X12 in an additive
default mode. Table 44 shows the summary statistics of the inflation series properties
for each respective country. The statistics of the average inflation, displayed in Table
44-Panel(a), reveal that inflation targeting countries have experienced a marked lower av-
erage inflation after shifting to IT. However, this direct effect of the monetary anchor on
inflation process is not obvious for the two fixed exchange rate targeters.83
The statistics, reported in Table 44-Panel(b), indicate that the distribution of inflation
is heavy-tailed. For all the countries, the distribution is positively skewed and leptokurtic,
and inflation series failed to satisfy Jarque and Bera (1980) for normality. This asymme-
try and peakness of the distribution are considered in modelling the relationship between
inflation and inflation uncertainty by using a Generalised Error Distribution (GED) with
83This cannot be attributed to the recent economic and political disturbances in the Middle East region.
The two countries have been reeling from unstable political and social conditions for the full period of the
study.
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normalised density of zero mean and unity variance, in which the normal distribution is a
special case Nelson (1991).84
The seasonally adjusted inflation series for each country exhibits stationary process, as
shown in Table 45. According to Dickey and Fuller (1979) (ADF) and Phillips and Perron
(1988) (PP) tests, with and without a trend, the null hypothesis that inflation contains
a unit root is rejected at a high level of significance. However, the two tests have been
challenged since they ignore treating structural breaks in the data, the drawback which
might result in a bias for nonrejection the null hypothesis. Hence, we perform Zivot and
Andrews (2002) (ZA) test, which accounts for the presence of a structural break, where
a data dependent algorithm is utilised to proxy Perron (1989)’s subjective procedure in
order to select the break points (Waheed et al., 2006).85We select to perform the model
(C), which permits a one-time change in the constant and slope of the trend function of
the seasonally adjusted inflation. The null hypothesis of a unit root without a break is
rejected for all the countries analysed against the alternative of a stationary series with a
break.
Breusch and Godfrey test for serial correlation is first executed to ensure the whiteness
of residuals before testing for ARCH effect. The results, presented in Table 44-Panel(b),
imply that the inflation series’ residuals are serially independent and conditionally het-
eroskedastic. We also assess whether inflation exhibits a structural change due to monetary
regime shift. For this, Chow test for stability is applied to the point when the regime is
supposed to commence. All the countries examined, except Poland, show a structural
break during the shift time as the Chow breakpoint’s F-statistics significantly rejects the
null of no structural break in inflation at 1%.86
5.5 Results
The conditional mean of inflation is specified by constructing several ARMA models.
Given that inflation is seasonally adjusted, it is found that including only the autoregres-
sive terms yields the best model specifications, which is the common case in modelling
inflation in the empirical literature (Kontonikas, 2004). For each country, we begin by
84This cannot be attributed to the recent economic and political disturbances in the Middle East region.
The two countries have been reeling from unstable political and social conditions for the full period of the
study.
85The determination of the exact time of the break is an endogenous function of the estimation, so the
critical values of Zivot and Andrews (2002) is different from those of Perron (1989) (Glynn et al., 2007).
86The structural break is found to start in 1990 not 1998 when IT was adopted. This goes back to the
economic structure of the Polish economy, which was subject to different monetary regimes during 1990s.
The country moved from a firm fixed exchange rate to the US dollar, adopted in 1990, to a crawling peg a
year later, then IT was adopted in September 1998. For more details, see Horska´ et al. (2001) and Jonas
and Mishkin (2004).
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incorporating up to twelve AR specifications to allow capturing the persistence of the
data. The length of AR components is shortened on the basis of Akaike and Schwartz
information criteria and by ensuring that all autocorrelation coefficients up to twelve lags
fall inside the non-rejection region, which is also confirmed by the Q-statistics of Box and
Pierce (1970). Accordingly, the selected AR process forms the following benchmark-mean
specifications:
Jordan:
pit = γ
JO
0 + γ
JO
1 pit−2 + γ
JO
2 pit−5 + γ
JO
3 pit−9 + γ
JO
4 pit−12 + ut (33)
Egypt:
pit = γ
EG
0 + γ
EG
1 pit−1 + γ
EG
2 pit−9 + γ
EG
3 pit−12 + ut (34)
South Africa:
pit = γ
SA
0 + γ
SA
1 pit−1 + γ
SA
2 pit−2 + γ
SA
3 pit−3 + γ
SA
4 pit−7
+γSA5 pit−8 + γ
SA
6 pit−11 + γ
SA
7 pit−12 + ut
(35)
Brazil:
pit = γ
BR
0 + γ
BR
1 pit−1 + γ
BR
2 pit−2 + γ
BR
3 pit−8 + ut (36)
Poland:
pit = γ
PO
0 + γ
PO
1 pit−1 + γ
PO
2 pit−2 + γ
PO
3 pit−5 + γ
PO
4 pit−9 + γ
PO
5 pit−11 + ut (37)
For each country, we split the inflation series between the time before and after adopt-
ing the monetary regime of interest. The preliminary evidence from the OLS regression
of the benchmark models, shown in Tables 46 to 50, suggests that IT has been successful
at reducing the volatility of inflation as ARCH effect turned insignificant after adopting
IT. Interestingly, for Egypt, inflation volatility has become stable not during the fixed
exchange rate system but after opting out, while for Jordan, the impact of the exchange
rate targeting is unclear as the volatility for the period after exchange rate targeting is
found at high lags.
For our motivation to examine the simultaneous relationship between inflation and
inflation uncertainty, we incorporate the standard deviation in the mean equation as a
volatility measure and augment the variance equation with lagged inflation.87 Further-
more, to model the impact of monetary regime on inflation dynamics, slope dummies are
plugged in the conditional mean equations, in which the dummy takes the value of one
when the examined monetary regime is in effect, and zero otherwise. We first attempt to
introduce the regime slope dummies via different lags, but only two interactive dummies
87Inserting S.D in the mean equation is used by Baillie et al. (1996) and Kontonikas (2004).
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are selected to interact with their corresponding inflation lags based upon a significant im-
provement in the fit of the model. We also employ a constant regime dummy in the mean
equation for the cases where doing so is found to substantially improve the overall statis-
tical performance. In addition, we account for political circumstances in some countries.
For the two exchange rate targeters, a dummy variable is added to the mean equation
to capture the impact of the Arab Spring on average inflation, in which the dummy is
assigned one for the period from 2011:01 onwards.88 For South Africa, a constant dummy
is included to consider the effect of apartheid on inflation, which takes the value of one
for the period before January 1995, and zero for the months after. Hence, the augmented
mean equations can be represented as follows:
Jordan:
pit = (δ
JO
1 + δ
JO
3 )pit−2 + δ
JO
4 pit−5 + δ
JO
5 pit−9 + (γ
JO
2 + δ
JO
6 )pit−12 + ut (38)
Egypt:
pit = (δ
EG
1 + δ
EG
3 )pit−1 + δ
EG
4 pit−9 + (γ
EG
2 + δ
EG
5 )pit−12 + ut (39)
South Africa:
pit = (δ
SA
1 + δ
SA
3 )pit−1 + δ
SA
4 pit−2 + δ
SA
5 pit− 3 + δSA6 pit−7
+δSA7 pit−8 + δ
SA
8 pit−11 + (δ
SA
2 + δ
SA
9 )pit−12 + ut
(40)
Brazil:
pit = (δ
BR
1 + δ
BR
3 )pit−1 + δ
BR
4 pit−2 + (δ
BR
2 + δ
BR
5 )pit−8 + ut (41)
Poland:
pit = (δ
PO
1 + δ
PO
3 )pit−1 + δ
PO
4 pit−2 + (δ
PO
2
+δPO5 )pit−5 + δ
PO
6 pit−9 + δ
PO
7 pit−11 + ut
(42)
A joint significance of the interactive regime dummies is confirmed by a Wald test of
δ1 = δ2 = 0. For each country, Chi-quare statistics reject the hypothesis that the dummies
are zero at 1% level of significance, as shown in the last row of Tables 51 to 57. The effect
of the monetary regime on inflation inertia is reflected by the sum of the coefficients of the
regime interactive dummy and that of their corresponding lags. A negative slope dummy
indicates that inflation persistence has declined after adopting the examined regime.89 The
results, reported in Tables 51 to 57, imply that IT has been successful at reducing inflation
88The unrest and tensions across the Middle East spread to Jordan and had negative effects on the
economy. For instance, the pipelines that carried gas from Egypt to Jordan were targeted and bombed
several times during the uprising, resulting in oil supply shortage. As a consequence, Jordan was forced
to deal with Israel to import Gas, as Israel has become a major gas exporter in the region. However, the
pace to deal with Israel triggered more domestic opposition and increased the external debt; see the Daily
Mail on 11th December 2014 for more details. The Arab Spring countries are still, at the time of writing
this, being affected by the adverse consequences of the social unrest.
89Note that, as stated by Kontonikas (2004), the effect of inflation regime on the inflation persistence is
preferred to be analysed in the context of the kalman filter.
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persistence at a high lag order, as the coefficients of the second interactive dummies, i.e.,
δ2, appear with a negative sign. This, however, does not apply to Poland, where all the
slope dummies are non-negative, but its regime constant dummy, Dt, plugged in the mean
equation, shows that the mean of inflation was reduced by IT; this also applies to all the
ITers in the sample.90 For South Africa, the years of apartheid were associated with higher
average inflation, as the constant dummy, APART, presented in Table 55, is significantly
positive under all GARCH models. For Egypt and Jordan, the Arab Spring dummy is
found insignificant as a constant, but its slope, pol, reported in Tables 51 and 53, has a pos-
itive and significant influence on the trend at 1%.91 Unlike the ITers, the inflation mean of
the FER targeters is not affected by the fixed exchange rate regime. The dummy appears
insignificant for Jordan and positive for Egypt. Nonetheless, the FER system appears to
be influential in lowering the inflation inertia in Egypt and Jordan at the first inflation lag.
The parameter estimates of the inflation uncertainty proxy, incorporated in the mean
equation, have a significantly positive sign for all the countries, indicating that inflation
uncertainty increases inflation, as argued by C-M. On the other hand, we find support for
the F-B hypothesis; inflation does generate inflation uncertainty, irrespective of the regime
followed. Remarkably, the coefficient of the inflation regime slope dummy, λ1, employed in
the variance equation, is significant and negative in all the respective countries; however,
the magnitude of the effect is almost negligible for Egypt.92 Nevertheless, the significance
proves that both regimes could to a certain extent reduce inflation uncertainty, albeit not
directly via decreasing the mean of inflation for FER targeters.
The results of asymmetric responses to increasing or falling in inflation are inconsistent
for all the cases. For Jordan, the results imply that both negative and positive inflation
shocks have the same influence on inflation uncertainty. The positive and significant β2
for Egypt, presented in the second column, EGARCH, of Table 53, indicates that positive
shocks trigger more conditional inflation uncertainty than negative shocks. Similarity, for
Brazil, the asymmetric coefficient, presented in Tables 56, suggests that inflation uncer-
tainty increases following a positive inflation shock. However, no asymmetry is found for
the two other ITers, implying that inflation uncertainty process is not influenced by the
90We did not report the results with a constant dummy for the other ITers as the results were found to
be better off, in terms of diagnostics, without adding the regime constant. However, the constant dummy
appeared with a negative sign for all the IT cases. We also attempted to incorporate the regime dummy
variable in the variance equations, but the dummy was insignificant for all the cases.
91Note that the ARCH effect exists in the estimated EGARCH-M model for Egypt, indicating that the
model is not well specified. In general, for both countries, all GARCH-M models showed better results
when the Pol-slope dummy and the regime constant dummy were dropped from the mean equation, see
Table 51 and 53.
92Note that this ignores the models estimated for Egypt and Jordan with slope political dummy and
regime constant dummy.
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direction of inflation shocks.
Interestingly, the slope regime dummy, λ1, incorporated in the mean equation, remains
negative for all the countries after controlling for asymmetries. Even when CGARCH-M
is used in modelling the inflation variance, the slope dummy has a significantly negative
sign for all the countries, except for South Africa, where the dummy turns insignificant.
This finding suggests that FER system and IT alike are effective in reducing inflation un-
certainty in the long run. Generally, the inflation trend of the ITers approaches the mean
quicker than that of the FER targeting countries. The power of the short-run component
of inflation uncertainty is also higher in the FER targeters. The diagnostic statistics,
reported below each estimated GARCH model, from Table 51 to Table 57, indicate that
the GARCH models are well-specified. The 1st and 12th lag order of Ljung-Box and the
12th lag squared residuals as well as the LM test for ARCH suggest neither remaining
autocorrelation nor a non-constant variance for all the countries, except for Poland, where
ARCH effect remains in the error terms.93
The findings of a positive bi-directional relationship between inflation and inflation
uncertainty suggest the need for a monetary anchor to reduce both inflation and uncer-
tain inflation. In general, inflation targeting countries enjoy lower average inflation and
inflation persistence compared to the time before adopting IT and to the countries with
FER regime. The two monetary regimes appear effective in reducing inflation uncertainty,
even under the presence of asymmetries in some cases, like Brazil, Sweden and Egypt. The
effect also remains in the long run, except for South Africa.
For FER countries, the benefits of the regime are not reflected in lower average infla-
tion and inflation inertia and a stable volatility. The constant regime dummy variable,
incorporated in the mean equation, is found to be insignificant for Jordan and positive
for Egypt, and although the FER system appears effective in reducing uncertain inflation,
the magnitude of the regime dummy coefficient is close to zero for Egypt. It could be
argued that anchoring the exchange rate could still influence inflation uncertainty as long
as the possibility to renege on FER commitment is not perceived by the market. The
several depreciations in the Egyptian Pound affected the mechanism of the FER system
and its credibility in the market. The weak economic institutions and dependency on
political authority due to the absence of mutual and clear vision between the central bank
93Poland adopted different monetary regimes during the 1990s. Moreover, Cuestas et al. (2012) find
that the Polish inflation rates are co-moved with that of the Euro Zone. When the sample is splitted to
cover the time after IT, all GARCH models exhibit no remaining ARCH effect.
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and government might hamper the role of FER as a device for decreasing inflation and
inflation uncertainty. It could be argued that providing the market with a quantitative
target for the price stability objective would not be optimal if it was not accompanied
with a clear central bank’s personality, roles and objectives, the features which distinguish
IT framework.
The results provide evidence, represented by lower inflation and inflation persistence
for inflation targeting countries, that the framework which has a direct quantitative target
of prices could be a better signalling device than the soft peg. The institutional features
which accompany adopting IT might uphold the economy to move from high inflation
to low inflation levels, as the credibility of the system, and thereby the policy outcome,
hinges upon the development of monetary constitutions and transparent policies. The
differences in such institutional arrangements might explain why the advantages of the
monetary framework differ across countries.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty un-
der two monetary regimes with a nominal price level target: inflation targeting and a soft
fixed exchange rate regime. In fact, given the important monetary implications of the
nexus between inflation-inflation uncertainty, a large number of studies have been carried
out to examine whether inflation causes inflation uncertainty, as suggested by Friedman
(1977) or inflation uncertainty leads to higher inflation as stated by Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986). However, a few studies have shed light on the plausible influence of each regime
on reducing inflation uncertainty. This study is carried out to fill the gap in the literature
by empirically assessing the validity of the Friedman and Cukierman-Meltzer hypotheses
under the two regimes and examining the effect of monetary regimes on the relationship
between inflation and inflation uncertainty. In particular, it is aimed to investigate the
impact of quantitative targets of monetary policy upon reducing inflation uncertainty. To
do this, we utilise the monthly CPI data collected from the IMF-IFS database of two fixed
exchange rate targeters: Jordan and Egypt, and three inflation targeting countries: South
Africa, Brazil and Poland, over the span 01:1980-06:2014.
In order to examine the two hypotheses simultaneously, we apply GARCH-M model,
which allows the inflation rate to be determined by the conditional variance. We incor-
porate the standard deviation as a proxy for inflation uncertainty in the mean equation
and augment the variance equation with lagged inflation. Nevertheless, as inflation series
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exhibit positive skewness and leptokurtosis, all the GARCH models are estimated with the
assumption that the errors have a generalised error distribution. The impact of the regime
is assessed by employing a constant and regimes slope dummy. For each country we start
by constructing different ARMA structures. The general to specific approach leads to AR
specifications which ensure the whiteness of the residuals. The regimes dummies are in-
troduced to different lags of inflation, but only two interactive dummies are selected to be
imposed on the mean equation, based on the improvement in the model fit. Furthermore,
we account for the time of apartheid in South Africa and the political disturbances, due to
the Arab Spring, in Jordan and Egypt. The results from the OLS of the conditional mean
of inflation, run to the time before and after adopting the examined regime, reveal that
inflation targeters, unlike fixed exchange rate countries, have experienced stable prices af-
ter IT. The ”IT regime” constant dummy variable, plugged in the mean equation, is found
significant and negative, reflecting the direct effect of the regime on lowering the average
inflation.94 This is confirmed by the statistics of average inflation, in which the ITers have
enjoyed lower average inflation after shifting to IT. On contrary, such desirable effect is
not found for exchange rate targeters, as the regime constant dummy appears significantly
positive for Egypt, and insignificant for Jordan. Political dummies incorporated for the
two exchange rate targeters and South Africa are found to positively affect the inflation
trend and the mean.
As the construction of GARCH-M considers only the magnitude of inflation shocks, we
apply asymmetric GARCH-M type model to account for the responses of the conditional
inflation uncertainty to increasing or falling in inflation. More importantly, the long-run
effect of inflation on inflation uncertainty is examined by the CGARCH-M, which allows
decomposing the short-run from the long-run component.
The relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty appear to be consistent
with Friedman and Cukierman-Meltzer hypotheses. The parameters estimate of inflation
uncertainty proxy and the one-period lagged inflation, from all the GARCH-M models
and for all the countries, are significantly positive. The asymmetric GARCH specifica-
tions show that inflation affected the process of inflation uncertainty differently in Egypt
and Brazil, while for Jordan, South Africa and Poland, the conditional inflation uncer-
tainty is not influenced by the direction of inflation shocks.
The impact of the monetary regime on inflation uncertainty is examined by employing
the slope inflation dummy in the conditional variance equation for all GARCH-M mod-
94The results with a regime constant dummy reported only for the case of Poland.
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els. A negative and significant parameter indicates that inflation is reduced across all the
countries, irrespective of the monetary regime followed by the central bank. The nega-
tive effect holds even when we account for asymmetries; the slope dummy remains with
a negative sign. Nevertheless, the influence of the regime is not clear for Egypt, as the
coefficient appears with weak magnitude. This could be due to the instability of the soft
exchange rate regime in Egypt during the analysed period.95
The negative estimates of the slope dummy under the CGARCH-M reflects the ability
of both regimes to reduce inflation uncertainty in the long-run; however, this effect is
found to be insignificant for South Africa. It is also noted that the inflation trend of fixed
exchange rate targeters converges to the mean slower that that of the ITers.
In general, the study has made a way towards enhancing the understanding of the
effectiveness of announcing an explicit quantitative target on inflation uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, the positive relationship found between inflation and inflation uncertainty in
both directions underlines that a monetary regime with an ultimate goal of price stability
is a necessity to keep inflation and inflation uncertainty constrained. Additionally, our
findings add to the growing body of literature on the importance of inflation targeting as
a framework for monetary policy. IT, according to our results, appears effective in lower-
ing the inflation persistence and inflation uncertainty more than the soft fixed exchange
rate regime. However, it is shown that ITers have not equally benefited from IT. One
possible explanation for this might be due to the institutional differences among countries
in terms of the level of central bank independence and transparency. Therefore, for further
contributions, it would be of important interest to analyse the plausible impacts of inde-
pendent monetary practices and constitutions on inflation and inflation uncertainty, under
the two regimes, especially is that exchange rate fixers usually enjoy less institutional and
economic independence.96
95Exchange rate devaluations occurred between 1991 and 1992. In 2001, the government announced a
new parity to the US dollar and shifted gradually to a crawling peg system then the central bank abandoned
the fixed system in January 2003.
96Note that countries under the fixed exchange rate lose monetary freedom, as they have to keep their
monetary policies in tune with the base country, but they can still ensure institutional independence from
the political authority.
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Table 44: : Inflation Properties
Jordan South Africa Egypt Brazil Poland
Panel (a)
Average 2.12 3.88 4.6 33.95 4.44
Maximum 37.65 18.81 51.51 361.23 46.78
Minimum -34.65 -3.87 -36.16 -2.66 -7.68
Average-New Anchor 3.43 1.83 4.92 2.77 2.32
Average-Before 2.62 4.91 3.96 58.04 6.25
Panel (b)
Skewness 0.65 0.78 0.95 2.45 2.75
Kurtosis 9.22 4.57 9.575 10.31 15.59
ARCH effect 8.20*** 23.01*** 76.12*** 27.36*** 19.56***
Breusch-Godfrey LM 1.86 3.8 0.53 1.27 4.81
Jarque-Bera 1385.88 331.09 2226.67 7703.5 942.89
Chow Breakpoint 3.01** 3.07*** 3.58*** 3.68** 1.25
Note: Average-New anchor represents the average of inflation for each country for the
adoption period of the monetary regime under investigation. Average-Before shows
the average before adopting the examined regime. However, since Egypt opted out
of the pegged exchange rate regime in January 2003, the average of the new anchor
reflects the average during the exchange rate targeting, and hence, the Average-Before
is the average after abandoning the fixed exchange rate system. Brazil was subject
to hyperinflation during 1980s until March 1994 owning to the default related fear of
the international government debt, see Garcia (1996) for more details. The statistics
reported under the Breusch-Godfrey LM test shows the Obs*R-squared statistics with
a chi-squared distribution. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no autocor-
relation up to lag order ’p’. ARCH effect test is a Lagrange multiplier test, by Engle
(1982), in which the null hypothesis indicates homoskedasticity.
Table 45: : Unit Root Tests
ADF ADF PP PP ZA ZA
constant constant/trend constant constant/trend t-statistics break
Jordan -12.05*** -12.07*** -19.02*** -19.01*** -7.34** 1991:04
South Africa -5.75*** -10.16*** -15.71*** -17.41*** -7.96*** 1992:01
Egypt -24.35*** -24.94*** -23.88*** -24.55*** -25.99*** 1991:11
Brazil -3.97*** -4.64*** -6.13*** -7.59*** -9.93*** 1994:07
Poland -3.52*** -3.91** -14.21*** -14.94*** -6.95*** 1989:12
Note: In the ADF test, the lag length is determined by Schwartz information criterion,
while for the Phillips and Perron test, the default Bartlett Kernel and Newy-West
bandwidth are used. In the Zivot-Andrews test, the optimal lag length is selected on
the basis of Akaike information criteria. The asterisks ***, **, * denote rejection of the
null hypothesis, i.e., inflation has a unit root for the ADF and PP tests and unit root
with no break for the ZA test, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 46: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Jordan 33
full sample pre-target post-target
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-1995:09 1995:10-2014:06
γJO0 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
γJO2 0.117** 0.154** 0.002
γJO5 0.173*** 0.259*** -0.031
γJO9 0.099** 0.125* 0.019
γJO12 -0.100** -0.082 -0.174***
ARCH(1) 8.20*** 5.68** 0.218
ARCH(2) 17.36*** 13.70*** 0.217
ARCH(12) 26.66*** 20.25* 21.13**
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at
1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively.
Table 47: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Egypt 34
full sample during-target opting out
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-2002:12 2003:01-2014:06
γEG0 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007***
γEG1 -0.155*** -0.199*** 0.380***
γEG9 0.124*** 0.142** -0.098
γEG12 -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.084
ARCH(1) 65.02*** 38.68*** 0.162
ARCH(2) 71.46*** 42.85*** 0.249
ARCH(12) 104.90*** 62.33*** 8.85
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at
1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively.
Table 48: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for South Africa 35
full sample pre-target post-target
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-2000:01 2000:02-2014:06
γSA0 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.004***
γSA1 0.231*** 0.139** 0.397***
γSA2 0.213*** 0.228*** 0.048
γSA3 0.134*** 0.108* 0.176
γSA7 0.131*** 0.173*** -0.032
γSA8 0.100*** 0.106* 0.07
γSA11 0.106*** 0.114** 0.003
γSA12 -0.124*** -0.089 -0.214***
ARCH(1) 34.47*** 12.82*** 0.27
ARCH(2) 34.90*** 13.16*** 1.77
ARCH(12) 56.67*** 26.60*** 18.12
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at
1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively.
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Table 49: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Brazil 36
full sample pre-target post-target
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-1999:06 1999:07-2014:06
γBR0 0.063** 0.110*** 0.005***
γBR1 0.462*** 0.447*** 0.741***
γBR2 0.367*** 0.358*** -0.062
γBR8 0.085** 0.065 0.035
ARCH(1) 25.58*** 13.08*** 1.29
ARCH(2) 25.69*** 13.13*** 4.36
ARCH(12) 29.16*** 14.63 8.3
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at
1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively.
Table 50: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Poland 37
full sample pre-target post-target
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-1998:08 1998:09-2014:06
γPO0 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.003***
γPO1 0.218*** 0.181*** 0.294***
γPO2 0.232*** 0.221*** 0.136*
γPO5 0.138*** 0.118* 0.128*
γPO9 0.114** 0.099 0.093
γPO11 0.181*** 0.177*** 0.113
ARCH(1) 19.96*** 8.34*** 0.02
ARCH(2) 20.61*** 9.79*** 0.03
ARCH(12) 36.78*** 18.46 1.4
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at
1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively.
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Table 51: : GARCH-M models for Jordan 38 (with dummies)
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt -3.97E-04 -3.20E-04
Pol 0.176*** 0.187***
δJO1 -0.148*** -0.125***
δJO2 0.091*** 0.077***
δJO3 0.116*** 0.081***
δJO4 0.061** 0.047**
δJO5 0.036 0.019
δJO6 -0.207*** -0.208***
δ 0.328*** 0.337***
conditional variance
φ 7.47E-06** -1.590***
α1 0.027
β1 0.810*** 0.127
β2 0.142
λ0 0.003*** 19.19
λ1 -0.002*** -25.67***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=2.15 Q(1)=1.27
Q(12)=13.22 Q(12)=13.70
Q2(12)=14.05 Q2(4)=13.94
TR2(12)=14.6 TR2(12)=14.28
Wald test 20.7***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where a positive
δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the one-period lagged
inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992) hypothesis, where a pos-
itive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Dt is the constant-monetary
regime, i.e., fixed exchange rate system, dummy variable. Pol is the slope dummy
that acts for the effect of Arab Spring on average inflation. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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Table 52: : GARCH-M models for Jordan 38 (without dummies)
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
δJO1 -0.143*** -0.131*** -0.139***
δJO2 0.063* 0.026 0.051
δJO3 0.095** 0.085*** 0.117***
δJO4 0.059** 0.113*** 0.063**
δJO5 0.058** 0.045*** 0.044*
δJO6 -0.194*** -0.153*** -0.179***
δ 0.361*** 0.341*** 0.338***
conditional variance
φ 7.95E-06** -2.493** 4.74E-05
α1 0.034 0.005
β1 0.785*** 0.121 0.764
β2 0.052
λ0 0.003*** 28.851* 0.003***
λ1 -0.002** -24.709* -0.003**
τ
µ 0.025
ρ 0.823***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=2.21 Q(1)=2.34 Q(1)=2.27
Q(12)=12.23 Q(12)=17.85 Q(12)=13.01
Q2(12)=14.71 Q2(12)=21.18 Q2(12)15.26
TR2(12)=15.22 TR2(12)=21.05 TR2(12)=15.82
Wald test 10.58***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where a positive
δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the one-period lagged
inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992) hypothesis, where a
positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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Table 53: : GARCH-M models for Egypt 39 (with dummies)
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt 0.002*** 0.0003*
Pol 0.999*** 0.999***
δEG1 -0.223*** -0.131***
δEG2 -0.008 -0.137***
δEG3 0.151*** -0.008***
δEG4 -0.033 -0.001***
δEG5 -0.083 0.002***
δ 0.621*** 0.679***
conditional variance
φ 9.29E-09 0.170***
α1 0.399***
β1 0.664*** 0.265***
β2 0.956***
λ0 3.65E-06 -59.505***
λ1 4.43E-04* 30.83***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=3.29 Q(1)=2.78
Q(12)=40.10 Q(12)=14.54
Q2(12)=4.43 Q2(12)=24.69
TR2(12)=4.16 TR2(12)=26.19**
Wald test 16.39***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where a positive
δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the one-period lagged
inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992) hypothesis, where a pos-
itive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Dt is the constant-monetary
regime, i.e., fixed exchange rate system, dummy variable. Pol is the slope dummy
that acts for the effect of Arab Spring on average inflation. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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Table 54: : GARCH-M models for Egypt 39 (without dummies)
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
δEG1 -0.282*** -0.263*** -0.161**
δEG2 -0.068 -0.047 -0.034
δEG3 0.189*** 0.204*** 0.138***
δEG4 -0.105*** -0.071** -0.05
δEG5 -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.151***
δEG 0.986*** 0.987*** 0.984***
conditional variance
φ 3.18E-07 -0.062 9.88E-05**
α1 0.091*** 0.149***
β1 0.892*** 0.244*** 0.276
β2 0.100***
λ0 0.0003** -5.647* 2.45E-05
λ1 -0.0004*** -1.545 -0.0004***
τ
µ 0.032***
ρ 0.991***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=0.0004 Q(1)=0.544 Q(1)=0.18
Q(12)=5.91 Q(12)=5.604 Q(12)=5.71
Q2(12)=20.35 Q2(12)=14.74 Q2(12)=12.94
TR2(12)=18.44 TR2(12)=13.48 TR2(12)=12.53
Wald test 10.39***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where a positive
δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the one-period lagged
inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992) hypothesis, where a
positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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Table 55: : GARCH-M models for South Africa 40
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
APART 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
δSA1 0.305*** 0.348*** 0.300***
δSA2 -0.112* -0.104 -0.107*
δSA3 0.042 0.003 0.032
δSA4 0.131** 0.165*** 0.135**
δSA5 0.129*** 0.159*** 0.115***
δSA6 0.001 -0.009 0.005
δSA7 0.077** 0.064* 0.079**
δSA8 0.037 0.03 0.036
δSA9 -0.166*** -0.147*** -0.160***
δ 1.557*** 1.467*** 1.546***
conditional variance
φ 5.89E-6** -7.736** 7.14E-06
α1 0.038 0.001***
β1 0.135 0.034 -0.001***
β2 0.158
λ0 0.001*** 31.769 -0.073
λ1 -0.001** -70.414** -0.131
τ
µ 0.028**
ρ 0.870***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=1.02 Q(1)=1.25 Q(1)=1.27
Q(12)=13.00 Q(12)=15.21 Q(12)=14.06
Q2(12)=25.96 Q2(4)=20.27 Q2(12)=25.53
TR2(12)=21.50 TR2(12)=18.87* TR2(12)=21.16*
Wald test 10.82***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where a positive
δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the one-period lagged
inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992) hypothesis, where a
positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. APART is a constant
dummy variable capturing the effect of apartheid on average inflation. Wald test
examines the significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
136
Table 56: : GARCH-M models for Brazil 41
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
APART 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
δBR1 0.223*** 0.848*** 0.227***-
δBR2 -0.294*** -0.228*** -0.031***
δBR3 0.532*** 0.344*** 0.777***
δBR4 0.321*** 0.228*** -0.192***
δBR5 0.069*** 0.093*** -0.042***
δ 0.063*** 0.456*** 0.464***
conditional variance
φ 0.006*** 5.321*** 0.004***
α1 6.861*** 0.174***
β1 0.142*** -0.041 0.167***
β2 0.225***
λ0 0.256*** 9.919*** 0.054***
λ1 -0.427*** -100.193*** -0.080***
τ
µ 0.169***
ρ 0.812***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=0.593 Q(1)=6.18 Q(1)=1.577
Q(12)=13.267 Q(12)=46.93 Q(12)=202.72
Q2(12)=0.453 Q2(12)=0.135 Q2(12)=1.72
TR2(12)=0.432 TR2(12)=1.51 TR2(12)=1.65
Wald test 1163.90***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where a positive
δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the one-period lagged
inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992) hypothesis, where a
positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0. The sum of α1 and β1
in the conditional variance is larger than one. This is because Brazil was subject to
hyperinflation during 1980s to March 1994.
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Table 57: : GARCH-M models for Poland 42
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt -0.001* -0.004***
δPO1 0.141* 0.272*** 0.142*
δPO2 0.185*** 0.264*** 0.192***
δPO3 0.182*** 0.114** 0.054
δPO4 0.001 -7.51E-05 0.026
δPO5 -0.012 -0.061** -0.12
δPO6 0.072*** 0.064** 0.068
δPO7 0.071** 0.081*** 0.133***
δ 1.439*** 1.690*** 1.722***
conditional variance
φ 2.14E-06** -3.227*** 6.15E-06***
α1 0.024 0.047***
β1 0.693*** 0.035 0.004
β2 0.017
λ0 0.001*** 29.109*** 0.001***
λ1 -0.001*** -19.046** -0.001***
τ
µ 0.052***
ρ 0.562***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=0.01 Q(1)=0.002 Q(1)=13.15
Q(12)=9.38 Q(12)=2.89 Q(12)=60.50
Q2(12)=27.85 Q2(12)=59.30 Q2(12)=69.59
TR2(12)=26.21*** TR2(12)=53.59*** TR2(12)=56.38***
Wald test 12.46***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where a positive
δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the one-period lagged
inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992) hypothesis, where a
positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Dt is the monetary regime-
constant dummy variable. Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime
dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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Chapter 6
Thesis Conclusions
Inflation targeting and fixed exchange rate regime are two polar monetary regimes with
a quantitative declared target for the goal of price stability. Both regimes are thought to
be a strong medium to anchor inflation expectations of market agents. The fixed exchange
rate regime is a device to import the credibility of monetary policy from abroad, while
inflation targeting requires a domestically built monetary reputation. The thesis is com-
posed of three chapters with issues related to inflation targeting and a conventional fixed
exchange rate regime to the US dollar. In the first study, we address the institutional
challenges to build a domestic reputation for the goal of price stability for Jordan, where
domestic monetary policy credibility is brought from abroad.
The second study assesses the credibility of monetary policy under the fixed exchange
rate system for the case of Jordan. The third study examines the imported foreign cred-
ibility for the recent conventional peggers to the US dollar. The fourth study sheds light
on the role of active monetary regimes in reducing inflation and inflation uncertainty and
investigates the causality between inflation and inflation uncertainty under inflation tar-
geting and a fixed exchange rate regime.
The first study underlines the challenges to move from a fixed exchange rate system to
the US dollar to inflation targeting, where the latter requires a strong institutional bases
of central bank independence and transparency. Hence we assess the level central bank
independence, transparency under the fixed exchange rate system. To support the analy-
sis, we opt two advanced inflation targeters, and compare the two institutional monetary
bases to their experience in the first year of implementing inflation targeting; i.e., 1990 for
New Zealand and 1992 for the UK.
The level of central bank independence and transparency are assessed by employing
the index of Mathew (2003) and Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), respectively. The results
for central bank independence reveal that more coordinations between the central bank
and government are needed in order to deliver more consistent policies and enhance the
accountability of achieving the goal of price stability. The government should also follow
a programme of fiscal consolidation, which entails a separation of its balance sheet from
the central bank’s. In this respect, more conservative financial legislations must be im-
posed to limit advances to the central government as well as the beneficiaries of securitised
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and non-securitised advances. The assessment of central bank transparency suggests that
the challenge to provide the market with more transparent policies are not fundamental.
However, ensuring central bank independence is essential to deliver more transparent poli-
cies. The central bank of Jordan should also prioritise its objective and explain changes
to policy and preferences.
In the second study, we examine the interest rate pass-through, using data on official
interest rates and retail interest rates obtained from the central bank of Jordan’s Statistical
Database for the monthly span from 1995 to 2012. We assess the effectiveness of monetary
policy under the fixed exchange rate system and highlight the impact of monetary policy
decisions on market agents’ investment and saving decisions. The cointegration results be-
tween the official interest rates and retail interest rates provide evidence that the interest
rate pass-through in Jordan is sluggish and weak, and the magnitude varies from incom-
plete pass-through to overshooting. We employ the full system of Hendry and Doornik
(1994) which connects the short run with the long run adjustments under symmetric and
asymmetric market response. A non-competitive pricing behaviour is observed the loan
market where banks are quicker to decrease their interest rates on loan. However, as no
information is released by the central bank of Jordan concerning the market structure,
it is not possible to infer to what extent market power exists. In this respect, further
investigation is required to determine the level and leverage of bank concentration. In
addition, the relationship between inflation and exchange rate needs to be addressed to
determine if a full-fledged inflation targeting can be adopted. The general finding suggests
that Jordan needs a transition period and programme of fiscal consolidation as well as a
more resilient exchange rate arrangement to build a domestic reputation for the goal of
price stability.
In the third study, we assess the foreign credibility of the recent conventional pegged
exchange rate to the US dollar over the period 1996-2012. Recent and past evidence has
revealed that a fixed exchange rate system is more prone to crises owning to demand
mismanagement. We build a projection exercise, based on the the first generation models
of currency crisis and the empirical work of the European Monetary System, to examine
the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime to the US dollar in a number of eleven
countries: Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Qatar and Venezuela. The first generation models of currency crises, led by Krugman
(1979), illustrate that the fall of the fixed exchange rate regime comes as a result of the
inconsistency between fiscal and monetary policies. The empirical works on past currency
crises have shown that fixed exchange rate countries were not successful at bringing the
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foreign credibility into their economies prior to the collapse of the system (Svensson, 1994).
The countries are classified according to the IMF de facto exchange rate classification and
de jure arrangement to define the year in which the fixed exchange rate was effectively
adopted. A regime constant binary variable as well as interactive dummy variables are
plugged into the model to account for shifts in exchange rate regimes. The credibility is
measured either as interest rate differential or by employing the exchange rate pressure
index. The two proxies are regressed on a set of macro fundamentals which reflects the
determinants of market agents realignment expectations: inflation differential, ratio of
debt to GDP, ratio of current account to GDP, foreign reserves, money growth, ratio of
import to GDP and adequacy ratio.
Our analysis is built on linear unbalanced panel data models which assume exogeneity
and endogeneity of the market structure. The limitation of the data found for emerging
market economies with a fixed exchange rate system does not allow considering political
and social factors in the model setups. To consider the small size of the sample at hand
and the relationship between current accounts and international reserves, implied by the
monetary approach to the balance of payments theory, we set up four projection-equations.
The chapter clarifies why anchoring interest rates is not possible for countries with
conventional fixed exchange rate systems. In all estimated setups, inflation differential
appears a main factor for generating realignment expectations on fixed exchange rates.
Although our finding suggests that the credibility of the pegged exchange rate is not dif-
ferent from the past collapsed exchange rate systems, more studies could provide better
understanding of why building a domestic reputation of low prices is not possible in oil
producing and import-reliant economies, and how the benefits of fixing the domestic ex-
change rate to the main trading partner outweigh the costs of building a domestic credible
policy for the goal of price stability.
The fourth study investigates the relationship between inflation and inflation uncer-
tainty under inflation targeting and a conventional fixed exchange rate system and the
impact of each regime on inflation and inflation uncertainty. In fact, the linkage between
inflation and inflation uncertainty have gained attention in the recent literature after the
Nobel lecture of Friedman (1977), in which he argues that inflation causes higher infla-
tion uncertainty. Likewise, Ball (1992) reveals that weak policy makers are more likely
to permit inflation during high-inflation episodes generating more inflation uncertainty.
However, according to Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), inflation uncertainty leads to higher
inflation.
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We contribute to the literature by comparing between two quantitatively-based mon-
etary regimes in terms of inflation and inflation uncertainty. The role of fixed exchange
rate in affecting inflation rate and inflation uncertainty has not been considered in the
literature. Two fixed exchange rate countries: Jordan and Egypt and three inflation tar-
geters: South Africa, Brazil and Poland are selected. The countries have experienced a
regime shift, which allows identifying the benefits gained from adopting the regime under
investigation.
Monthly data on consumer price index for the period from 1980:01 to 2014:06 are ex-
tracted from International Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund. The basic
statistics of the average inflation, show that inflation targeting countries have experienced
a marked lower average inflation after shifting to inflation targeting. However, this direct
effect of monetary anchor is not observed in the two fixed exchange rate countries.
The results from the benchmark model of each country show that inflation targeting
has been successful at reducing the volatility of inflation. While for Jordan and Egypt,
the fixed exchange rate regime has no clear effect on inflation volatility. Interestingly,
Egypt exhibits a more stable volatility not during the fixed exchange rate system, but
after opting out of the system.
The results from GARCH in mean models reveal that under the two monetary regimes
inflation increases inflation uncertainty, as suggested by Friedman (1977) and Ball (1992),
and inflation uncertainty raises inflation, as hypothesised by Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986). The interactive dummy variables, incorporated in the mean and variance equa-
tions, provide evidence that inflation inertia has been lowered only in inflation targeting
countries, except in Poland, and that both regimes have impacts on reducing inflation un-
certainty. However, the magnitude of the dummy for Egypt is close to zero, which might
indicate that the fixed exchange rate regime loses its leverage upon inflation uncertainty
when the market perceives that a shadow exchange rate might dominate. The regime
constant dummy variable, employed in the mean equation, shows that inflation targeting
lowers the mean of inflation, whereas the fixed exchange rate effect is found either posi-
tive for Egypt, which means that the regime increases average inflation, or insignificant
for Jordan. This leads to conclude that although the fixed exchange rate system has an
impact on reducing inflation uncertainty, this effect does not happen through decreasing
average inflation rates. Moreover, it is found that all the countries under both regimes
affect inflation uncertainty in the long run, except South Africa, and that the impact holds
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under asymmetry.
In general, the findings of a positive bi-directional relationship between inflation and
inflation uncertainty provide evidence of the importance of non-discretionary monetary
policies. The study highlights that the benefits of inflation targeting have not generated
equally across the adopters. A further analysis is required to examine the role of in-
stitutional factors in improving the impact of monetary regimes of quantitative targets,
and to explain why the influence of a nominal anchor could be weakened in the absence
of institutional arrangements, credible monetary policy in the past and adequate fiscal
management. This could also imply how building the credibility of monetary policy do-
mestically strengthens the credibility of low prices imported from abroad.
Overall, the thesis contributes to the existing body of literature on monetary regimes
in different aspects. First, it seeks to highlight the challenges facing a small developing
country to move towards domestically-built policies to pursue price stability. Implicitly,
it aims to highlight the weaknesses of monetary policy concealed by following a credible
anchor currency. Second, it shows that the current experience of a soft peg does not differ
from the past experience of collapsed fixed exchange rate regimes. The inflation differential
between the domestic economies and their anchor country manifests why anchoring inter-
est rate is not possible to implement. Third, the positive relationship between inflation
and inflation uncertainty, found for inflation targeters and exchange rate peggers, reflects
the need for inflation expectations anchors. The fixed exchange rate system has no effect
on average inflation and volatility and its impact on inflation uncertainty hinges upon
the market agents realignment expectations. Inflation targeting appears as a more sta-
ble and powerful quantitative target in affecting average inflation and inflation uncertainty.
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Appendix A: The Modified Central Bank Independence In-
dex of Mathew (2003)
A: Political Independence or Personnel Independence (PI)
A1. Appointment of the Governor
1. The Governor is appointed by the Central Bank (CB) Board or two different bodies,
which really balance one another, respectively nominate and appoint the Governor,
for instance, the board or ministry of finance nominates and the legislature appoints
(1 point).
2. The Government or the minister of finance nominate the Governor and the head of
the state appoint or the opposite (0.5 point).
3. The Government both nominates and appoints the Governor, for instance, ministry
of finance nominates and the cabinet appoints the Governor (0 point).
A2. Terms of the Governor
1. The term is longer than 5 years but not exceed 8 years (1 point).
2. The term is 5 years (0.5 point).
3. The term is 4 or less than 4 years (0 point).
A3. Dismissal of the Governor.
1. The dismissal of the Governor is possible only in the case of breach of qualification,
misconduct, or poor performance; the procedures are very transparent, and with the
approval of the legislature (1 point).
2. The dismissal of the Governor is possible only in the case of breach of qualification,
misconduct, or poor performance; but the procedures are not transparent, and not
with the approval of the legislature (0.5 point).
3. Unconditional dismissal of the Governor by the Government and/or the head of the
state (0 point).
A4. Appointment of Governor Deputy
1. The Deputy is nominated and appointed by the Governor and the CB Board (1
point).
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2. The Government nominates the Governor and the head of the state appoints or the
opposite (0.5 point).
3. The Government both nominates and appoints the Governor, for instance, ministry
of finance nominates and the cabinet appoints the Governor (0 point).
A5. Term of the Deputy
1. The term is longer than 5 years but not exceed 8 years (1 point).
2. The term is 5 years (0.5 point).
3. The term is 4 or less than 4 years (0 point).
A6. The Presence of Government Nominees in the Bank Board
1. There is no mandatory participation of Government representative in the bank board
or the bank monetary policy commission (1 point).
2. There is mandatory participation of Government representative in the bank board
or the bank monetary policy committee (0point).
[Maximum score for PI = 6]
B: Monetary Policy Independence (MPI)
B1. The degree of conservativeness of the CB or Independence in setting effective
objectives
1. The objective of monetary policy is only price stability or price stability is the
principal and overriding, long run goal of monetary policy (1 points).
2. The objective of monetary policy includes price stability and other aspects like finan-
cial stability-both exchange rate stability and banking sector stability (0.5 point).
3. The objective of monetary policy includes price stability, financial stability and other
conflicting concerns like stimulating economic growth and employment output sta-
bility (0 point).
B2. The degree of Goal or Target Independence
1. The CB alone sets the numerical goals or targets for its objectives, for instance,
exchange rates, monetary aggregates, interest rates or inflation (1 points).
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2. The CB and the Government jointly set the goals or targets for its objectives, for
instance, through a policy targets agreement (0.5 point).
3. The Government alone sets the targets for the objectives (0 point).
B3. The degree of Instrument Independence
1. The CB alone sets the instruments of monetary policy to achieve its objectives
(1points).
2. The CB and the Government jointly set the instruments of monetary policy (0.5
point).
3. The Government alone decides on setting instruments (0 point).
B4. General policy conflicts
1. The CB absolutely prevails over the Government in case of policy conflicts (1 point).
2. The Government prevails over the CB, subject to due process and possible protest
from the latter (0.5 point).
3. The Government absolutely prevails over the CB (0 point).
B5. Exchange Rate Policy Co-ordination
1. CB formulates and implements exchange rate and foreign exchange policy consistent
with objectives of monetary policy, and bank’s view prevails over the Government
in case of policy inconsistency (1 point).
2. CB formulates, and implements exchange rate and foreign exchange policy on basis of
instructions given by the Government, or Government’s view prevail over (0 point).
[Maximum Score for MPI =5]
C: Fiscal Independence or Financial Independence (FI)
C1. Limitations on advances (non-securitised lending)
1. CB advances to the Government prohibited (1 points).
2. CB advances permitted, but with strict limits in terms of absolute cash amounts
(0.80 point).
3. CB advances permitted with loose and accommodative limits (0.5 point).
4. No legal limits on CB advances to the Government (0 point).
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C2. Specification of the limits of CB lending
1. CB advances to the Government prohibited (1 point).
2. CB lending defined in absolute currency amounts (1 point).
3. CB lending defined in shares of Government revenue (0.5 point).
4. CB lending defined in shares of Government expenditure (0 point).
C3. Maturity of loans
1. CB advances permitted (1 point)
2. The maturity of CB loans cannot exceed 6 months (1 point).
3. The maturity of CB loans above 6 months but cannot exceed 1 year (0.5 point).
4. No legal limit on the maturity of CB loans (0 point).
C4. Restrictions on Interest rates
1. CB advances permitted (1 point).
2. CB lends to the Government at market interest rate (1 point).
3. CB lends to the Government at below market interest rates, but positive rates (0.5
point).
4. CB lends to the Government at zero interest rates (0 point).
C5. Beneficiary of (non-securitized lending)
1. CB advances to the Government prohibited (1 point).
2. The central government is the only beneficiary (0.5 point).
3. The central government and the public corporations or the local or provincial gov-
ernment (0 point).
C6. CB’s participation in the primary market for Government securities
1. The CB is prohibited from buying Government securities from the primary market
(exclude purchasing government bonds for monetary policy purposes) or if not pro-
hibited, CB’s activity in the primary market is discretionary or voluntary (1points).
2. The CB is an active and involuntary buyer in the primary market for Government
securities (0 point).
[Maximum score for FI = 6] [Maximum score of CBI = MPI+PI+FI = 17]
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Appendix B: Central Bank Transparency Index of Eijffinger
and Geraats (2006)
A: Political Transparency
a. Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit
prioritization in case of multiple objectives?
1. No formal objective(s) = 0.
2. Multiple objectives without prioritization = 0.5.
3. One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1.
b. Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)?
1. No = 0.
2. Yes = 1.
c. Are there explicit institutional arrangements or contracts between the monetary
authorities and the government?
1. No central bank, contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0.
2. Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2.
3. Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract (al-
though possibly subject to an explicit override procedure) = 1.
B: Economic Transparency
a. Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly
available? The focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP,
unemployment rate and capacity utilization.
1. Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0.
2. Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2.
3. Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1.
b. Does the central bank disclose the formal macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy
analysis?
1. No = 0.
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2. Yes = 1.
c. Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts?
1. No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0.
2. Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than
quarterly frequency = 0.5.
3. Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium
term (one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy instru-
ment (conditional or unconditional forecasts) = 1.
C: Procedural Transparency
a. Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its
monetary policy framework?
1. No = 0.
2. Yes = 1.
b. Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or
explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time?
1. No, or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.
2. Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or
explanations (In case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward
and forward-looking arguments = 1.
c. Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating
instrument or target was reached?
1. No voting records, or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.
2. Non-attributed voting records = 0.5.
3. Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1.
D: Policy Transparency
a. Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target promptly
announced?
1. No, or after a significant lag = 0.
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2. Yes, at the latest on the day of implementation = 1.
b. Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions?
1. No = 0.
2. Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 0.5.
3. Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1.
c. Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting
or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)?
1. No = 0.
2. Yes = 1.
E: Operational Transparency
a. Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating
targets (if any) have been achieved?
1. No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
2. Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 0.5.
3. Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect
control over main operating instrument/target = 1.
b. Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeco-
nomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process?
1. No, or not very often = 0.
2. Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic
developments (at least quarterly) = 0.5.
3. Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1.
c. Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light
of its macroeconomic objectives?
1. No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
2. Yes, but superficially = 0.5.
3. Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting the
objectives = 1.
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Appendix C: Parameters Constancy Tests
This appendix provides the α and β parameters constancy tests, based on the means of
recursive estimation, of the short-run symmetric model, given that official interest rates
are weakly exogenous. R1-form represents the re-estimation of the long-run parameters α
and β.
In addition, the appendix contains CUSUM test for model stability. The instability is
detected if the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals lies outside the area between the
5% critical lines. The two tests are conducted for Jordan and the two inflation targeters.
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Figure 4: : Jordan: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of rediscount and
loan
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Figure 5: : Jordan: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of rediscount and
deposit
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Figure 6: : Jordan: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of repo and loan
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Figure 7: : Jordan: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of repo and deposit
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Figure 8: : New Zealand: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of TB-30
and housing
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Figure 9: : New Zealand: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of TB-30
and deposit
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Figure 10: : New Zealand: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of TB-60
and housing
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Figure 11: : New Zealand: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of TB-60
and deposit
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Figure 12: : UK: CUSUM test for the symmetric model of CD and lending
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Figure 13: : Jordan: Alpha parameter constancy test for rediscount and loan
Test of Beta(t) = ’Known Beta’
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Figure 14: : Jordan: Beta constancy test for rediscount and loan
156
Alpha 1 (R1-model)
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
-3.5
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5 DDEPOSIT
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00 DREDISCOUNT = 0
Figure 15: : Jordan: Alpha parameter constancy test for rediscount and
deposit
Test of Beta(t) = ’Known Beta’
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Figure 16: : Jordan: Beta constancy test for rediscount and deposit
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Figure 17: : Jordan: Alpha parameter constancy test for repo and loan
Test of Beta(t) = ’Known Beta’
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Figure 18: : Jordan: Beta constancy test for repo and loan
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Figure 19: : Jordan: Alpha parameter constancy test for repo and deposit
158
Test of Beta(t) = ’Known Beta’
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
X(t)
R1(t)
5% C.V. (3.84 = Index)
Figure 20: : Jordan: Beta constancy test for repo and deposit
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Figure 21: : New Zealand: Alpha parameter constancy test for TB-30 and
housing
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Figure 22: : New zealand: Beta constancy test for TB-30 and housing
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Figure 23: : New Zealand: Alpha parameter constancy test for TB-30 and
deposit
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Figure 24: : New Zealand: Beta constancy test for TB-30 and deposit
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Figure 25: : New Zealand: Alpha parameter constancy test for TB-60 and
housing
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Figure 26: : New Zealand: Beta constancy test for TB-60 and housing
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Figure 27: : New Zealand: Alpha parameter constancy test for TB-60 and
deposit
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Test of Beta(t) = ’Known Beta’
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Figure 28: : New Zealand: Beta constancy test for TB-60 and deposit
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Figure 29: : UK: Alpha parameter constancy test for CD and lending
Test of Beta Constancy
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Figure 30: : UK: Beta constancy test for CD and lending
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Appendix D: Average Inflation and Conditional Standard
Deviation
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Figure 31: Jordan: Average Inflation and Conditional Standard Deviation)
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Figure 32: Egypt: Average Inflation and Conditional Standard Deviation)
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Figure 33: South Africa: Average Inflation and Conditional Standard Devia-
tion)
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Figure 34: Brazil: Average Inflation and Conditional Standard Deviation)
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Figure 35: Poland: Average Inflation and Conditional Standard Deviation)
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